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SLMM: Challenges to Ceasefire Monitoring in Sri Lanka

Sri Lankan refugees trickling into Indian coasts denote that all is not well in the island. Despite the Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) and a Monitoring Mission to oversee it, violence has escalated to significant proportions, especially after the LTTE's split in March 2004. What is the mandate of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM)? Why could it not prevent the spiralling violence when its aim is to "prevent and diffuse escalation"? Is the outbreak of violence due to a lack of commitment of the parties to the basic principles of the agreement?

Article 3 of the CFA stipulates setting up of an international monitoring mission "to enquire into any instance of violation of the terms and conditions of the Agreement." In order to implement this, the Head of SLMM issued an 'Operation Order' codenamed HERMES, which gives a short introduction to the current situation, the mission of SLMM and how the head of the SLMM intends to execute the mandate. Accordingly, SLMM operates offices round the clock in the six districts of Jaffna, Trincomalee, Batticaloa, Amparai, Mannar and Vavuniya apart from its headquarters in Colombo and a Liaison Office in the LTTE-controlled Killinochi. Sea violations are monitored by specific teams stationed at Jaffna and Trincomalee. The SLMM consists of members from the five Nordic countries - Norway, Sweden, Finland, Denmark and Iceland. They are all accorded the same immunities and privileges as diplomatic agents under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 18 April 1961. In addition, there are Local Monitoring Committees (LCMs) in each district to "deal with issues related to the implementation of the CFA, and to inquire into incidents and alleged violations of the CFA, seeking to resolve any dispute at the lowest possible level." Each LCM consists of five members, two appointed by the government, two by the LTTE and chaired by one SLMM monitor. The SLMM is the final authority regarding the interpretation of the CFA.

Despite these multilayered arrangements the SLMM could not prevent escalation of violence is a cause for major concern. The eastern parts in particular are a challenge when it comes to monitoring. The attack on the Batticaloa SLMM office and temporary withdrawal of monitors from the Trincomalee districts due to the unmanageable situation there are two recent examples. Three actors are responsible for incidents involving ceasefire violations. The LTTE launches sporadic attacks on the security forces and the paramilitary groups opposed to the Tigers. Although the LTTE denies its involvement claiming them as "people's attacks," evidence suggests otherwise. Similarly, the government forces are also responsible for violent incidents in the name of retaliatory attacks or security measures. The most worrying aspect, however, is the involvement of armed groups aligned with the security forces, and the criminal elements hiding behind the conflict.

The resulting situation is muddled, affecting the people, especially of the East. No wonder that a majority of the complaints are from the general public despite risks involved in lodging complaints. In 2005, the SLMM ruled 519 violations by the LTTE and 41 by the government; in 2004 the figures were 845 and 20 respectively; in 2003 the LTTE violated the CFA 1,113 times, while the government breached it 49 times; for 2002 the figures were 994 and 52 respectively. Thus, since the CFA came into place, the LTTE violated it 3,471 times as against 162 times by the government. But, it is not clear how violations by the paramilitary groups are accounted. The very magnitude of violations indicates failure on the part of actors to enforce self-discipline. Ironically, the SLMM has not been taken seriously; monitors are at times threatened and even attacked. If the two parties comply with the CFA sincerely, the job of the monitors would be easy.

At the structural level, the SLMM is insufficiently empowered to discharge its responsibilities. The monitoring appears "cosmetic"; the body exists just to monitor violations and make suggestions. Most importantly, the SLMM could do little to mitigate the increasing distrust between the government and the LTTE. Therefore, it is required to upgrade the powers of the SLMM to give it more teeth to deter violators. If such upgradation demands review of the CFA, then the parties concerned should not hesitate to do so. The SLMM is still inaccessible to many Sri Lankans; its role and functions are not clearly understood; and the media has so far not been "friendly". This has resulted in a gap between the monitors and the people. This aspect has to be addressed immediately. The more the Monitoring Mission closes the gap with the masses, higher are its chances of success.