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What if the US ratifies the CTBT? Debating India’s Options

D Suba Chandran
Deputy Director, IPCS
e-mail: subachandran@gmail.com

In his Prague speech, Obama mentioned categorically, that he would work towards getting the US Senate to ratify the CTBT. The general expectation amongst the non-proliferation lobby is that the US ratification of the CTBT will cause China to follow suit, which would then be followed by India, Pakistan and Israel.

There is not much of a debate in India, yet, on India’s options, once the US ratifies the CTBT. Undoubtedly, there will enormous pressure on India to sign the CTBT; the Indo-US nuclear deal will be used as a pressure point by the US vis-à-vis New Delhi. Or at least, this is what the American non-proliferation ayotollahs will expect of the Obama administration.

What should India do, if the US ratifies the CTBT and pressurize India to follow the suit? India may like to consider signing the CTBT, provided three of its basic security concerns are met. First, the primary objective of the US ratification needs to be clear to the international community. Why is Washington willing to ratify now, after blocking all such efforts in the past? Is the US serious about nuclear disarmament, as Obama mentioned in Prague, and therefore wants to ratify the CTBT as a part of its commitment? Or, does the US want to gain tactical advantage before the NPT RevCon in 2010?

If Obama is sincere regarding global nuclear disarmament, he is likely to pursue a path that he has outlined in his Prague speech, which included ratifying the CTBT, and working closely with Russia towards deep cuts in their existing nuclear arsenals. In fact, Obama himself hinted that these two events could be considered as benchmarks. If Obama is serious and there is visible progress in these benchmarks, India should consider it as a yardstick in signing the CTBT. This will be in tune with India’s longstanding demand that the CTBT should be a means to a larger goal of nuclear disarmament and not an end itself.

Second, more importantly, from an Indian perspective, developments in its immediate neighbourhood should be of greater concern, than the US ratifying or reaching a deep cut in the existing arsenal with Russia. Four countries in particular are of importance - China, Pakistan, Iran and to an extent North Korea. All four countries are in Asia and a part of India’s immediate and extended neighbourhood. The progress towards nuclear disarmament should not be seen merely as the US ratifying the CTBT, rather it should be seen in terms of how much the US along with other nuclear powers is able to convince/pressurize these four countries into signing and ratifying the CTBT. If there is visible development on this issue, then India should consider this a second yardstick for signing the CTBT. This will be in tune with its regional security interests.

Finally, the general expectation is that the US ratification will start a domino effect, with China, India, Pakistan and Israel following it. Presuming that US and China ratifies the Treaty and India following suit, will Pakistan sign and ratify the CTBT? Is Islamabad’s nuclear strategy so simple, that it is India-specific? Will Pakistan sign and ratify the CTBT, if India does? If the answer is in the negative, then there is no point in India signing the CTBT. India’s interests will be best achieved if the domino effect that starts with the US ratification, makes the full trip, and includes Pakistan, Iran, Israel and North Korea. If the movement is intended to stop with India, then New Delhi should ensure it stops actually with China.

If the above three yardsticks are met, then India should consider signing and ratifying the CTBT. Let New Delhi make its position and the yardsticks clear to the international community. India needs a CTBT debate, not based on nuclear nationalism, as happened during the 1990s and also not on the grand old hypocritical theme of global disarmament, as has been happening for the last six decades. Rather, it should be based on cold strategic calculation and also the effectiveness of New Delhi’s contribution to an international effort. Instead of merely harping on global nuclear disarmament or calling the present nuclear regime a failure or a failing one, India should move forward leaving aside the debates of the 1950s and 1990s. Haggling over a hypocritical statement is not the sign of a growing global power.

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