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Sri Lanka: Five Years of the Ceasefire Agreement

The Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) in Sri Lanka completed five years on 22 February 2007. At this juncture it is pertinent to look at whether the CFA has achieved its stated objectives of "bringing an end to the hostilities, improving the living conditions and restoring normalcy for all inhabitants of Sri Lanka, whether they are Sinhalese, Tamils, Muslims or others" and of finding "a negotiated solution to the ongoing ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka."

Under Norwegian facilitation, the government of Sri Lanka (GOSL) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) signed the CFA on 22 February 2002. A separate body known as the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) was created to monitor the CFA. The ceasefire paved the way for six rounds of talks between the GOSL and the LTTE. The CFA also enabled opening of the A-9 highway - the only land route linking Jaffna peninsula with the rest of the island - enabling social re-linking between the North and the South. It undoubtedly provided the longest spell of no-war conditions and in turn gave much hope to the affected civilians. The ceasefire also gave an opportunity to the outside world to have a glimpse of hitherto fortified LTTE-controlled areas.

The benefits, however, were short lived as the CFA fell apart in due course of time. The six rounds of talks ended in failure. The two parties could not implement even temporary measures agreed during these rounds of talks. Tragically, even Norway has been unable to bring the two parties together to sustain the CFA and secure safety of the Monitors. Presently the CFA is alive, but only on paper. The situation can best be described as "undeclared war" characterized by high casualties, humanitarian strife and large scale displacement. There are various reasons attributed to the failure of the CFA.

There were certain compulsions that led both parties to go for a CFA in 2002. By the end of 2001 there was a "hurting stalemate". Both parties realized that they could not hope to win and looked for an opportunity to stop the fighting. Realizing also that it should act responsibly in the post 9/11 period, the LTTE first announced a unilateral ceasefire in December 2001. The new government under Ranil Wickremasinghe, which came to power that month on a "peace wave," reciprocated with a formal agreement. These conditions, however, later "withered away."

Instead of putting in place confidence building measures during the ceasefire period, both parties indulged in weakening the other. Effectively using free access provided by the CFA, LTTE intelligence and hit squads penetrated government-controlled areas for selective assassinations. Some of the high profile victims included Lakshman Kadirgammar, Foreign Minister, Lt. Gen. Parami Kulatunga, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army, Maj. Muthalif, of Army Intelligence, Lt. Col. T. Rizvi Meedin, senior Military Intelligence official, and several undercover operatives. On its part, the government, with the help of Tamil paramilitary groups and 'Deep Penetration Units,' knocked out some key LTTE leaders. The government also was successful in weakening the LTTE by weaning away Karuna, one of the longest serving commanders of the LTTE. Karuna's dissidence remains a severe blow to the Tigers. It is only after Karuna's split in March 2004 that ceasefire violations started going up. However, according to independent observers, violations committed by the LTTE have always been substantially higher than the GOSL. Sluggish socio-economic rebuilding of the devastated Northeast, especially after the tsunami, increased the distrust.

At the structural level, the CFA ignores the issue of arms control thereby encouraging both conflicting parties to arm themselves. The SLMM was not empowered enough to prevent ceasefire violations. Its role was restricted to 'naming and shaming' of the parties rather than to make parties abide by the Agreement. Given the wide mandate of the CFA, the powers of the SLMM were too minuscule. Unsurprisingly, over a period of time, the SLMM attracted disregard from both conflicting parties. Also in due course, both the GOSL and the LTTE developed serious disagreements on interpretation of the CFA. Disagreements ranged from the movement of LTTE cadres with/without arms in the government controlled areas to the dismantling of high security zones, implementation of the Prevention of Terrorism Act, disarmament of Tamil paramilitary groups, and so on.

To make the CFA successful, it is important to correct the above lacunae. It is perhaps appropriate to abrogate an agreement that has not worked and replace it with a new one. However, the lessons of the past five years must be incorporated in a new agreement. The key lesson is that any kind of CFA will fail if the parties do not abide by its provisions.