Southeast Asia - Articles

Driven by a common understanding of international politics and shared interests, India has developed strong political and strategic relationships with the Vietnam-centric Indochina countries during the last fifty years. While some of the basic premises and objectives of India's Indochina policy have remained the same, the methods and strategies have seen major modifications since the late 1990s. Three major developments seem to have figured in the diversification and strengthening of India's Indochina strategy - the inclusion of Indochina into ASEAN, India's emphasis on reviving its existing constituencies in the ASEAN and China's growing presence in the Bay of Bengal. The objective here is to highlight the continuity and change in India's Indochina policy, as it stands today, while discussing its premises and supportive strategies.

The basic premise of India's Indochina policy still remains Vietnam-centric and maintaining the strategic partnership with Vietnam forms its central objective. The bulk of India's trade and defence supplies have gone to Vietnam. Second, China remains one of the most important reference point for strategic engagement with Indochina and it has gained new momentum in the context of the rising power of China. Reflecting India's discomfort over China's growing strategic presence in the Indian Ocean, India's Defence Minister, George Fernandes declared in 2000, during his visit to Vietnam that India's strategic interest extended from the northern part of the Arabian Sea to the South China Sea. In April 2007, India conducted bilateral and trilateral naval exercises in the South China Sea and the Pacific Ocean and its naval forces also conducted naval exercises on their own in the South China Sea. Third, the idea of 'getting connected' with the region has led to greater emphasis on both land-based and sea-based communication linkages with an emphasis on linking India with the whole of mainland Southeast Asia. Fourth, greater defence, trade, maritime security engagements have figured in India's Indochina policy. Finally, India's cooperation with other Indochina countries - Cambodia and Laos has been primarily cultural and developmental in nature.

While pursuing these objectives, India has adopted a multi-pronged approach to its Indochina policy, which until the 1990s was carried out only at the bilateral level. The main objectives of India's bilateral approach had been to develop intense security, defence and strategic cooperation without creating any type of alliance system, disentangle bilateral relationships from sub-regional and regional complexities, and explore the potential for cooperation with a particular country, be it Cambodia, Laos or Vietnam.

A major shift from bilateralism in India's strategy of engaging Indochina countries is characterized by 'Sub-regionalism with a regional outlook' and developing greater cooperation with them. In pursuit of these policies, Mekong-Ganga Cooperation was formed in November 2000 with the special emphasis on developing communication through air, rail and road links and capacity building of the CLMV (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam) countries. Furthermore, in an attempt to demonstrate geographical proximity, promote connectivity, especially road transport and create public awareness of India-ASEAN relations, the Indian government launched an India-ASEAN Car Rally in 2005 in which the Indochinese countries also participated.

Capability-building is another important component of India's Indochina policy. In its support for the 'Initiative for ASEAN Integration,' India has established Entrepreneurship Development Centres in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos, to train and develop the next generation of Indochinese entrepreneurs and strengthen small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in the sub-region. In order to develop greater ASEAN-wide communicational links, India has also declared its support for developing the ASEAN e-Network Project establishing a VSAT-based Tele-Education and Tele-Medicine Network to connect Cambodia-Laos-Myanmar-Vietnam (CLMV).

However, a closer scrutiny reveals a huge gap in policy pronouncements and the actual steps taken, which are extremely limited, ad-hoc and of an over-cautious nature. Indian hesitancy in developing a long-term strategic partnership even with Vietnam has been very conspicuous in the absence of any strong content in defence agreements and any roadmap about how to further strengthen its presence in the sub-region. Despite the request for 'friendly prices,' Indian defence hardware and spare parts have unusually high price quotes compared to other market sources of Vietnam such as Russia, Belarus and Ukraine. Moreover, defence deals have often fallen victim to bureaucratic procrastination and payment-related problems. In terms of key components of maritime cooperation, India's engagement in the Indochina region is not, in any substantial way, more than its engagement with countries like the Philippines and China. India's trade relations with Vietnam have remained marginal till date and heavily in favour of India. Despite robust economic growth of 7-8 per cent in both the countries, the total value of India-Vietnam trade stood at only US$1 billion in 2006. The bureaucratic and procedural delays in India's trade sector and problems in payment have always acted as major de-motivating factors for Vietnamese exporters.

There is an urgent need to translate the rhetoric of political cooperation into meaningful and substantial economic and defence linkages by reducing the gaps between policy declarations and implementation. Vietnam cannot be taken for granted and wishful pronouncements are not a replacement for positive policies. Unless these approaches change Vietnam may yet become another lost opportunity for India.