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#527, 19 July 2001
 
A Tale of Two Decisions
N Manoharan
Research Officer, IPCS
 

Consciously or unconsciously July has become an eventful month in the history of Sri Lanka . On July 10, 2001, the Sri Lankan President, Chandrika Kumaratunga, prorogued the Parliament till September 7, and announced a referendum to be held on August 21 on the need to have a new Constitution. The two moves are important events. 

 

 

While the first decision was expected, as it was one of the possible alternatives available to the President for breaking the impasse caused by the post-SLMC withdrawal of support, the decision on the referendum took everyone by surprise. The clubbing together of both these moves was seen as “illogical”. The Opposition, especially the UNP, criticized the decisions as “authoritarian” and a “death blow to democracy”. True. But, before condemning the moves it would be appropriate to understand the compulsions leading to the present situation.

 

 

When a faction of the Sri Lankan Muslim Congress (SLMC) under Rauf Hakeem withdrew support from the government, reducing it to a minority, the government was left with four options to sustain itself in power:

 

 

1. to get the support of the JVP or at least its abstention during the no-confidence motion;

 

 

2. to form a national government comprising the opposition UNP (on the Israeli model);

 

 

3. to dissolve the House and call for fresh elections; and 

 

 

4. to prorogue the Parliament to buy time.

 

 

The JVP was unlikely to support the government; forming a national government was not feasible given the polarity between the ruling PA and the opposition UNP; the President cannot dissolve the Parliament till October 10—one year after its constitution. This left the government with only the option of prorogation. 

 

 

Though Chandrika reasoned that the decision was taken keeping in mind the “welfare of the people”, it is not difficult to understand that this was indeed to buy time to regain the lost majority. But in the current political situation, even the ruling party members are not confident of getting the required number of votes when the House reassembles after September 7. In this situation what are the reasons that the President will give to exercise a second prorogation? Assuming that the present government gets a majority how is the President going to proceed with “welfare measures” and “stabilize the progress”? What is the certainty of its continued survival for the rest of its term?

 

 

Here comes the logicality of the “illogical” second decision. The government is sure of getting an overwhelming number of ‘ayes’ in the referendum. Even the Opposition is aware that it is hard for people to say no to the question: “Are you in agreement with the proposal that the country needs a new Constitution, which is a nationally important and essential requirement?” While all crave for a change in the present Constitution, disagreements on ‘what to change’ also abound. This is exactly the problem. In case it gets a majority in the referendum, the government is planning to convert the present legislature into a Constituent Assembly to enact a new constitution. It can also prove to the Opposition that it has a massive mandate and the present instability is solely due to the ‘defective’ electoral system. But, it is this motive which is most disturbing. It is true that a referendum is the only way to bring about the necessary reforms as it is impossible for any party to get two-thirds majority in the present electoral system. It is also true that the President had to exercise this option after patiently attempting to pass a new constitution through the Parliament for the past six years. However, what is disagreeable is the use of the referendum to save the government rather than bring about necessary reforms. Moreover, given the grim economic situation will the island’s economy be able to bear the Rs. 600 million extra expenditure? 

 

 

What if the people vote ‘no’? Certainly it will be a great embarrassment for the government and for the President herself. In such a situation the President can neither save her government nor bring about the required changes in the Constitution.

 

 

Both the ruling and Opposition parties have to understand the complex social and economic conditions in the country and stop taking the people for granted. The Opposition is not justified either in attempting to destablise the present government for which the people gave mandate not more than a year ago, or in continuously blocking the reforms that are imperative to move the country forward. The government should also desist from using the authoritarian provisions of the present Constitution of which it was a bitter critic once. 

 

 

 

 
Article by same Author
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Devolution in Sri Lanka: The Latest Take

‘Taming the Tigers’: Reintegration of Surrendered LTTE Cadres

Fishing in Troubled Waters: Indian Fishermen and India-Sri Lanka Relations

Alternative Strategies for Indo-Sri Lankan Relations: Passenger Ferry Service

Sri Lanka: UN Panel and Sovereignty Issues

Sri Lanka: One Year after the War, Where is Ethnic Reconciliation?

Sri Lanka: Why Sustain the ‘State of Exception’?

Upcoming Parliamentary Elections and the Future of Sri Lanka

Challenges Before the President

Ghosts of War Haunt Sri Lanka

Sri Lanka: Clash of ‘War Heroes’

Cross-border Nationalism

Where is the “Northern Spring” in Sri Lanka?

Will the LTTE Rise Again?

Post-LTTE Sri Lanka: Demilitarization as a First Step towards Peace

Post-LTTE: India’s Policy Options on Sri Lanka’s Ethnic Issue

Sri Lanka: Cease the Fire and Catch the Peace

Sri Lanka in 2008: A Tale of Two Fires

The LTTE: 'Determined to Fight, but Ready for Peace'

Eelam War IV: Military Strategies of the LTTE

Eelam War IV: Strategy of the Government of Sri Lanka

Fishing in Troubled Waters: Tamil Nadu Fishermen and India-Sri Lanka Relations

Eastern Provincial Council Elections: A First Step Towards Final Settlement?

Local Polls in Batticaloa: How Significant?

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