Post-LTTE Sri Lanka: Demilitarization as a First Step towards Peace
N Manoharan
Senior Fellow, CLAWS, New Delhibr>
e-mail: mailtomanohar@gmail.com
Under President Mahinda Rajapakse, the Sri Lankan government’s approach towards the long simmering ethnic issue rests on “four D’s” - Demilitarization, Democratization, Development, and Devolution. Under demilitarization, the primary objective of the government was to defeat the LTTE and break its network – both internal and external – completely. Although the Tigers have now been defeated, about 1,000 of them are still at large. Fear of slaughter or disappearance is perhaps making these scattered Tigers fall back; the common refrain is “if death is the result of surrender, then fight and die rather than get caught and die.”
A good rehabilitation package will certainly attract those Tigers at large who are keenly watching the status of their surrendered colleagues. Providing alternative livelihood opportunities to those already surrendered (9,000 according to the government) will go a long way in convincing these LTTE cadre on the run. Child soldiers among the surrendered are segregated and put in under a separate rehabilitation process while the status of the rest remains ambiguous. The government could certainly be more transparent in this aspect. Given the economic situation of the country, providing suitable employment to the demobilized LTTE cadres is not going to be an easy task. In this regard, the international aid agencies are the only hope. Sri Lanka Donor Conference countries including the US, the EU, Japan and Norway can play a leading role by also roping in India.
Demilitarization should also logically include demobilization of excess government soldiers. The strength of the Sri Lankan Army at the peak of the war was 200,000. Since the war is over, the government may not require such a large force to hold territory captured from the LTTE. However, instead of demobilizing excess soldiers the government is actually planning to increase military strength by 50 per cent (that is, by adding 100,000 more). If the strength of the Navy and Air Force is added, the total military personnel after the proposed increase would be 350,000. In other words, there will be one military person for every 60 civilians, perhaps among the highest military-population ratio in the world. The justification given is that the extra service personnel are required to take care of reconstruction of the war-ravaged north and east. The fact of the matter, however, is that the Rajapakse government does not want to take chances with the LTTE, which has a history of bouncing back from worse defeats. Yet, another reason is the government’s fear of violent social consequences if thousands of highly trained battle-hardened soldiers are demobilized all of a sudden. The Sri Lankan military bureaucracy also does not want to lose its relevance and importance with the termination of the ethnic war.
It is also unfortunate that Colombo is seriously considering setting up of ‘high security zones’ (HSZs) in Kilinochchi and Mullaithivu districts as it did in Jaffna and Trincomalee districts. HSZs in the Tamil-dominated northeast of Sri Lanka were created mainly to protect military camps, strategic installations, and the lifelines of the security forces from LTTE attack. HSZs in the Jaffna peninsula encompass 18 strategic military installations, covering about 190 square kilometers, and led to displacement of and economic hardship for nearly 130,000 people. Those displaced live either with relatives or in refugee camps. Apart from this, there are large tracts of agricultural land in these zones, depriving many farmers of their livelihood. About 16,027 farming families have been affected. Given the fact that Jaffna has a long historical tradition of land use, the people wish to keep their own land and houses they have inherited. Similarly, HSZs were created in eastern Sri Lanka. Such a move would not only deprive the displaced of their places of origin, but would also perpetuate the ‘fear of the uniform.’
Demining is yet another aspect of demilitarization. As former LTTE-controlled areas are heavily mined, any resettlement of the internally displaced will only be possible after demining of these areas. Several demining teams including four from India have been working tirelessly in sanitizing the conflict areas for resettlement. Given the tediousness of demining, India could work in unison with other international actors to increase the pace of the process. The US and Japan have offered a grant of Sri Lankan Rs.3.2 billion to the Lankan government for demining in the Mannar District. Belgium has also offered to help in technical, training and equipping Sri Lankan security forces in the demining process. India should convince some more countries to come forward to help, but directly, in demining remaining areas of the Northeast. This will go a long way in resettling the displaced Tamils in their original homes.
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