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#1205, 10 November 2003
 
Constitutional Crisis in Sri Lanka: One Move, Many Stalemates
N Manoharan
Research Officer, IPCS
 

Plebiscitary politics has once again come to the fore in the Island’s politics. Citing the “security of the country”, President Chandrika Kumaratunga sacked three ministers of the present UNF government, prorogued Parliament and imposed island-wide emergency (but later withdrawn). The Supreme Court of Sri Lanka has also endorsed the constitutional validity of her act. Her latest step could have been constitutionally right, but the following questions needs to be answered to test its sagacity. What made the President to act so when the Prime Minster was out of the country? Why media minister was sacked when the national security was the primary concern? What was the need to prorogue parliament when the budget session was a week’s away? Why at that juncture when there were signs of revival of peace process with the submission of counter-proposals by the LTTE? What was the need to do so when the economy was slowly limping back to normal?

President’s stated reasonâ€ “in the interest of the security of the nation”â€ was vague. If the threat perception was from the LTTE what did she do to counter that threat after taking over the ministries of Defence, Interior and Information? What is being done to stop the LTTE from augmenting its military capability? Status quo, however, continues on the ground despite sweeping powers given to security forces. The President has so far not disclosed her plans for addressing the security of the Island nation Respect for ceasefire agreement and commitment to negotiations were, indeed, spelled out. But, how far and in what manner, it is not clear. Not in the distant past till her People’s Alliance lost power, the President had determinedly been pursuing “war for peace” programme so as to settle the ethnic issue. Given this fact, irrespective of the roadmap, it is highly unlikely that the LTTE agree to negotiate with Chandrika’s team. Though the President has stated that she has “no intention of resuming or provoking the resumption of violence” the potential for armed confrontations between the security forces and the LTTE remain higher than before. In all probability there are more chances for war than for peace; in which case the security scenario might deteriorate sharply.

What will happen to the economy, which has been on the recovery path, in that case? Within 48 hours of the imposition of emergency the share values in Colombo stock exchange lost to a tune of about $712 mn. Fearing resumption of violence most investors have lost confidence. Over 2000 tourists cancelled their booking in a day. It is going to be tough to wean them back even if the present crisis gets dissipated. The Island’s economy is not in a position to withstand another war. Given the level of unemployment and discontentment among the youth another war and the consequent negative economic growth might lead to civil unrest like the one witnessed by Sri Lanka during 1988-89. 

 It is also worth asking how far Chandrika’s actions were democratic. She was elected directly by the people in 1999 through democratic means. So was the UNF government in 2001. In a participatory democracy, the latest mandate of the people counts. The point is whether the President considered this aspect before suspending Parliament. The UNF coalition still commands absolute majority in the 225-member house making it difficult to bring in a no-confidence motion against it. The only other option the President has is to dissolve the present parliament and announce fresh elections. But, the present electoral prospects are not in favour of President’s People’s Alliance. It is also impossible for the UNF coalition to get a two-thirds majority to impeach Chandrika. Seeking a fresh mandate could be an option, but given the proportional electoral system there are more chances for the present stalemate to continue even after the elections. In that case is it judicious to go in for costly elections? Forming of a “government of national reconstruction and reconciliation” could be a good alternative. Such formation, however, has its own problems. Such a government would not last long and would crumble due to its own contradictions. When there are differences of opinion even on the basic aspects of governance, how is the “grand alliance” going to approach the complex ethnic issue? The better way, therefore, for the President at this moment is to leave the government to function on its own. At the same time, Ranil Wickremesinghe’s government may benefit by consulting and not just informing, the President on every move especially on the peace talks. The present government’s approach towards the peace process is more or less same as Chandrika’s in the mid-1990s. There is no issue that remains unresolved if the two parties come together, which is a possibility, keeping in mind the interest of the country as a whole rather than personal or party interests.

 
Article by same Author
IPCS Debate: The UNHRC Resolution on Sri Lanka

Devolution in Sri Lanka: The Latest Take

‘Taming the Tigers’: Reintegration of Surrendered LTTE Cadres

Fishing in Troubled Waters: Indian Fishermen and India-Sri Lanka Relations

Alternative Strategies for Indo-Sri Lankan Relations: Passenger Ferry Service

Sri Lanka: UN Panel and Sovereignty Issues

Sri Lanka: One Year after the War, Where is Ethnic Reconciliation?

Sri Lanka: Why Sustain the ‘State of Exception’?

Upcoming Parliamentary Elections and the Future of Sri Lanka

Challenges Before the President

Ghosts of War Haunt Sri Lanka

Sri Lanka: Clash of ‘War Heroes’

Cross-border Nationalism

Where is the “Northern Spring” in Sri Lanka?

Will the LTTE Rise Again?

Post-LTTE Sri Lanka: Demilitarization as a First Step towards Peace

Post-LTTE: India’s Policy Options on Sri Lanka’s Ethnic Issue

Sri Lanka: Cease the Fire and Catch the Peace

Sri Lanka in 2008: A Tale of Two Fires

The LTTE: 'Determined to Fight, but Ready for Peace'

Eelam War IV: Military Strategies of the LTTE

Eelam War IV: Strategy of the Government of Sri Lanka

Fishing in Troubled Waters: Tamil Nadu Fishermen and India-Sri Lanka Relations

Eastern Provincial Council Elections: A First Step Towards Final Settlement?

Local Polls in Batticaloa: How Significant?

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