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#2033, 7 June 2006

Sri Lanka: Co-Chairs Conference & Peace Efforts

N Manoharan
Senior Fellow, IPCS

The Co-chairs of Sri Lanka's donors - the European Union, Norway, Japan and United States - met in Tokyo on 30 May 2006 to reinvigorate the stalled peace process in Sri Lanka. The comprehensive statement by the 'Gang of Four', issued at the end of the meeting, touched on all aspects of peacemaking in the Island.

The statement insisted that the LTTE "must re-enter the negotiating process…must renounce terrorism and violence…must show that it is willing to make the political compromises needed for a political solution within a united Sri Lanka." In that case, "the international community will respond favourably to such actions; failure to do so will lead to deeper isolation of the LTTE."

Similarly, the statement said the "Government must show that it will address the legitimate grievances of the Tamils…must immediately prevent groups based in its territory from carrying out violence and acts of terrorism…must protect the rights and security of Tamils throughout the country and ensure violators are prosecuted…must show that it is ready to make the dramatic political changes to bring about a new system of governance which will enhance the rights of all Sri Lankans, including the Muslims." Doing so, "the international community will support such steps; failure to take such steps will diminish international support." The Co-Chairs encouraged "the Government of the Sri Lanka to further develop concrete policies for addressing the grievances of minorities and for building mutual confidence between different communities."

The 'Gang of Four' was concerned that both parties failed to deliver upon, including the commitments made at their meeting in Geneva in February 2006. The statement observed that the escalating violence has "led to a breakdown of law and order and the terrorization of the affected population." It rightly pointed out that the "international community can only support," but peace "can only be delivered by Sri Lankans themselves." In this regard, the four countries suggested that both parties recommit to the "principles set down in the Ceasefire Agreement, the decisions from the six rounds of talks, and the meeting in Geneva in February 2006." Finding solutions "requires political commitment, imagination and spirit of compromise and the responsibility for this lies solely with the Government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE."

The Co-Chairs identified three key elements of involvement of the international community in the Sri Lanka peace process: facilitation by Norway, the monitoring role of the SLMM, and substantial aid flows from the Co-Chairs and a multitude of donors. The four donor countries reiterated their "support for the important role of Norway as facilitator to the peace process and the ceasefire monitoring activities of Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) in an increasingly difficult situation." They emphasised the necessity "to examine how to strengthen the role of SLMM" and the importance of "continuous and positive involvement of the UN, Red Cross, and civil society, including the NGOs, in the peace process." The statement called both the Government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE to "ensure their protection so their positive work for Sri Lanka can continue."

Given the clarity and perceptiveness of observations with undercurrents of deep understanding of the current state of affairs, the statement can be considered as an important 'policy statement' on the Sri Lankan peace process in the current situation. It can undoubtedly be taken seriously as a basis by the stake-holders of peace in Sri Lanka to move forward. If the LTTE thinks that the international community is of late tilting more towards the Sri Lankan state, it should read this statement to clearly understand where the international community stands vis-à-vis the Sri Lankan crisis. It is true that the US' leanings are not so friendly to the LTTE and the EU is moving towards that direction too, but the neutral positions of Japan and Norway might have acted as a moderating influence on the statement. Thus, given the objectivity and fairness of observations made, the statement is unlikely to be unacceptable to both parties. It is about time that both parties grab the opportunity with the help of 'supporters of peace' identified by the Co-Chairs to settle the issue than to miss it once and for all.

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