Sri Lanka - Articles

Sri Lanka's human development index is the highest in the region. However, it continues to be wracked by the longest and bloodiest conflict in South Asia. The death toll during 2006 is estimated between 3,000 - 5,000 and the total count since the beginning of the conflict could exceed 70,000. Despite the likely renewal of cease fire, the end to the conflict is not in sight. Given the high number of human casualties and displacements, it is surprising that the "war" in Sri Lanka seems to have been forgotten in the wake of other flash points of inter and intra state conflict in South Asia.

The current round of fighting has been the bloodiest since the announcement of the official cease fire in 2002. The famous birthday speech by Prabhakaran in November 2005 indicating plans to consolidate the guerillas' hold over the territory they govern in the north and the east began another period of blood bath, dubbed 'Ealam IV' by many observers. Its opening phases were marked by typical LTTE tactics - suicide attacks targeting political, military, civil society leaders and the Sinhala and Muslim populations, as also attempts to control the sea lanes to Jaffna. Meeting some success, the LTTE extended the conflict to control the waters in Muttur near the strategic port of Trincomalee. However, the defection of the Karuna faction in the east and strong retaliation by Sri Lankan armed forces, that have substantially improved their fire power with the induction of multi barrel rocket launchers and Kfir jets from Israel, put the guerrillas in a defensive position.

The Tigers then attempted to open another front against the garrison in Jaffna, shelling the air port and sea routes in attempts to rush the defensive positions. Here too, the armed forces successfully repelled their attacks. Buffered by their success against the Tigers, the Sri Lankan Army extended its operations towards Killinochchi - the Tiger heart land. This move led to calls for cease fire by the LTTE. Preliminary indicators suggest that fighting has stopped and the modalities of implementing peace, initiated by the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM), though greatly weakened by the withdrawal of monitors from the European Union are being reworked.

The fact remains that cease fire in Sri Lanka rarely implies lasting peace. More often than not, it heralds another period of suicide attacks, deep penetration and sea borne raids by both parties. This prospect becomes more likely with the increased use of air power by the government forces. The impasse in Sri Lanka is due to the inability of either side to bring the conflict to a conclusive end, and the lack of interest by the principal stake holder in the region, India, in ending the conflict.

An economic crunch due to heavy military expenses and frequent economic disruptions due to the conflict has made the Sri Lankan government heavily dependent on donors. It was the threat of discontinuing economic aid that led the government to accept the cease fire much against the wishes of its military commanders. Despite the induction of air and ground fire power and renewed vigor, the Sri Lankan forces lack the capacity to overrun LTTE positions and reunite the country by force. On the other hand, the LTTE continues to rely on sneak raids and surge tactics for it does not possess adequate conventional fighting capability in terms of fire power, man power and training to extend its area of influence.

While there are numerous external stake holders in the conflict including the powerful donor lobby led by Japan, they lack the political clout to bring both parties to the negotiating table. In such a situation, India's assiduous policy of keeping itself away from island politics is only prolonging the struggle. While the Indian position may have been acceptable in the past, recent developments require a change in Indian policy.

There now appears to be a greater willingness on both sides for a political solution. The key issue remains greater autonomy versus Ealam. In light of the loss of control over much of the eastern area to the Karuna faction, the ban by the European Union and depleting support abroad, the intransigence of the Tigers may have become so whittled as to accept greater autonomy as a realistic option. In such a situation, Indian mediation conducted behind the scenes, as in the case of Nepal, could well prove to be the need of the hour. This opportunity must be utilised so as to prevent the LTTE from recouping in the interregnum.