Home Contact Us
Search :
IPCS: Research Institutes in India
   

Nuclear - Articles

Print Bookmark Email Post Comment
#344, 24 March 2000

Widening the Nuclear Trigger

Sabil Francis
Research Scholar, JNU

No matter what is said about civilian control over nuclear weapons, technology will ensure that they will remain in more hands than one. Since a Pakistani missile can destroy New Delhi in five minute, the power to launch a nuclear counter strike against Pakistan will have to be dispersed. The Indian nuclear draft doctrine holds that the ultimate decision to launch nuclear missiles, will be a decision taken by the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, However, the demands of technology will make this difficult. Put it simply, if Pakistan attacks New Delhi with atomic weapons,  wiping out  senior government officials then a nuclear counter strike will have to be launched by relatively junior middle level army officers. The history of  the Cold War is instructive in this regard.

 

 

In the early years of the atomic era the nuclear key was firmly in civilian hands. U.S President, Harry Truman, who ordered the atomic destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki , in 1945 said in 1949: “As long as I am in office the nuclear weapon will be delivered into the hands of the military only by specific order.” He wanted nuclear control to be in the hands of the Atomic Energy Commission; but with advances in Soviet nuclear technology, it became impossible to keep the nuclear trigger in the of the President's hand.  The first US plan for a nuclear attack on the Soviet Union , drawn up in Oct.1945 recommended that the dropping of 20 atomic bombs on the biggest Soviet cities in the event of war. However, these plans had to be shelved when Soviet missiles gained the capability to reach the United States . In Eishenower's time a Soviet nuclear missile would take half an hour to reach the United States , but in the years this followed, that gap steadily decreased. As Washington came under the threat of being wiped out, the command over nuclear weapons  was decentralised.

 

 

By the 1960s, captains in the army, officers in change of the minuteman missiles, and even junior grade officers had the to launch nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union A 1959 Presidential order envisaged that nuclear missiles could be launched against the Soviet Union if “the urgency of time and circumstance does not permit a specific command from the President of the United States”. 

 

 

One of the key issues in creation of a US nuclear doctrine arose when it was discovered in the 1950s that the separation of command between various adjuncts of the military had resulted in the drawing up of separate war plans. This ensured that everyone was bombing the same target which led to the concept of “minimum deterrence” in 1949. The assertion was made that the US will “depend primarily upon a great capacity to retaliate, instantly, by means and at places of our own choosing”, of Curtis Le May, the commander of US strategic forces, said “If I see that the Russians are amassing their planes for an attack, I’m going to knock the shit out of them before they take off the ground” At the heart of the civilian-military tussle for control over nuclear weapons was the civilian need for a flexible nuclear plan that took into account the possibility of a negotiated outcome to a nuclear duel, and the military preference for quick decisive action to ensure that any war would be won by military rather than political means. 

 

 

Military planners also stressed an offensive rather than a defensive doctrine, which meant seizing the initiative. Such offensive plans called for pre-emptive strikes if the Soviet Union was actively considering a nuclear strike against the United States , a bigger budget, and a greater delegation of nuclear authority. Such plans favoured a total decimation of the Soviet Union . The same thoughts cannot be far from the minds of military planners in India and Pakistan . This is all the more dangerous, as the military is in power in Pakistan . The choice before both countries is to develop an arsenal that can decimate the other or rely on minimum deterrence. The former is much easier for India , the latter for Pakistan . Pakistan will eventually move to a position of minimum deterrence, but the question is will junior Pakistani officers concur? Destroying India , may seem attractive to them fortune prevented the Cold War from going out of control. The question is whether the same will hold true for South Asia , especially when the nuclear trigger is decentralised.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Rate this Article

Not Rated stars Ave. rating: Not Rated from 0 votes.
View comment(0)
POST Your Comment
No comment for this article
 
 
Article by same Author
The LTTE Network
LTTE and Tamil Nadu: A Nexus
The Uniqueness of LTTE's Suicide Bombers
Prabhakaran: Key to the LTTE
No Compromise in Sri Lanka
LTTE's Human Wave Tactics Redefine Guerrilla Warfare
The LTTE: Waiting to Strike?

 
ADD TO:
Blink
Del.icio.us
Digg
Furl
Google
Simpy
Spurl
Y! MyWeb
FacebookFacebook
 
Print Bookmark Email
 
 

The Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS) is the premier South Asian think tank which conducts independent research on and provides an in depth analysis of conventional and non-conventional issues related to national and South Asian security including nuclear issues, disarmament, non-proliferation, weapons of mass destruction, the war on terrorism, counter terrorism , strategies security sector reforms, and armed conflict and peace processes in the region.

For those in South Asia and elsewhere, the IPCS website provides a comprehensive analysis of the happenings within India with a special focus on Jammu and Kashmir and Naxalite Violence. Our research promotes greater understanding of India's foreign policy especially India-China relations, India's relations with SAARC countries and South East Asia.

Through close interaction with leading strategic thinkers, former members of the Indian Administrative Service, the Foreign Service and the three wings of the Armed Forces - the Indian Army, Indian Navy, and Indian Air Force, - the academic community as well as the media, the IPCS has contributed considerably to the strategic discourse in India.

 
Subscribe to Newswire | Site Map
B 7/3 Lower Ground Floor, Safdarjung Enclave, New Delhi 110029, INDIA.
Tel: 91-11-4100 1900, 4165 2556, 4165 2557, 4165 2558, 4165 2559 Fax: (91-11) 41652560
Email:
© Copyright 2012, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies.