Sri Lanka - Articles

The Sri Lankan snap elections, slated for 2 April 2004, is significant for several reasons. 6024 candidates are in the fray for 225 seats of which 196 are to be directly elected. An all-time high of 2337 independents are contesting, signifying dissatisfaction with the established political parties.

This is also the first time that Buddhist monks in large numbers have decided to contest. Monks in politics are not new. In 2001, Ven. Baddegama Samitha Thera won a parliamentary seat, the first after independence. Earlier, in 1931 a Buddhist monk was nominated for the State Council. Now numerous Bhikkus are contesting under their own party – Jathika Sangha Sammelanaya (JSS). Many members of the clergy have thrown in their lot with the ultra-nationalist Hela Jathika Urumaya (formerly Sihala Urumaya). Despite their denouncement by the Mahanayakas of Malwatta and Asgiriya chapters (the official Sangha), 260 monks are contesting for 150 seats. The main justification for their involvement is to “infuse morality in politics, which is not there,” but it is feared that their entry would worsen the current situation by bringing party politics into the Sangha and widening the ethnic divide. Ultra-fundamentalist Ven. Soma’s death and the consequent anti-Christian sentiments will probably be capitalized upon for political advantages. But this will reveal interesting results in the Christian belt of Western and the Buddhist strongholds in Central and Southern Sri Lanka.

For the first time, the Janatha Vimukthi Permuna (JVP) has joined an alliance led by a national party (SLFP). The new alliance, now recognised as a political party (United People’s Freedom Alliance – UPFA), is expected to be a strong pole against the centre-right UNP-led United National Front (UNF). Although in power, the UNF does not control key ministries (Defence, Interior, and Communications). Hence, it is difficult for the Ranil Wickremasinghe government to use the official machinery for electoral advantage to balance the anti-incumbency factor.

The Muslim parties are in disarray. Without any strong party of their own, they now have four factional groups to split their votes. After Ashraff’s death the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC) faced a vertical split between Ashraff’s wife and party stalwart Rauf Hakeem. In 2002, another faction left the Hakeem’s SLMC to form the Ashraff Congress. Later, a splinter group left the Ashraff Congress to form the Muslim National Alliance. Overall, due to their disunity, the Muslim parties may lose ground to the national parties.

The situation regarding the Tamil parties is equally murky. TULF has split after the party veteran Anandasangaree’s leaving the party. This, apart from the rebellion in the LTTE on regional lines, has weakened the Tamil National Alliance’s chances of sweeping the Tamil dominated areas in the north and the east. At the same time, TNA may better its 2001 score since people from the LTTE-controlled areas will be allowed to vote this time. However, the Tamil electorate is more confused than ever.  None of the Tamil parties have a clear plan for the settlement of the ethnic crisis. As far as parties belonging to estate Tamils are concerned, they are better placedâ€â€�without splits and ambiguities.

Given this complex pre-poll scene, it is not hard to assess the post-poll situation. If UPFA comes to power, as predicted by a recent opinion poll, the dominant issues of the Island – ethnic and economic – will get reexamined. On the ethnic question, it has no plan of action except to state that it would “negotiate with the concurrence of all parties concerned.” The Alliance is divided on economic development. While the SLFP has abandoned its socialist policies in favour of a free market economy, JVP stands for indigenization. It is not clear which system would be finally adopted. On the political front, the Alliance has promised to abolish the Executive Presidency and proportional representation system. But such promises are difficult to fulfill unless it gets a two-thirds majority, which is unlikely.

If the UNF forms the government it has greater chances of taking the peace process forward and sustaining the economic development. However, this will not be smooth sailing. Firstly, the government will have to cope with cohabitation problems for at least a year and a half till President Kumaratunga’s term ends in December 2005. Secondly, it is not clear how the UNF government will accommodate the Karuna faction in the peace talks without annoying Prabhakaran. The Muslim situation has further deteriorated, posing greater challenges to the process. If the electorate exercises its franchise without proper thought, it will be voting in a bleak future.