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Sri Lanka: Prospects of Proposed Talks in Geneva

Amidst intense fighting the Government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE have agreed for talks in Switzerland on 28-29 October 2006. While the government has placed a seven-point agenda, the LTTE has set a condition that military operations should stop before agreeing on the modalities of talks. The prospects of good results from the forthcoming talks look bleak at the outset.

Backed by aerial bombardments by K-fir jets, the Sri Lankan Army is engaged in advancing the forward defence line (FDL) in the north along Muhamalai-Kilali area. Before the talks, the government forces will try to push its FDL beyond Elephant Pass, which it lost to the LTTE in April 2000. The attempt is to gain as much military advantage at the negotiating table. The aim of the Tigers is exactly to stall this military advance and in turn prevent government from securing high ground at the talks. The efforts of the LTTE, in this regard, are both at military and diplomatic levels. Militarily, the Tigers are giving stiff resistance to hold advancing Sri Lankan Army resulting in numerous casualties on both sides. The casualty figures may increase many times over if the present moves and counter-moves continue aimed at the Elephant Pass. Diplomatically, the LTTE is urging the international community to allow Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) members to gain access to the area. In addition, it has warned that it may withdraw from the talks "any time" if the present military operations persist. Interestingly, both sides are claiming the present hostilities as "defensive moves" and, at the same time, accusing the other for "aggression".

With the present military advantage on the ground, the government has set a seven-point agenda for talks. The government wants to focus on "core issues" that include "democracy, multi-party system, pluralism, human rights, child recruitment, development of the northeast, and devolution." Colombo clearly stated that it did not "want to be trapped within talks about the ceasefire agreement." The LTTE is yet to react on this. The militant group, however, may not agree for taking-up "core issues" at this stage. It will insist, as in the recent past, on effective implementation of the ceasefire agreement (CFA). Tigers' immediate aim is to get a respite from the military operations and regroup. It is prepared, at this juncture, neither to fight a "final war" nor to go for "final talks". The government, at the same time, is not willing to lose this chance.

An appropriate agenda would be to single out 'development of northeast' as the main focus. This should include rehabilitation and resettlement of nearly 800,000 internally displaced due to the war, rebuilding of infrastructure like schools, hospitals, roads and rail links, telecommunications etc, ensuring livelihood for the people belonging to the entire area, and clearing mines. The LTTE cannot object to such a humanitarian agenda. These development activities, however, require a suitable atmosphere and an appropriate mechanism. A new CFA should replace the existing one to maintain an atmosphere devoid of any violence. The present document has become controversial enough to undergo euthanasia. Similarly, both parties must try and evolve a joint mechanism for planning and executing development activities. It is easier said than done given the history of failure of PTOMS (Post-tsunami Operational Management Structure) evolved to take care of tsunami rehabilitation in the northeast. However, it is not an impossible task if both sides are motivated by interest of the ordinary people affected by the devastating war.

Instead of taking-up a whole lot of issues at one go and failing on everything, is it not prudent to take one matter at a time and keep succeeding? What is required at this juncture is a good confidence building measure to square-off 'trust deficit' that is immensely evident between the two antagonists. Talks should be used, and not misused by one party to demonstrate "insincerity" of the other. The prospects of upcoming talks depend entirely on the priority of the parties in using or misusing the opportunity.