General Musharraf created a controversy by making a statement in December 2002 that “In my meetings with various world leaders, I conveyed my personal message to Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee that the moment Indian forces cross the line of control and the international border, then they should not expect a conventional war from
Pakistan
(emphasis added).” (The News, 01 January 2003). What did Musharraf mean by that?
The News, in its editorial (“Unconventional wisdom,” 01 January 2003) interpreted that “General Musharraf’s use of the negative with “conventional” would mean “unconventional” and while the dictionary defines unconventional as simply something that is “not limited or bound down by convention”, in strategic parlance, it does refer to weapons of mass destruction.”
The Nation, linking his speech with the need for a full time COAS, was critical in its editorial (“Winning an unfought war,” 01 January 2003) that “by the unconventional method, as he explained later in the speech, he meant that the large masses of Pakistanis would surround the Indian Army to checkmate its moves. While the idea of people's participation has unquestionable strength, in principle, the point the President missed was that this strength can only be demonstrated if the nation is highly motivated, well prepared and enjoys unity of purpose. It would be a dangerous illusion were he to assume that Pakistanis at this stage stand like a rock behind him. Besides, his statement contains an implicit admission of inability to confront the Indians in conventional warfare. It is an acknowledged fact that only undiluted attention could tackle this serious shortcoming of the Army. A full-time COAS is the need of the hour, made urgent by the ever-hostile posture of our neighbour. The President should either make room for another competent General to take over as COAS, or give up his presidential assignment to devote his energies fully to providing the needed strength to the armed forces.”
Rasul Bakhsh Rais, extended the argument and wrote (“Pakistan’s nuclear posture,” The News, 11 January 2003) “What is most pertinent in case of Pakistan's nuclear posture is the question: Is Pakistan's first strike threat credible in the face of India's conventional preponderance and greater nuclear capacities? In order to answer this question we must assume that
Pakistan
's strategic environment is dynamic and may continue to change in two significant ways. First is substantial increase in
India
's conventional war fighting capability and greater numbers and assumed superiority of its nuclear arsenal. One may also argue that
India
has the economic and technological means that it would use to continuously upgrade its military capabilities both in conventional and nuclear spheres to keep
Pakistan
off balance or bleed its economy white by dragging it into an expensive arms race. The question then is how will Pakistan be able to pull the weight of this arms race, stay competitive or give practical meaning to its doctrine of nuclear deterrence?.” He concluded, “the central strategic message and logic of
Pakistan
's nuclear strategy is that
India
cannot impose a conventional war on it and push that war to any decisive point. Any such war will have to be another draw, wastage of resources and another wound in the already sour relations of
India
and
Pakistan
. By sending this message to India Pakistan hopes that Indian leaders would recognise the logic of nuclear weapons and not resort to conventional war because it would be un-winnable and inconclusive.”
Dawn, commenting on the exchange of data on nuclear installations, in its editorial (“Pointless rhetoric,” 6 January 2003) questioned, “Last week, the two sides exchanged data on nuclear installations. This is done every year as part of a bilateral agreement. Why confine it to that formal level? Why not talk on more substantive nuclear matters - like averting a nuclear war by accident and establishing a hot line? Unless tensions are lowered and angry polemics stop, there is a real danger that even a stray incident on either side could escalate tension and the two sides could find themselves locked once again in a face-to- face military confrontation.”
General Musharraf was quoted (Dawn, 9 January 2003) telling, "Our Command and Control structures, which have been in place for four years now, are water tight. We reject all such malicious stories and allegations comprehensively”, during a meeting, in which Hatf V Ghauri, Pakistan’ s Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile, was handed over to the Pakistan Army.
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