As the Sri Lankan Army is consolidating its position in the north, the leaders in
Colombo
are busy finalising the proposed Constitutional reforms. Thus, a two-pronged strategy of ‘war for peace’, and ‘consensus for peace’ is being simultaneously waged by the Government to end the ethnic crisis. However, there seems to be a stalemate on both fronts.
The two main political groups—PA and UNP—could not agree on the transitory provisions viz., to shift from the presidential to a parliamentary system. While the PA insists on five years, the UNP wants the change to be consummated with immediate effect. Differences also exist on the mandate of the present Parliament to pass the constitutional reforms. Unlike the Government, the Opposition feels that the required approval should be accorded by the new House, which will include the mandate of about one million new electors. There is also no consensus on how the present package should be presented to Parliament. While the Government is committed to present it as a new constitution, the UNP wants the document to be laid as a White Paper. The UNP is now demanding its presentation to both the LTTE and the Buddhist clergy, knowing well that they will reject it outright. As the Government was adamant, the UNP has withdrawn from the ‘historic’ agreement it reached with the Government on July 31. The history of Liam Fox agreement on bi-partisan consensus has repeated itself!
Knowing that the island state requires political stability to carry forward the peace process was it prudent to rush through with the
Westminster
model? Is the main Opposition not aware that waiting will only allow the Sinhalese hardliners to campaign vigorously against devolution in the coming elections and campaign against any reforms? Is not the idea of presenting the reforms in the form of a White Paper tantamount to evading the issue? By these moves, the main Opposition has proved that ‘party first and nation second’ is its sole principle.
At the other end, the moderate Tamil parties have expressed disagreement on the structure of the state, land control, merger of North and East by a referendum, and formation of an Interim Council during the interlude. They view the present structure of the state as diluting the 1995 draft, which provided for a “Union of Regions”. As far as control of land in the provinces is concerned, the minority parties want land to be under provincial control to avoid “ethnic colonisation” and consequent demographic change, as happened in the past. The Tamil parties also fear that the present provision for merger of North and East after ten years if conditions are conducive will be a farce as the merger provided for in the Indo-Lankan Accord of 1987 never came into effect. They also argue that the ethnic composition of the Interim Council is only a repetition of the Donoughmore formula of 1931, which was a failure.
On the far right, the Sinhalese hardliners and the LTTE have rejected the Bill. Buddhist clerics, the JVP and the newly floated Sihala Urumaya have refused any kind of devolution in the name of constitutional reforms. The “too late, too little” argument of the Tamils is countered by “little now, more later” policy. In other words, the Sinhalese fear that though the regional councils sound “little now” (devolution), it would turn out to be “more later” (disintegration) in the future.
The LTTE considers the present devolution package as ignoring the basic right of the Tamils to nationhood and self-determination, as articulated in the Thimpu Declaration of 1985. It was “only a skeleton of the original package, sucked of all its flesh and blood”. The LTTE feels that no reforms will work until Sri Lankan Tamils get a separate state.
At the judicial level, the Supreme Court has ruled on August 3 that the package be provided to the countrywide referendum after its passage by Parliament. The Government faces a shortage of around 10 votes in the 225-member House for a two-thirds majority. This is assuming that all the Tamil parties vote with the Treasury Benches, which is not certain. Given the strong protests from the influential clergy and the popular right wing parties there is every possibility of the Constitution being rejected by the people in the referendum.
Given these numerous obstacles, the only possible way to avoid these difficulties is to withdraw the Bill from Parliament and extend the life of the House to buy time and draft fresh reforms. In this new exercise all the parties concerned—Buddhist clergy, moderate Tamils, Opposition parties and, if possible, the LTTE—should be taken into confidence unlike the piecemeal discussions undertaken in the present exercise. No doubt, it will be a long drawn out exercise. But once agreement is reached, it will be a long-lasting one.
Facebook
Blink
Del.icio.us
Digg
Furl
Google
Simpy
Spurl
Y! MyWeb
