Press comments on the Pokharan tests on its first anniversary this year were less than ecstatic, even sombre and defensive. Many editorials noted with relief that
India
had weathered the economic sanctions, and was not politically isolated. A cautious optimism prevailed that the worst was over, and that
India
had got away with its nuclear audacity. That sense of national well-being lies buried now on the snowy heights of Kargil in
Kashmir
.
It is increasingly clear that the Pokharan tests were meant to serve the BJP's internal political agendas. But it secret enterprise shattered the domestic consensus that existed on
India
's nuclear policy of keeping its option open. The Congress is determined to deny the BJP any political advantage by displaying
India
's nuclear and missile prowess.
An overall deterioration has occurred in
India
's security environment. A state of non-weaponized deterrence, based on strategic ambiguity, was existing earlier between
India
and
Pakistan
; it had succeeded in defusing two serious Indo-Pak crises in 1987 and 1990. This deterrent state has undoubtedly acquired greater certainty after the Pokharan and Chagai tests. Thus
India
's extreme caution in not violating the LoC, despite
Pakistan
's intrusions into the Kargil area, is partly occasioned by the need to isolate
Pakistan
and firmly place it in the wrong. But this caution is also informed by
Pakistan
having established strategic parity with
India
. This was surely an unintended consequence of the Pokharan tests.
Besides, the no-holds-barred conventional conflict in Kargil reveals that it could not be deterred by nuclear deterrence. So what have the nuclear tests accomplished? How have they added to
India
's security? On the contrary, the Sino-Pak linkage has encrusted into a nuclear axis; this is evident from the consultations between the two countries that preceded
Pakistan
's tests and have proceeded during the Kargil crisis.
Turning to Sino-Indian relations of
China
's identification in Prime Minister Vajpayee's famous letter to President Clinton as " a state which committed armed aggression against
India
in 1962", which " has materially helped another neighbour of ours to become a covert nuclear weapons state" rankles in
Beijing
. India-China relations had steadily improved over the last decade; they are back in the freezer. The last much-hyped Joint Working Group meeting held in
Beijing
produced little more than a decision to resume their dialogue. Whether the impending Foreign Minister's visit to
Beijing
will yield any greater understanding remains to be seen.
In truth,
India
's case that
China
presented a nuclear threat to its security is hard to explain. There was no direct nuclear threat, although fanciful scenarios can always be conjured up. Besides, the India-China Agreement on Confidence Building Measures (1996) pledged both sides not to use their military capability against each other. It also visualised a reduction of forces along the line of actual control. This has been effected by
India
, and is difficult to square with the Chinese threat.
The indirect nuclear threat from
China
derives from its assistance to
Pakistan
's nuclear and missile programmes; this was officially brought to
China
's attention, but apparently to no avail.
India
could have retaliated by developing a military relationship with
Vietnam
or
Taiwan
. By exploding nuclear devices and proclaiming itself as a nuclear weapons power,
India
has constructed a strategic milieu where it faces two nuclear adversaries. Attack vectors can be visualised from the Northern Territories/Tibet that would make identifying the attacker difficult. How this likelihood can be countered will trouble military planners, but admits of no facile solution. Here, too,
India
's security milieu has worsened after Pokharan II.
That brings us to Indo-U.S. relations. There is much satisfaction in
New Delhi
with the Jaswant Singh-Strobe Talbott talks; a relaxation has occurred in the sanctions regime imposed after its tests. But there is nothing to suggest that
India
would gain access to the high technology that it wants in sensitive areas. These talks are, in essence, a damage-limitation exercise to discuss how
India
will implement the 'benchmarks' stipulated by Security Council Resolution 1172.
The most immediate 'benchmark' is that
India
joins the CTBT. Synthesizing a domestic consensus on this issue would be unrealistic given the political passions unleashed by the impending elections. Fortunately, there is no consensus either in
Russia
or the
United States
to ratify the CTBT. So
India
could postpone its decision to sign the Treaty as long as possible, then sign, and await its ratification by
Russia
,
United States
and
China
before proceeding further. An iffy ploy perhaps, but one which the BJP must consider to keep Indo-US relations in some state of repair, especially necessary after the Kargil conflict started.
The accentuation of
India
's dependency relationship on the
United States
contradicts the independence it sought with its nuclear tests; this further underlines the fecklessness of the BJP's Pokharan II adventure.
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