Sri Lanka - Articles

In his 2004 Hero's Day speech, Prabhaharan touched upon various issues ranging from the present situation of the Tamils, peace talks with the previous UNF government, reasons for its stalemate, need for an interim set up in the Northeast, LTTE's proposals on the Interim Self-Governing Authority (ISGA) and reactions to it from various quarters, the status of past agreements between the Tamils and the Sinhalese, and, finally, the LTTE's choices if the peace talks were not resumed unconditionally at the earliest.

Considered as the LTTE's policy outline for the next one year on the ethnic issue, Prabhaharan's speech brings three main issues to the fore:

Stalemate?

The present stalemate is described as "critical and complex", but politically a "void". It is a situation of negative peace with great uncertainty, but it is not true that the LTTE has gained nothing from the stalemate. The ceasefire has helped the LTTE to intrude across the Island; to eliminate informers and dissidents; to undertake taxation and extortion in the whole of northeast often violating the ceasefire agreement. Such activities, unfortunately, have strengthened the Sinhala hardliners who argue that ISGA would only institutionalize the present violence. The Tigers, instead of complaining about the stalemate, could have undertaken welfare activities, at least in the areas under their control, with the resources available. Would that not have brought "peace dividends" to the Tamils? It could also have turned the tide of international support in Tiger's favour. There is an urgent need, therefore, for the Tigers to prove that if an interim arrangement is established the funds that flow in would not be used for war efforts.

The UPFA government is equally to blame for the present impasse. One of its main constituents-JVP-does not want any conditions like ISGA to be the basis for talks. President Chandrika wants a two-track approach - simultaneous talks on an interim set-up and permanent solution - which is unacceptable to the LTTE. Since the LTTE has agreed to flexibility on ISGA during the negotiations, there is nothing wrong in accepting ISGA as the basis for talks, but with the condition that any permanent solution must be based on federalism, as suggested in the Oslo Agreement in December 2002.

Here comes the crucial role of the international community. It is for the first time that the international community has been involved both extensively (Japan, US, UK, India and Norway are now involved) and intensively (facilitation role by Norway and consultation role by Japan). Without these catalysts, the two sides would continue to remain inactive. The importance of this factor is evident in Prabhaharan's address, which had the world as his audience.

Doubting Thomas?

Prabhaharan accuses the Sinhala polity for the lack of "maturity and magnanimity or the political sagacity to understand and accept the fundamentals of the Tamil national question." Colombo, indeed, has gone back on its promises in the past. Vote bank politics continue to guide the two main political constituents - PA and UNP - now joined by the JVP. The lack of bi-partisanship on the ethnic issue is another hindrance in arriving at a viable solution. The southern parties, especially the UNP and the SLFP, have to acknowledge these facts. On its part, the LTTE has to accept the ground realities in the South as much as it expects the Sinhala polity to understand the North. The Tigers were partly responsible for pushing Chandrika to consort with the ultra-nationalist JVP. If the LTTE is uncomfortable with the present political configuration in Colombo, with whom is it going to negotiate? It tried with the UNP, but unsuccessfully.

Prabhaharan's address also brings out his doubts at the macro level. For instance, his reasons for demanding an interim arrangement are confusing. At one place, he states that he wants to address the existential needs of the suffering Tamils; in another place, he bases his ISGA demand on the conclusion that the Sinhala political leadership would "not be able to offer a reasonable permanent solution to our people"; in yet another place, he says he is ready to discuss a permanent solution. With such persisting doubts, it is difficult to move forward. He has to be clear.

War Clouds?

Does Prabhaharan mean resumption of hostilities when he said "we have no alternative other than to advance the freedom struggle of our nation"? Perhaps. But, he cannot face the ire of the international community. Without consolidating the East, he knows it would be a disaster to restart armed hostilities. The Tiger chief knows that it was the threat of the appalling consequences of war that brought Colombo to the negotiating table; hence, the veiled threat. At the same time, given Prabhaharan's resolute attitude, his message can not be dismissed as mere "barking"; this "barking" could be a warning before "biting", if the present stalemate continues.