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#3240, 21 September 2010
 
Political Instability in Nepal-I: Internal Divisions and Integration of Maoists
Arun Sahgal
Consultant, IPCS
 

Nepal continues to be in the midst of political instability. Not only are the political parties at odds with each other, but also remain fragmented from within, with various factions attempting to promote their own agenda. Within the UCPN (Maoists), Mohan Baidya supports people’s revolution, Baburam Bhattarai favours a more pluralistic and democratic policies, while Prachanda occupies a ‘vague middle ground’ between the two. People’s revolution started in the first week of May by the Maoists to mobilize popular support for toppling Madhav Nepal’s government, did not meet with much success and had to be abandoned.

Within the Nepali Congress’s (NC), there is an ongoing struggle for the leadership - a three cornered contest between the acting President Sushil Koirala, former Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba  and senior leader Bhim Bahadur Tamang.  On the other hand ULM remains faction ridden between Party President Khnal led pro-Maoist group and nationalist led by KP Oli who refuse to have any truck with the Maoists. This has forced the party to abstain in the last four rounds of Prime Ministerial elections and today threaten the Party unity. Similarly, United Madhesi Democratic Front (UNMDF), a conglomeration of Madhesi parties is united only in name with different components puling in different directions.

Political deadlock in electing a new PM is further compounded by a crisis of confidence and a deep rooted mistrust between the democratic parties and the Maoists. The major issue is the sequence and manner of the closure of peace process, while additional problems include the nature and structure of the future government - Presidential, parliamentary democracy or in between (for example, executive President and elected Prime Minister on the lines of French model) and lastly the role of UNMIN. Every party wants to reach a conclusion on the above issues to their own advantage.

The closure of peace process involves rehabilitation and integration of erstwhile Maoist combatants; this includes handing over their control and management from the UMNIN to a Special Committee created for the their management, reintegration of erstwhile militant combatants into the Nepalese security forces including the Army and lastly return of properties illegally seized by the Maoist armed cadres called the Young Communist League. Further, the democratic parties do not want to hand over power to the Maoists under the shadow of the gun. Integration of Maoists combatants and disarming of YCL cadres is deemed to be the first step for a political reconciliation with the Maoists.

The Maoists demand that for the purposes of integration there should be one yard stick; either the recruitment norms applicable to the Nepalese Army or agreement on numbers to be inducted in which case selection norms do not apply. The Army and democratic parties on the other hand are clear that both the numbers and norms have to be decided before hand before there can be any talk on formation of consensus government. They are adamant that the Maoists cannot go back from the earlier agreed numbers which range from 3000 – 5000.

Neither the Nepalese government nor the all party Special Committee has any idea of numbers or the list of the Maoist Combatants lodged in the special cantonments. According to both the Nepalese Congress and UML the UNMIN has the list but does not share it with both the political parties and Special Committee. There are wild rumours that large numbers of Maoist Combatants have left the camps and the actual number is anything between 12000-14000 and certainly not the UNMIN and Maoist figure of 19,602.  Paradoxically despite this, Nepalese government has the onus of paying stipend and allowances to the 19,602 Maoist combatants. Under these circumstances present caretaker government blames UNMIN for bias and is not keen on extending the mandate of UNMIN beyond 15 September, though most likely it would be extended with some caveats.

The above mentioned situation is highlighted by the absurdity of Maoist position. Whereas at one level Maoists are a political party staking claims to form the Government, at another level, being party to Comprehensive Peace Accord, they interact directly with the UN and have offered a contrarian stand of extension of UNMIN mission without change in mandate for another six months. Government on the other hand is ready to extend the mandate but with a stipulation that Nepalese Army should not be under the proviso of UNMIN having conducted peaceful elections and should not be penalized for delay in closure of peace process.

In the above standoff both the EU and the United States are with the Maoists who do not want any change in the mandate and appear to have bought the Maoist argument. Nepalese Army on the other hand is livid having being confined to camps and cantonments strung all over the country with poor living conditions. This is becoming a serious issue exacerbating the standoff. The Maoist Combatants are enjoying much better living conditions in the UNMIN Camps.

 
Article by same Author
Constitutional Rumblings in Nepal: Three Scenarios

Operation Geronimo: A Game Changer for Pakistan's Military?

Engaging the Pakistani Military: India’s Gains

Political Instability in Nepal-II: Four Likely Scenarios

Implications of The Unfolding Situation in Nepal

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