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The much awaited annual “Hero’s Day” speech of the LTTE chief Prabhakaran was delivered on 27 November 2003. The speech forms a significant document in outlining the Tigers’ views on important issues. This year’s dominating theme was the constitutional crisis arising out of the November 4 moves of President Chandrika Kumaratunga and its implications on the peace process.

“President’s Take-over”

To Prabhakaran, “President’s take-over of the Ministries of Defence, Interior and Media… has resulted in the de-stabilization of the state and the peace process has come to a standstill.” The temporary withdrawal of Norway from its faciliatory role was also effected by the political deadlock in the south. On the whole, “Tamil speaking people and the international governments are disappointed…” According to the LTTE chief, the two reasons put forward by Chandrika for her interventionâ€â€�“military build-up by the LTTE threatening the national security and sovereignty of Sri Lanka” and “too many concessions to the LTTE provided by the UNF government”â€â€�were unacceptable.

The feelings of being side-lined and plebiscitary politics were the actual reasons behind Chandrika’s moves rather than out of concern for security. Inter-party tussle, what Prabhakaran called “typical historical pattern of political bazaar drama” was dealt in the concluding portion of his speech but not logically linked with the constitutional crisis. Tamils could have been the losers out of this “chess game”, but not the LTTE. The organisation grew in leaps and bounds, inter alia, as a result of Sinhala partisanship. Given this reality, the LTTE covertly celebrates the present political tussle, while overtly shedding crocodile tears.

“Ceasefire”

It was out of its “deep commitment to peace” that the LTTE “initiated ceasefire and observed it despite provocative actions by the armed forces”. However, the “ceasefire has not created conditions of peace and normalcy in the Tamil homeland.” He reasoned the presence of the Sri Lankan armed forces in the north for this. On the other hand, the south has reaped the benefits of ceasefire in terms of “total peace, normalcy and economic development”. The “LTTE also suffered severe losses during ceasefire by way of two merchant ships, several fishing trawlers and 26 Sea Tigers including senior commanders.”

It is true that the present ceasefire was initiated by the LTTE in December 2001. But it is beyond veracity that provocations were only from the armed forces. In fact, it was the LTTE which tested the patience of the government: set-up camps in the “cleared areas” in the name of political work, killed “informers”, organized protests that resulted in violence, and defied the ruling of the SLMM many times. Prabhakaran was also not entirely objective in his observation that “southern Sri Lanka reaped the benefits of peace”. Reopening of Jaffna-Kandy A-9 highway, lifting of economic embargo, and renewed economic activity in the northeast after a long time, gradual resettlement of displaced persons, and infrastructural developments in the region slipped the observation of the LTTE supremo. The loss of ships and lives were purely of the LTTE’s making though the Sri Lankan Navy could have managed the incidents in a more matured manner.

“Peace Process”

According to the LTTE chief, the peace talks “failed to make concrete progress”. “Resolutions and decisions made and structures evolved during the talks were not put into operation”. Instead of “addressing the more serious existential issues of resettlement of the displaced, reconstruction of the war damaged infrastructure, and the re-establishment of normalcy”, Ranil’s administration was “only interested in projecting the peace process to attract aid from donor countries to build up the economy and to set-up an international safety net.” This has “increased the intervention of several countries which actually complicated the peace process.”

Though the six rounds of talks failed to make any significant breakthrough, there are some achievements which are reflected on the ground. Peace is a prolonged and painful journey that demands immense patience. Expecting results overnight will not help the exercise much. The aversion to international pressure for peace was evident in Prabhakaran’s remarks. The involvement of international community has not complicated the process as he claimed, but in fact aided it to move forward. If the LTTE is sincere in negotiated settlement, there is nothing to complain about international involvement.

“A Final Solution”

Having realised the “impossibility of bringing a final solution to the ethnic issue immediately within a short period, an interim administrative structure was necessary to address the urgent humanitarian needs, issues of resettlement, rehabilitation and reconstruction and other complex problems faced by the people of the northeast.” In this regard, their “ideas were put forward in a clear and comprehensive form after wider consultations.” Prabhakaran reiterated that the “LTTE proposal was not a framework for a final solution, but for an interim arrangement and a basis for negotiations.” He claimed the draft framework “has progressive, constructive and original elements.” But, it was “criticized by the Sinhala racist forces, media and Indian political analysts as a threat to Sri Lanka’s sovereignty.” He concluded by warning secession by “invoking the right to self-determination if the Sinhala chauvinistic ruling elites continue to deny the rights of our people and oppose reconciliation and if the conditions of oppression continue.”

Prabhakaran’s assurance, that the LTTE’s proposal was “not final” but only a “basis for negotiation” is to be appreciated. However, doubts continue to persist. What if the “needs of the people” of the northeast are not realised through the interim arrangement? While talking in terms of accommodation of Tamils by the Sinhala majority, why did he fail to mention the accommodation of other minorities like Muslims in the northeast? His concluding remarks warning Sinhala chauvinistic ruling elites on secession might be taken as LTTE’s hidden agenda of separation. Such warnings will only strengthen the rightist forces in Sri Lanka without serving any other purpose.