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#739, 26 April 2002
 
Referendum in Pakistan-I Rhetoric vs Reality
D Suba Chandran
Research Officer, IPCS
 

It was no surprise that General Musharraf announced a referendum to continue as President for the next five years. Why did he choose to opt for it when the military regime was given a deadline to organize general elections by October this year? What prevents him from contesting for the office of President after the provincial and national assemblies are elected? What are his stated reasons and real questions?

 

 

The Rhetoric: Carrying the reforms further 

 

 

In his 5 April 2002 speech, General Musharraf gave four reasons to remain President for the next five years – economic revival, good governance, poverty alleviation and political restructuring. 

 

 

The military regime believes it has significantly improved the economy. The fiscal deficit has come down from 7 percent to 5.2 percent of the GDP; foreign exchange reserves have increased from US $500 million to US $5.3 billion; the Pakistani rupee has stabilized vis-à-vis the dollar and remittances have increased by 15-20 percent. On good governance, the regime feels it has succeeded in bringing the law and order situation under control through a host of measures; efforts have been taken to regularize madrassa education and increase literacy. More projects have been introduced to alleviate poverty. Finally, on the issue of genuine democracy, the regime feels that holding local elections was the first and right step. Democracy needs consolidation, for which more time is needed by General Musharraf!

 

 

All these reforms are under progress; more time is needed to implement them and usher stability into Pakistan ; hence, Musharraf needs to remain at the helm of affairs to carry them on. The question posed by him to Pakistanis is, “What is my personal rule? Am I required for Pakistan ?” 

 

 

The Reality: Searching for Legitimacy 

 

 

The main reason for Musharraf to seek a referendum is to gain legitimacy for his rule, which has been criticized both inside and outside Pakistan . The changes undertaken by the military regime and planned in the administration have been criticized on this ground. 

 

 

Musharraf had two options before himself. The first is being elected by the Electoral College consisting of the elected representatives of the National Assembly, according to constitutional provisions. This is totally ruled out for the simple reason that elections need to be conducted for the National and Provincial Assemblies. General Musharraf prefers to be elected by the people before that, as he has to amend the Constitution making the office of President stronger vis-à-vis other democratic institutions. He also needs to institutionalize the role of the military, which may not be possible after the new members are elected to the National Assembly. The second option is to have a national government formed by a consensus reached with the political parties and getting himself nominated as President for a limited period with limited objectives. Reaching a consensus among the political parties is also totally out of the question; neither would any limitations of time or objectives be acceptable to General Musharraf. 

 

 

Hence he has chosen the safest but the least legitimate option to remain the President. 

 

 

Fear of pro-military parties not getting majority 

 

 

Musharraf is also aware that the pro-military parties and groups, in any future National Assembly, would not be in a position to provide him the necessary strength and support from within Parliament. Despite the failure of the Pakistan Muslim League (PML) and the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) in the past and Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif being outside the country, these parties are certain to perform much better than pro-military parties like the PML-QA, PTI and Millat Party. If the PML and PPP alongwith the Alliance for Restoration of Democracy (ARD), decide to contest elections together (somewhat unlikely), they could achieve a workable, if not absolute, majority in the Parliament and Provincial Assemblies, which runs counter to the wishes of the military regime. Hence powerful legal and constitutional checks need being devised to combat an onslaught on Parliament by these anti-military parties. A powerful President, backed by adequate constitutional and legal measures, would be the most desirable option before the military; for making these constitutional and legal changes, they need legitimacy.

 

 

Popular support

 

 

Musharraf is aware that the majority supports him, which is what made him opt for the referendum. The popular support for Musharraf can be interpreted as representative of the people’s wishes. 

 

 

Musharraf needs, in brief, legitimacy to make changes in the Constitution that would strengthen the powers of the President and institutionalize the role of the military. 

 

 

 

 

 

 
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