Pakistan - Articles

The idea of a ‘water war’ between India and Pakistan is being deliberately drummed up. In this regard, Pakistan is likely to pursue the following three strategies at national (within Pakistan), bilateral (with India) and international levels.

Strategy 1: Blame India for Pakistan’s Water problems
Internally, there is a serious problem in sharing the Indus Waters between the four provinces of Pakistan. This is made worse by the failure of two institutions - Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) and Indus River System Authority (IRSA) inside Pakistan. WAPDA is in charge of managing the waters and power sectors; many have questioned its efficiency to handle the growing challenges relating to energy and water. The IRSA, which is the apex body to share waters between the four provinces in Pakistan, is highly divided. The current debate, problems and perceptions within the IRSA, and how the provinces see this institution, will highlight the internal divide.

Sindh has been accusing Punjab of water theft; and is also against the Indus Waters Treaty(IWT). The government of Sindh has passed resolutions repeatedly in its Provincial Assembly (in most cases unanimously) against the IWT. These internal problems have an important impact on the IWT and Pakistan’s demand on the Indus Waters. The smaller provinces, though in principle are against the IWT, their real problems are against Punjab in terms of sharing the waters. This is why NWFP and Sindh (along with Balochistan) are against the construction of Kalabagh dam by Pakistan.

Pakistan, (read Punjab), is likely to accuse India for their internal woes in sharing the Indus Waters. ‘Blame India for Pakistan’s water woes’ project, Islamabad thinks, will considerably bring down the internal problems in sharing waters, and even unite the provinces. Besides the sincere doubts and apprehensions of the lower riparian; one can see a deliberate orchestration of water theft by India by certain mainstream and vernacular news papers, and jingoist talk shows by certain anchors.

Will the smaller provinces fall for this? Their primary problem will remain Kalabagh and not Baglihar. In other words, the primary concerns of smaller provinces in Pakistan will be the sharing of waters within, than the accusation of India stealing waters. Like Kashmir, IWT will remain a Punjabi obsession. This does not mean the smaller provinces will support India indirectly; they are against the IWT in principle and consider the signing of the Treaty as the original sin.

Strategy 2: Object to each and every Indian Project
At the bilateral level, Pakistan is likely to object to every Indian project, whether there is merit or not in their case. To be fair to Pakistan, one should understand the concerns and fears of lower riparian regions, which are universal. Beyond the trumped up feelings of India ‘stealing’ Pakistan’s waters, there is a genuine fear, that Pakistan will run dry. With an increasing population and the emphasis on agriculture remaining high, water is their most important concern. There is also a genuine fear within Pakistan, that India is not sharing all information that it could (in good faith) and it should (under the IWT obligations).

For the above mentioned real and imagined reasons, Pakistan is likely to object to each and every project, which India is likely to pursue on the western rivers. This would serve the following purposes; first, it would delay the project, thereby forcing India to respond to its objections and share more information. Second, this would address the internal audience within Pakistan; Pakistan cannot complain to its own people that India is the real culprit, without Islamabad making a formal complaint. The expectation is that India cannot afford to delay the projects; the political, energy and economic implication of delaying these projects will cost India dearly.

Strategy 3: Internationalize the Water Issue and Replace ‘Kashmir Issue’ with ‘Water Wars’

Finally, Pakistan is likely to flash the water issue at the international level, as ‘the’ most important issue between India and Pakistan, threatening the latter’s very existence. Pakistan would not hesitate to take the differences in sharing the Indus Waters to the neutral expert, as provided by the treaty. Though, this will delay the project and increase its economic cost in the long run, this is what Pakistan wants precisely. Irrespective of any negative verdict, Pakistan would not mind referring to the neutral expert, for the impact it will have on India. Consider the case of Baglihar on Chenab; how much time it took for India to get the verdict finally? And how much has the delay increased its cost, in terms of construction and also the energy production?

Pakistan is also likely to take the water issue at the international level and project it as having the potential to start the next round of war between the two countries. A Water War between India and Pakistan is already being discussed within Pakistan; unfortunately, today one finds references even in mainstream newspapers, on the possible use of nuclear weapons, if India denies Pakistan’s share. This (linking water and nuclear weapons) will catch the international attention, to pressurize India and Pakistan to work together. What Pakistan is likely to do is to replace the Kashmir issue (for which there is not much interest today at the global level) with water, to gain international attention.