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Elements for Comparison
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IPCS Report
(February 2003)
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CFR Report
(October 2003)
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Focus
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India-US
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US-South Asia (India, Pakistan, Afghanistan)
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Projection
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Time limit not specified
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Medium term through 2010
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No. of members involved
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9 + 17
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50
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Reasons for synergy
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End of Cold War, nuclearisation, 9/11, and war on terrorism
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End of Cold War
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Areas of convergence
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Religious extremism, WMD proliferation, arms and drugs smuggling, Asian stability, and energy security from Gulf, democracy
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Security in the Indian Ocean region, uncertain Asian power equation, terrorism, spread of WMDs, knowledge industries; also common ground in areas such as services, lowering industrial tariffs, and reducing restrictions on agricultural trade
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Areas of divergence
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Nuclear, US-Pakistan linkage
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Nuclear
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Political
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India should explore linkages within South Asia and neighboring regions to gain leverage with the US
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India’s best interest lie in not pursuing any strategic alliance or partnership with the US; a nuanced issue-based policy is best while broadening overall relations
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China is a priority in the India-US dialogue, as also dialogue on developments in Southwest and Southeast Asia
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Both countries should publicize and emphasize upon their respective bureaucracies to work for enhanced US-India cooperation
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Maintain and enhance official cooperation and dialogue in political, security, and intelligence areas
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Economy
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Economy provides a sound foundation for enlarging the relationship. But India:
- needs to further open its economy;
- strengthen its domestic economy; reform its internal administrative processes to promote the health of the Indian economy.
- establish a free trade area in South Asia to provide a stimulus to its growth.
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India should implement its economic reforms with greater vigor to promote more rapid growth; open its economy further to the global market by reducing administrative restrictions and other barriers to foreign trade and investment;
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India should review its system of price preferences for government procurement, prohibition of agents in the defence procurement area, using foreign bids only to pressurize domestic suppliers to lower their prices and so on;
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India must improve the competitiveness of its goods and work with special interest groups in the US to press its objectives;
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India must realize that the IPR regime can serve its interests; ensure compliance with its existing laws; a segmented view on IPR is possible (eg. promote IPR in pharmaceutical and IT but not in indigenous medicines);
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Flagging investment and savings rate requires attention; India’s infrastructure and services sector needs improvement to promote the investment climate; speed up its internal reforms; strengthen patent laws; emphasize the manufacturing sector.
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Both countries should intensify official and non-official dialogue on economic and trade issues (both bilateral and international); re-constitute a bilateral economic forum to permit more regular exchanges on investment climate, economic policy reform and trade; and negotiate trade agreement in services.
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US and other major trading countries have found it in their interest to appreciate India’s intellectual work power in the developing world at economic and trade forums
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On economic issues, it is in the US interests to show sensitivity to India’s concerns as a developing country; it is in India’s interests to avoid taking reactionary positions on reforms.
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A standard free trade agreement is not practical; instead focused agreement on services would be promising.
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India needs to rethink its negotiating strategies and not spurn the opportunities available to make bilateral deals on trade matters by linking it with banking and tourism; greater analysis is required of what deals and trade-offs are possible with the US.
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US should encourage its private sector to take a fresh look at India as a destination for direct investment.
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Military
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Service-to-service cooperation is worth pursuit in areas of Indian competence like counter-insurgency warfare, desert and high altitude warfare, adaptation of troops to fight in different terrains and weather conditions, and altitude-related illness.
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Greater attention required in areas like counter-terrorism, establishing new strategic framework, intelligence cooperation, assigning a role for nuclear weapons in the international system, and defence R&D.
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India should be careful not to rely too heavily on US cooperation in areas critical to India’s security. It should develop alternate sources of military supplies and further explore capabilities of India’s private sector.
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Treat India as a “friendly” country for granting export licenses for defence equipment.
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Ease restrictions on export to India of dual-use items that have civilian and military uses.
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Expand joint naval activities in the Indian Ocean to ensure that the sea lanes remain open and secure.
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Missile systems
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India should not foreclose developing its missile system, including ICBMs and SLBMs
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Instead of voicing reservations on the US missile defence policy, India could explore the possibilities of undertaking joint research projects with the US to develop missile-related technologies that would also have relevance for its own security.
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India should be prepared to adopt and implement tighter controls over missile technology.
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Task force divided opinion on providing missile defence system to India.
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Nuclear Weapons
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It is in India’s interests to let the nuclear issue remain on the backburner.
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Concern with the dangers of India and Pakistan using their nuclear weapons is less; urgent need for a serious dialogue; US should urge both countries to initiate nuclear discussions to seek agreement on nuclear CBMs, including establishment of nuclear risk reduction centres, to lessen chances of accidents, misperceptions, and misunderstandings that might trigger a nuclear exchange; nuclear risk reduction starts at the LoC.
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Belief that Bush Administration will accommodate a nuclear India within the international nuclear regime seems unlikely; but the US will need to accept India as de facto member of the international nuclear regime.
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US govt. should search for ways to accommodate a nuclear India and Pakistan within the global non-proliferation system; US should push for implementation of nuclear export controls.
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Space
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US should ease restrictions in the civilian satellite sector.
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People-to-People contacts
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Both governments should encourage academic interests on each other countries. NRI community could play a larger role to finance chairs and departments for Indian studies in the US; India needs to liberalize its visa policies towards foreign, including American academics; both countries need to encourage American and contemporary Indian studies in their educational and research institutions.
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Encourage US foundations, business and scientific and educations institutions to expand efforts to develop cooperative programs with Indian counterparts; their involvement would further broaden bilateral relations.
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Policy needed to channel the economic and political influence of the NRI community; need to encourage them to develop larger professional linkages with their counter parts in India and establish institutions to impart their knowledge and skills to Indian students.
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Indian Americans have become a significant bridge between the two countries.
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Parliamentary groups in each country can have a positive influence on the bilateral relationship and enhance greater understanding.
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S&T
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