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#2099, 24 August 2006

Mission Impossible: Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission in Crisis

N Manoharan
Senior Fellow, IPCS
e-mail: mano@ipcs.org



The Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM), established to monitor the ceasefire agreement (CFA) signed on 22 February 2002, is in a deep crisis. The CFA is being violated in every way by the two signatories - the Government of Sri Lanka (GOSL) and the LTTE - despite a ceasefire being in place. The present situation can best be described as "undeclared war" with more than 1000 killings since January this year. Present volatile circumstances suggest that a full-scale "declared" war is not far away. The predicament of the SLMM is mainly due to structural shortcomings in the CFA itself and challenges posed by the "parties" to the Agreement.

Structural Deficiencies

The SLMM charter is detailed in Article 3 of the CFA. The principal mandate of the SLMM was to "enquire into any instance of violation of the terms and conditions" of the CFA. The Monitoring Mission was given the task of "conducting international verification through on-site monitoring of the fulfillment of the commitments" as entered into the CFA." To perform this task both parties were bound to "ensure the freedom of movement of the SLMM members" and give "immediate access to areas where violations of the Agreement were alleged to have taken place." But, in case the Monitors were denied access by either or both sides, the Agreement was silent on follow-up action by the SLMM. The Parties, therefore, did whatever was in their interest without bothering about the CFA. Even if access was permitted, the Monitors could not go beyond 'naming and shaming' violators by recording and publicizing the violation. There was no provision in the CFA for any kind of preventive action even if the SLMM came to know of a possible violent act beforehand.

Similarly, as per Article 3.2 of the CFA, the Head of the SLMM "shall be the final authority regarding interpretation" of the Agreement. But the CFA did not grant corresponding powers to dispense this huge responsibility of "interpretation" to the SLMM chief. Since the interpretation was not binding, it was easy for the parties concerned to disregard the "ruled violations" as "biased" or "faulty". The number of violations thus ran in the thousands and were disclaimed by both parties.

Problematic "Parties"

The characteristics of the violations suggest that the two concerned parties have little regard for the CFA and in turn the SLMM. For instance, Article 1.2 that details military operations - "firing of direct and indirect weapons, armed raids, ambushes, assassinations, abductions, destruction of civilian or military property, sabotage, suicide missions and activities by deep penetration units; aerial bombardment; and offensive naval operations" - has been violated many times despite the Monitoring structure being in place. The main objective of the CFA, especially as laid down in Article 1.2, is to act as a "means to establishing a positive atmosphere in which further steps towards negotiations on a lasting solution can be taken." Since the final aim of a "lasting solution" is not clear in the minds of both the GOSL and the LTTE, the "means" are disregarded.

The latest crisis in the SLMM was triggered by the LTTE in response to the EU ban in May 2006. The LTTE insisted that post-ban Monitors from EU countries-Denmark, Sweden and Finland-must leave the SLMM as their impartiality on the matter is questionable Tigers initially gave one month and later three months for the EU monitors to wind-up. From 1 September 2006 the SLMM will be left with only 20 monitors as against the original strength of 56 in spite of hectic parleys from Norway and Switzerland to break LTTE obduracy. The SLMM found neither new countries nor new monitors from the existing two countries (Iceland and Norway). It is unfortunate that at this hour of deteriorating conditions in the Island, two-thirds of the Monitors are moving out of Sri Lanka.

Yet, another concern for the SLMM is the safety of the Monitors. Though the Operations Order (HERMES) clearly mentions that "safety and security for SLMM personnel are imperative" it was not an issue till the SLMM office at Batticaloa came under attack in January 2006. The concern became serious with the attack of the LTTE on a Sri Lankan transport ship with SLMM Monitors on board in May 2006. The Monitors lost hope when the Sri Lankan Air Force continued aerial attacks in Muttur area despite the presence of SLMM personnel in August 2006. The LTTE also categorically stated that it cannot guarantee the safety of Monitors from EU countries beyond 1 September 2006. Considering this, there is a growing demand from the SLMM itself that Norway withdraw all Monitors by calling-off the Mission. But, by pulling out  of the Mission, Norway might indirectly give an excuse to both parties to convert  the present "undeclared" war into a declared one. Presently, the presence of the SLMM has no meaning, except to demonstrate Norway's perseverance with the mission.

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