The germane question now arises: can
India
’s forward march to nuclear weaponization be reversed? Perhaps, not. Before
India
proceeds ahead to weaponization, however, the direct and indirect costs involved need adding up.
Naturally, the direct costs of a nuclear weaponization programme would depend on the type of nuclear force to be deployed. That would depend on the nuclear threats needing to be deterred.
Pakistan
?
China
?
United States
? As a referral point, however, it could be mentioned that
China
spent between $ 2.5 and 3 billion annually on its nuclear weapons programme during the initial years of its weaponization (1964-76).
India
might spend less, as it has met the costs involved in the development of nuclear devices. It has tested its Prithvi missiles, and is keeping them in storage. The Agni and longer-range missiles, however, would need adequate testing. Large resources would be required, especially if they are to be deployed in a land mobile, airborne and/or submarine-based mode.
India
could offset these costs by reducing the size of its armed forces, since they would shelter now under the nuclear deterrent. The bomb votaries have always stressed this argument. This could prove tricky, because the Army is extensively employed on counter-insurgency duties. And no reduction might be possible since the enmity of
China
has been ensured by the BJP’s anti-Chinese rhetoric. Consequently, the Sino-Indian border might get re-activated necessitating the divisions withdrawn from along the line of actual control to be re-inducted. This would add to the defence budget.
The indirect cost of the sanctions is another dimension of this problem.
Japan
has announced a suspension of grants and loan aid--estimated between $ 600 mn and $ 1 bn annually. The mandatory sanctions imposed by the United States under its Arms Export Control Act includes development assistance; military sales and exchanges; trade in specified dual use goods and technology; US loans, guarantees and credits; loans and credits by US banks to the Indian government; and support for India in the international financial institutions. It is unclear how much all this would add up to.
But the BJP establishment has taken heart from the discordant voices emerging from the developed countries, especially after the recent G-8 meeting in
Birmingham
. The hope is strong that the impact of the sanctions imposed would be cosmetic and short-lived. Simultaneously, calls have been issued by several BJP spokesmen that no price is too high to pay when national security is threatened. Dire threats of counter-actions have also been held out. These include, ceasing to repay loans, curtailing flights by foreign airlines into
India
, and exporting sensitive technologies to generate resources. The national budget, to be presented shortly, will indicate the BJP’s government’s overall thinking on these issues.
At this stage we have an unfolding situation. It is difficult to estimate the total impact of sanctions and their hidden costs. Like the increase in risk premia that foreign banks might charge on loans for operating in
India
. Or curbs that might be placed on
India
’s trade relations. Or transfer of technology. The counter-actions threatened could worsen the situation. Could a trade-off between sanctions and counter-sanctions be effected at some minimal levels to the satisfaction of all concerned?
For its part, the
United States
might appreciate that isolating
India
at this juncture will not serve its larger interests. It has somewhat belatedly appreciated
India
’s weight in the emerging regional and international milieu after the Cold War. It had also appreciated
India
’s nuclear restraint over all these years, despite grave provocations from
Pakistan
and
China
, and the glacial pace of nuclear disarmament. Despite conducting these nuclear tests
India
remains one (small?) step away from deploying nuclear weapons. This distinction is important since it uncovers the space that still obtains for an Indo-US dialogue. This suggestion derives from the recommendations of the Council on Foreign Relations that the United States seek a "closer strategic relationship with
India
", and "adopt a declaratory policy that acknowledges
India
’s growing power and importance…" It had also designated
Pakistan
as a "failed state". This fact also needs mention because US policies towards
India
and
Pakistan
have traditionally been fashioned in terms of a zero-sum game. Clearly the disappearance of
India
’s chief Cold War strategic ally--
Soviet Union
--and the latter’s withdrawal from
Afghanistan
provides new opportunities for the
United States
to evolve a more viable policy towards
South Asia
, in general, and
India
in particular.
This exercise must configure
China
into the equation.
India
must assume that Sino-Pak linkages will strengthen. The
Kashmir
situation could deteriorate. Will the
United States
join them to oppose
India
? Ostensibly to shore up the non-proliferation regime? The
United States
has premised its relations with
China
within a larger schema of forging a strategic engagement with that country. That includes elements of competition and collaboration in their bilateral relations. Could a similar Indo-US strategic engagement be pursued appreciating the changing structures and alignments in the post-Cold War world?
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