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Sri Lankan Ceasefire: The Geneva Talks

Much expected talks at Geneva between the LTTE and the government of Sri Lanka (GOSL) is over. It is exactly after four years of signing the ceasefire agreement (CFA) that both parties met on 22-23 February to deliberate on its "smooth implementation". Despite various fundamental differences, the final outcome was moderately positive on two aspects: reiteration of two parties to abide by the CFA and decision to meet again in Geneva on 19-21 April 2006.

The joint statement issued at the end of the talks read "the GOSL and the LTTE are committed to respecting and upholding the Ceasefire Agreement, and reconfirmed their commitment to fully cooperate with and respect the rulings of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM)." On its part, the LTTE committed itself "to taking all necessary measures to ensure that there will be no acts of violence against the security forces and police." The government team promised to undertake "all necessary measures in accordance with the CFA to ensure that no armed group or person other than Government security forces will carry arms or conduct armed operations." In short, both sides reiterated what they had agreed four years ago. However, given the acrimonious opening statements made by both teams at the beginning of negotiations, such a final outcome can be considered positive.

In its inaugural statement, the government team termed the CFA as "contrary to our Constitution and law" and "prejudicial to the sovereignty and the territorial integrity of the Republic of Sri Lanka." It charged that the "LTTE had taken undue and unfair advantage of the ceasefire to strengthen its military capability" due to "inherent weaknesses in the existing ceasefire agreement as well as the lacuna in setting out norms for its effective implementation." The expectation, therefore, was to "rectify certain grave anomalies arising from the agreement." But, in its opening remarks the LTTE considered the CFA was the "most constructive achievement" of the Norwegian peace process and "the foundation upon which the process has to be built". It charged the Sri Lankan armed forces for "arbitrarily" killing "109 Tamil civilians" "with the active assistance of the Tamil paramilitaries" during the four years that the CFA is in operation. Given these diametrically opposite initial stands the negotiations were expectedly arduous to the extent that the LTTE team once even threatened to walk out of the talks. But, thanks to pressure from the international community there was some congruity in the end.

Acceptance by both parties to meet once again at the same venue in April is a welcome development. Whether the forthcoming round would turn out to be constructive or not depends on how far both stakeholders convert commitments into realities. Present trends, however, are not encouraging. Firstly, the GOSL surprisingly claimed that the joint statement issued at the end of negotiations was in fact an "amendment" to the existing CFA. Did the GOSL actually believe in this statement, or was the statement merely to pacify Sinhala nationalists at home? The GOSL is on the defensive to Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna's (JVP) charge of dumping the 12-point MoU signed between President Mahinda Rajapakse and JVP in September 2005. The MoU inter alia sought "reworking" of the CFA and arrive at a final solution of the ethnic issue within the framework of an unitary state. Meanwhile, the Karuna faction has refused to disarm asserting "No one can impose their will on us to take them [arms] from us, which we use only for defensive purposes." It is also not a good idea for the security forces and intelligence wings to pack Karuna and his men home. In short, GOSL confronts an uphill task.

The LTTE has its own dilemmas. The LTTE may not involve itself directly in attacking security forces. But, it may continue to use its "invisible hands" of 'Upsurging People's Force' to perpetuate violence especially in Jaffna peninsula. The LTTE may also find it difficult to terminate its targeted assassinations, intimidations and conscription. Tigers would continue to keep their suspicions alive especially on paramilitary activities.

Overall, both parties have their own problems in abiding to the commitments made at Geneva. It is here that the role of SLMM becomes crucial. Drawing inspiration from joint statement at Geneva, the Monitoring body should be more assertive and proactive instead of just receiving complaints on ceasefire violations. More emphasis should be given to the activities of the local monitoring committees at district level. They not only are well informed of ground realities, but are more amenable to confidence building between the two groups. If trust is built upwards from this level, the next round would certainly witness some progress towards larger issues.