Nuclear - Articles

Islamabad’s nuclear linkages with Iran and its clandestine exports have featured in the world’s media in recent weeks. These have included links to North Korea and Libya’s clandestine activities as well. The latest evidence on Iran recently came to surface when it shared information of its nuclear suppliers with international regulators. The fact that Pakistan has been proliferating nuclear technology, equipment and material was suspected for some time; now it is exposed with conclusive evidence. European and American intelligence agencies and IAEA inspectors have confirmed that Pakistan is the source of crucial technology, key blueprints and equipment for a pilot Iranian uranium-enrichment plant. These revelations prompted the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to conduct an exhaustive investigation into the Iranian nuclear program. It was determined that Iranian nuclear blueprints depict a type of centrifuge with a striking resemblance to the Pakistani enrichment plant at Kahuta.

The earliest version of this centrifuge was devised by URENCO, a consortium of the British, Dutch and German governments. From 1972 to 1975, Abdul Qadeer Khan, popularly regarded as the father of the Pakistani bomb, worked as a metallurgist there. During this period, Khan had access to extremely sensitive centrifuge designs and obtained illegally a complete list of suppliers of high tech components from around the world.. In 1976, Khan returned to Pakistan. Subsequently, in 1979 the Kahuta Enrichment Plant was established at Kahuta that eventually began to enrich uranium with centrifuges based on the stolen Dutch design.

The blueprints obtained from Teheran reveal distinctive features similar to the ones made by Pakistan.. David Albright, a former IAEA inspector and US analyst asserts that the documents provided by Iran expose a secret procurement network that acquired innumerable sensitive parts and tools from several countries. IAEA inspectors have also found physical evidence such as traces of highly enriched uranium on the Iranian centrifuges identical with the material produced in Pakistan. Mounting evidence seems to indicate that Pakistan clandestinely transferred centrifuges to Iran in 1987.

Pakistani establishment has suggested the proliferation has been initiated by certain rogue scientists who have flouted strict export control measures. Its officials have stated that all sales to Iran might have occurred in the 1980s during the tenure of General Mohammed Zia ul-Haq. The pretence is that clandestine transfers have no governmental backing of the present leader – General Musharraf.

Pakistan has been deeply embarrassed by the revelations, but it merely blamed some rogue scientists for these acts. It then went on to debrief some of its leading nuclear scientists including A Q Khan and his close associates – Mohammed Farooq, Yasin Chohan and Syeed Ahmad. The aim may be to exonerate them from more serious crimes.

Nuclear entities and the scientific community in Pakistan now face the charge of being a hub of nuclear proliferators for nearly two decades. Despite Gen. Musharraf’s non-proliferation assurances given after 9/11, nuclear technology has continued to leak from Islamabad. In 2002, US spy satellites detected a Pakistani C-130 loading North Korean Missile parts in Pyongyang. In October 2003, Iran listed its suppliers to the IAEA who had assisted its clandestine uranium-enrichment programme. Some trails, it seems led to Islamabad. To ensure complete halt of nuclear exports, stringent governmental control need to be imposed over Pakistan’s nuclear laboratories which have powerful allies in Pakistan’s army and military intelligence agencies. It is also important to increase the accountability of the scientific personnel to prevent them from pursuing nefarious acts. Unless Islamabad tightens up its export control regulations and institute robust and dependable personnel, Pakistan will remain a source of proliferation threat to the international community.

What is of immediate concern to the world and India in particular is Gen. Musharraf’s claim that Pakistan is in full control of its nuclear programme. Blaming greedy scientists rather than the entire Pakistani establishment as rogue proliferators barely reduces the speculation about the security of Islamabad’s nuclear arsenal. Besides, the two recent assassination attempts on Gen. Musharraf also raises serious questions about whether the Pakistani establishment can ensure the safety of the country’s nuclear arsenal and keep it from the covetous reach of terrorist groups. The prospect of sensitive nuclear technology or weapon components falling into terrorist hands can spell disaster to the world.

Pakistan today is not a stable nuclear weapon state. Despite official assurances, Islamabad has remained a consistent source of nuclear proliferation. It is time Pakistan acts as a responsible nation and curbs nuclear proliferation because therein lies the real threat of a nuclear catastrophe.