The recent clashes between the ‘First minority’, Tamils, and the ‘Second minority’, Muslims, in Eastern Sri Lanka has again brought into focus the strained ethnic relations in the island state.
The incidents were shocking considering two major developments in the Tamil-Muslim relations. Firstly, the LTTE has tendered an apology to the Muslims for the violence perpetrated against the community in the 1990s. Their ideologue, Anton Balasingham, admitted recently that the ethnic cleansing committed by the Tigers was a “political blunder” and “could not be justified”. Secondly, the LTTE in the Hakeem-Pirabaharan joint statement (13 April 2002), apart from recognizing them as a separate community, welcomed Muslims displaced in the 1990s from the Northeast and exempted them from tax collection.
What factors have led to inter-community violence?
· The shadow of the past continues to haunt the two communities. Despite linguistic unity, economic interdependence, similar social organisation and geographical coexistence, history is full of divergent interests between the two communities. Tamil leader Ponambalam Ramanathan in the 1880s argued that Sri Lankan Muslims were Tamils differing only in religion to thwart separate communal representation for Muslims; they contested this strongly and asserted their separate ethnic identity. The Muslims were upset by the Tamils’ pro-Sinhalese stand during the 1915 Sinhalese-Muslim riots.
In the post-independence period, Muslims adopted the “politics of pragmatic adaptation” to further their community interests. This was due to two factors. Firstly, in the absence of their own political party, Muslims cooperated with Sinhalese national parties to get representation in the government. They ended up supporting important Sinhalese-sponsored legislation like the Citizenship Act (1948), Sinhala Only Act (1956), and Standardisation of University Admissions (1972), which the Tamils saw as designed to repress them. In return, the Muslims got concessions by which they advanced rapidly. Even after the formation of Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC) in 1981, majority of Muslims living in Sinhala-dominated areas continued to favour Sinhala parties due to scattered demography and the perception of SLMC as the party of eastern Muslims. Secondly, the domination of Tamils in the administration and education in the initial years after independence was resented by the Muslims; the only way to break their domination was to join the Sinhalese.
The LTTE tried to revive the ‘Ramanathan theory’ in the 1980s to:
· Maintain contiguity of their Eelam covering Northern and Eastern provinces, where around 500,000 Muslims live.
· Recruit Muslim youth for their cadre-starved organisation.
But the Muslims refused to identify themselves with separatism not only to avoid straining relations with the Sinhalese, but also due to the inherent fear of becoming a ‘minority within a minority’. Inter-community relations reached a point-of-no-return in 1990 with the LTTE-forced exodus of Muslims from
Jaffna
peninsula and subsequent massacres, kidnappings for ransom and extortion by the Tamil militants. This radicalized Muslims and led to the emergence of Muslim armed groups with the help of the state.
· Muslims are resentful of being sidelined by the Government-LTTE MoU signed on 23 February 2002. The only mention of Muslims occurs in the Preamble and as “not directly party to the conflict”. They have no guarantee for their security during the ceasefire period while the LTTE cadres are being gradually allowed to move freely in the eastern and northern non-LTTE areas. The MoU is also silent about what lies in store for the Muslims in future, especially with 100,000 displaced Muslims languishing in the northwest.
· The eastern Muslims have not overcome their fear of LTTE’s highhandedness despite assurances from Pirabhaharan. They have little confidence in their deputy ranks and cadres. In a controversial interview to The Daily Telegraph, the LTTE political chief of Batticaloa, Karikalan, denounced Muslims’ land rights in the northeast.
Considering this backdrop, it is of the utmost importance for the LTTE to address some of the basic grievances of the Muslims. They have three basic expectations viz., security, wellbeing and preservation of their identity. The top leadership of the LTTE should ensure that the lower ranks respect the commitments made in the agreements. On its part, the government must provide security to the Muslims. It is about time that steps for bringing back the displaced Muslims and rehabilitating them are taken. But, before that, the situation on the ground must be brought under control. In any future settlement of the ethnic issue, Muslims’ land rights, employment, political and administrative representation must be guaranteed. Ignoring this might result in the birth of another secessionist movement.
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