Do ballots avoid bullets? In
Sri Lanka
both go together; violence has become the normal element in all political processes. The electoral violence during the recent elections was unprecedented. Between October 20 and December 14 (election announcement to government formation) there were 2362 major incidents of violence including 56 deaths, 112 cases of attempted murder, 29 abductions, 51 lootings and 215 acts of arson. This averages 43 incidents per day. While wide spread violence occurred throughout the island the worst affected districts were
Kandy
, Gampaha, Kurunegala, Matara, Nuwara Eliya and Kegalle.
Electoral violence assumes different forms in
Sri Lanka
: preventing competing parties from campaigning, fight for poster space, rigging, threats, murder, attacks, preventing opposition supporters from reaching polling booths, chasing out opponent polling agents, seizing voters lists, ballot stuffing, theft of polling cards and attack on the defeated by the victors. Though these forms of electoral violence exist in most third world democracies, what is unique about
Sri Lanka
is its entrenchment. Till 1970 these electoral malpractices did not posses violent overtones. However, flagrant mismanagement of the 1970 elections was the turning point, when post-election violence surfaced for the first time; its intensification began in 1977 when electoral violence became all-pervasive—pre-election, during voting, and post-election. From then on there was no turning back.
One school of thought points out that Sri Lankan society possesses “a powerful ideological understructure of political violence” because of chandiya, feudal notions of punitive justice for wrongdoings, including ‘seven tortures’. But, such claims are contestable as Sri Lankans are basically a peace loving people, so the reasons lie elsewhere. The current electoral violence can be largely attributed to the gradual militarisation of Sri Lankan society. The two JVP uprisings (1971 & 1987-89) and the ongoing Tamil militancy have totally transformed both the Sri Lankan state and its society. Now violence has become part of its political culture. This has become a justification for the state to issue arms to ministers and members of parliament. In addition, the hands of the security forces have been strengthened by the passage of several draconian laws. This has only fuelled the violence—ethnic and electoral—as the island’s forces are unable to balance excessive power with its objective use.
Experience and evidence shows that the ruling party is the worst culprit in perpetrating electoral violence, by misusing the security apparatus to gain electoral advantage. Consequently, the opposition resorts to illegal means to “empower” itself. The scene is thus set for Army deserters, who desert with sophisticated weapons and make money either by selling them or committing crimes like robberies and extortion. Army deserters also act as security guards for politicians and spread fear among voters, polling agents and election staff. The political bosses also look for underworld help to supply arms and men. This support is on a reciprocal basis, as the underworld requires political patronage to sustain its drug and hooch trade.
The economic dimension of electoral violence in
Sri Lanka
is also worth noting. Control public office allows control of public resources. When a party wins it tries to occupy the entire civil and political space by placing its appointees in all possible posts under the state. This ensures that they are obligated to serve the interests of the appointers. The fear of losing the attendant benefits makes them desperate to see that their party wins the elections by any means.
The prevalence of violence is also due to the insensitivity of the political leadership towards casualties on their side. The concerned parties, on the other hand, try to gain sympathy votes from their dead and injured. This is evident by the funeral processions being decorated with party flags and cutouts instead of photographs of the dead.
The preferential system of voting has also resulted in intra and inter party rivalries. Candidates of the same party compete for preferential votes in a particular electoral district; hence, violent clashes between supporters of different candidates of the same party are common. At the inter-party level, parties seek as many votes as possible; hence intimidation is common.
Regarding post-election violence, supporters of the winning party vent their anger on the defeated ones. This type of violence creates its own “memory banks” and the victimized wait for an opportunity to avenge their long nursed grievances when possible. And the cycle of violence goes on.
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