Pakistan - Articles

The Sino-Pak nuclear agreement to build two nuclear reactors in Pakistan, reports of which surfaced earlier this year, was followed by much analysis and debate. The Chinese Premier’s recently concluded trip to Pakistan, where no mention was made of this issue, coupled with the October 2010 reports of Chinese assistance to help Pakistan build a new one-gigawatt nuclear facility and allegations that it would go well beyond the generation of energy, requires the strategic implications of this nuclear collaboration to be examined closely.

An immediate conclusion would be to see this deal as China’s strategic response to the Indo-US nuclear deal of 2008 which, though approved by the NSG, granted India some extraordinary exemptions. As a rising power, China wants to bend the rules for its ‘Israel’, as one Chinese diplomat chose to refer to Pakistan, in the same manner as the US arm-twisted for India, a non-NPT state, in the NSG. The Chinese move also hopes to counterbalance the increasing presence of the US in Asia, apparent from its forging of links with China’s neighbours, in pursuance of what Chinese authorities fear is a ‘policy of encirclement’. In addition, it would also work as a low-level deterrent against India, the emerging Asian nation with which China shares a number of disputes regarding boundaries and the Dalai Lama. China’s engagement with Pakistan is a geopolitical strategy that seeks to consolidate its regional and global predominance, and cannot be confined within a security narrative. By establishing closer ties with nations that are categorized as ‘failed states’ and are a source of concern for the US, such as Pakistan and North Korea, China is attempting to strategically upstage the US. 

Sino-Pak nuclear interactions have the potential to negatively impact the global nonproliferation regime and undermine the legitimacy of the NSG. The Indo-US nuclear deal was hardly a good precedent, and although the proceedings of the Sino-Pak agreement differ from those of the Indo-US deal on a number of counts, China will follow the same trajectory, thereby encouraging other non-NPT states like Iran to flout the NSG protocols. On the one hand, while the US and other NSG members will be able to register their objections, the absence of legal constraints will prevent them from actually obstructing Chinese nuclear exports to Pakistan. On the other hand, should the US decided to let it pass without any opposition, it will be indicative of long-term global nonproliferation goals playing second fiddle to short-term political compulsions. 

Both China and Pakistan have repeatedly stated that the deal is only for the peaceful generation of energy. However, the eventuality of this agreement leading to nuclear terrorism in Pakistan and its spilling over into the surrounding areas cannot be ignored. With an unstable civilian government at the helm of affairs, an arguably dormant nuclear black market and the nexus between Pakistani officials and insurgents, the likelihood of the theft of nuclear material for the construction of a dirty bomb is very real.

The agreement also heralds the ambitious scope of China’s nuclear programme. Reports state that within the next decade, China could very well be generating vast quantities of nuclear power, second only to the US. The Chinese nuclear programme’s growing prominence due to its emphasis on quick and inexpensive measures while admirable has alarmed the international community. For instance, the Chinese can construct a reactor in about four years, as opposed to six, which is the duration of a French construction. Added to this is its alleged proclivity to flout international norms, such as that demonstrated by the Sino-Pak agreement. There is thus increased US pressure on China to abide by NSG regulations. However, the speculation is that if pressed too hard, China might quit the NSG, isolating the Chinese nuclear programme from the global mainstream which could result in the emergence of a nuclear black market, with China at its core. This notion is a little problematic because China has expressly stated its wish to play an important role in global multilateral institutions, which suggests a distancing from the anti-status-quo posturing that characterized the Maoist era.  Also, following the same argument, it is difficult to imagine that a state which desires to be a ‘responsible stakeholder’, especially one whose control is all-pervasive, will allow spoilers like a nuclear black market to ruin its chances of global preeminence.

Despite several reservations, there is also a pro-deal argument. It urges that it may be better to have Pakistan function within the nuclear mainstream rather than outside it. For this to occur, China would have to play a major role in stabilizing Pakistan and use its influence to secure Pakistan’s nuclear establishment and assets. It may also be unwilling to defy international norms and could make the deal conditional on Pakistan’s acquiescence to an important nonproliferation issue, such as the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT). However, this perspective may not work for a number of reasons. China is the only nuclear-weapons state to have abstained from declaring its support to the FMCT, despite official statements made to the contrary. There is also the case of the Indo-US nuclear deal, which failed to elicit any compromises from India. Pakistan can use this to justify its refusal to make promises that might weaken its nuclear posture vis-à-vis India.