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#843, 26 August 2002
 
Inside Pakistan III: Grand National Alliance
D Suba Chandran
Research Officer, IPCS
 

     A major event inside Pakistan during the week 12-18 August 2002 was the formation of a Grand National Alliance (GNA). It is on open secret that the GNA was formed with the full backing of the military regime. It was also in effect formed by the military regime, with the full backing of the parties comprising it, namely the Pakistan Muslim League (QA) led by Mian Azhar, National Alliance (including five minor parties), Millat Party of Farooq Leghari and some minor regional parties.

     This case is similar to the military’s creation of Islamic Jamhoori Ittehed (IJI) led by Nawaz Sharif in the late 1980s. The IJI was formed by the military (read ISI) with the objective of preventing Benazir Bhutto and her Pakistan’s People’s Party (PPP) from acquiring power. The GNA has been formed with the same single-minded objective.

     General Musharraf received intelligence reports in early March, that the PPP was poised to make a comeback. He is reported to have announced this in a corps commanders meeting after which he floated the idea of a referendum, making himself the President for the next five years. Recent reports informed the regime that the PPP would sweep the elections in Sindh and could form coalition governments in Punjab and NWFP. Hence, it became important for General Musharraf to counter Benazir or/and her PPP, for which the military regime under took a series of measures.

     First, a series of legal provisions were introduced which were clearly aimed at the PPP and Benazir Bhutto. Under the Political Parties Order 2002, Benazir Bhutto is not eligible to contest elections or hold office in any political party.

     Second, the regime tried to unite all the PML factions. It sent an emissary to negotiate with the Sharifs. The deal was that Shabaz Sharif would be allowed to return and lead the united PML against the PPP. The Sharifs rejected this deal as the animosity between PML (N) and PML (QA) was too great. It might be recalled that Mian Azhar along with the Chaudhurys of Gujarat split the PML (N) to form a new faction – Qaide Azam, after the military coup, and supported the military regime.

     When efforts to unite the PML factions failed, the military regime hoped that legal provisions would prevent Benazir Bhutto from being elected as the Chairperson of PPP. Though the PPP had elected Benazir as its Chairperson, it cleverly formed a new wing PPP-Parliamentarians (PPPP) led by Makhdoom Amin Faheem, to contest the elections. Since the PPPP cannot be legally barred from contesting the elections, it has started negotiations with the MMA and PML (N) to put up joint candidates against the PML (QA).

     Thirdly, the concept of joint candidates has jolted the military regime. Earlier it had hoped that there would be a quadrilateral contest between the PPP, PML (N), MMA and PML (QA), in which votes would get divided. These parties were also aware of this danger, hence they decided to reach an understanding to fight against any military-sponsored alliance.

     Consequently, the military has decided to unite all the pro-regime parties under one banner which led to the Grand National Alliance being created.

     Will the military be able to repeat its IJI success through the GNA? This is doubtful, for the following reasons. First, the IJI comprised of all the major parties except the PPP, which resulted in a two-way contest in the late 1980s. But today, the GNA does not include the religious parties, which were then a part of the IJI. All the religious parties currently are united under the Muttahida Majlis Amal (MMA), which is opposed to the military regime, due to the pro West policy of the latter, especially since September 11.

     Secondly, PML (N), the main faction outside GNA and is totally against the PML (QA), which is the backbone of GNA. Today, the Sharifs are willing to negotiate even with the PPP to defeat the PML (QA).

     Thirdly, the GNA is an alliance of parties and leaders with limited popular support at the national level. No doubt, Mian Azhar, Farooq Leghari and the Chaudhurys are powerful in their own constituencies, but they lack the charisma of Benazir and Nawaz. If the PPP, PML (N) and MMA fields joint candidates against these leaders, their personal victory itself may be difficult. Besides, there are serious personality clashes within the PML (QA) itself; the recent breaking away of Ejaz Haq from Mian Azhar is an example.

     Unless the military regime indulges in massive rigging, there is no way that the GNA would be able to form the government, even at the provincial levels, leave alone the national level. 

 
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