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#892, 8 October 2002
 
Elections in Pakistan
D Suba Chandran
Research Officer, IPCS
 

  Four factors will prove to be crucial in deciding the outcome of elections in Pakistan. First is the level of popular participation in the forthcoming elections. There has been a considerable decline in the voting percentage, ever since the first elections in post-Zia Pakistan. Though the 1997 elections resulted in Nawaz Sharif becoming the Prime Minister, it recorded the lowest voter turnout – around 35 percent. With Nawaz Sharif exiled and his party divided and defamed, it is not sure how many PML (N) voters of the 1997 elections would vote in the forthcoming elections.

  The other major party, PPP, when compared to 1993 elections, witnessed a 7 percent decline in its votes. The main reason for the PPP voters not exercising their franchise in 1997 has been that of corruption charges against Benazir Bhutto and the party as a whole. With its leader Benazir Bhutto disqualified from contesting elections and not being allowed to enter the country, participation of PPP (now PPPP) voters is also not sure.

  A related issue has been that of the popularity of General Musharraf and his military regime. Though the majority welcomed the coup in October 1999 and backed his initial actions, this support has declined considerably over the period. However, the crucial factor in the forthcoming election would be how much of anti-Musharraf support would turn into a pro-democracy demand, thereby rallying behind the political parties. An increased voter turnout would favour the political parties especially the PPP and PML (N); whereas a low turnout will favour the pro-military regime parties led by the Grand National Alliance (GNA).

  The second issue is how free and fair the elections would be. Political parties inside Pakistan, especially PPP and PML (N) have been alleging of pre-poll rigging. Some of the recent legal measures introduced by the military regime have been aimed specifically against Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif. The disqualification of Benazir Bhutto, Shabaz Sharif and Kulsoom highlight the regime’s efforts to keep the top leadership of both PML (N) and PPP away from elections. The Election Commission of Pakistan remains ineffective. Though it has issued many directives and recommendations to the military regime, they have not been taken seriously. Nothing much can be expected against the military regime from the Election Commission in the forthcoming elections either.

  The third issue is related to political mobilisation. There are three broad formal and informal alliances and understandings between the various political parties. First is that of two archrivals, PML (N) and PPP (now known as PPPP). Both have agreed to work together, without getting into an electoral alliance and an informal agreement has been reached to field joint candidates in select constituencies, especially against the leaders of GNA. The second alliance is that of the GNA, which is being viewed as the King’s party. The main constituent of GNA is PML-QA led by Mian Azhar and the Chaudhurys of Gujarat. Others include Farooq Leghari’s Millat Party, Sheik Ahmed’s Sindh Democratic Alliance (SDA) and some minor parties. The third alliance is that of Muttahida Majlis-i-Amal (MMA), including Jamaat-I-Islami, Jamiat-I-Ulema-I-Islam (Fazlur Rehman); Jamiat-I-Ulema-I-Islam (Samiul Haq), Jamiat Ulema-i-Pakistan, Jamiat-i-Ahl-i-Hadees and Millat-i-Jaferya Pakistan

  If the elections conducted are free and fair, and if the voter turnout is high, the PPP and PML (N) would win majority of the seats. PPP (now PPPP) still enjoys support at grassroots level in rural Sindh and rural Punjab, while PML (N) in urban Punjab. On the contrary, the GNA does not enjoy support at grassroots level, and the leaders of the alliance have limited influence and confined only to their districts. None of them have the charisma of either Benazir Bhutto or Nawaz Sharif. Besides, the GNA is riddled with internal divisions, as there are a lot of personality clashes. 

  However, if the voter turnout is less, and if the nazims are used by the military regime along with unfair practices then it would enable GNA to win enough seats to form a government, either directly or through manipulation. The MMA will remain ineffective, as it has always been. The religious parties always possess street power, but lack the voters support. Besides the personality clashes, the Barelvi-Deoband division will keep the MMA unsuccessful. In Sindh, the Muttahida Quami Movement (MQM) has kept its vote bank intact, and hence would be a powerful force in the province. It will not be surprising if the MQM forms the provincial government, with the SDA or otherwise.

  What would be the outcome of elections? There are three possible outcomes. First,  the PPPP winning enough seats and forming a government with the support of PML (N). In that case, the President and the National Security Council (NSC) will make ensure that the popularly elected Parliament and the Prime Minster remain ineffective. The second outcome would be that of GNA forming the government, in which case the military regime would have a complete free run in the internal politics, while getting kudos from the international powers for organising a free and fair election and installing a democratically elected government. The third outcome would be a fractured vote, resulting in hung parliament. In that case, the regime would keep the Parliament weak, pitting one against the other and proving its thesis that democracy in Pakistan needs further guidance. Either way, the military has nothing to lose and democracy has nothing to win. 

 
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