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India's Upcoming Vote on Iran in the IAEA

Dismissing the question how India would vote on the Iran question in the upcoming IAEA meeting on 24 November as hypothetical, the Government has said that it would be guided by the contents of the resolution, but assured that it would pursue the national interests. What are those national interests remains unexplained.

Should a worst case scenario be imagined what could be the IAEA resolution on Iran? Noting its up-till-now unsatisfactory responses to the IAEA's discovering its undeclared uranium enrichment activities, the IAEA could propose its case being referred to the Security Council, which could impose sanctions thereafter on Iran.

India dearly hopes the issue will not come to the vote, and that some, any, compromise solution will be found, since it finds itself between a rock and a hard place. It cannot offend the United States with the Indo-US nuclear deal being delicately poised at present. It cannot offend Iran, either, which could become a significant supplier of fossil fuels if the Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline project fructifies. Hopefully, Iran would blink, and accept the face saving Russian compromise formula, envisaging that Iran manufactures uranium hexafluoride; it would be converted into enriched uranium by Russia to fuel Iranian reactors; thereafter, the reactor spent fuel would be returned to Russia for safeguarding.

Should a compromise prove elusive and the IAEA resolution suggest that Iran's case be referred to the Security Council, what could be India's choices?

• India could vote in favour of the resolution alongside the United States and its allies as it did on 24 September.

• Or vote against it like Venezuela, the sole dissenter on the previous occasion.

• Or abstain, like Russia and China and Pakistan. This would easier than opposing the resolution and confronting the United States and its allies.

In a sense, the choice before India lies between progressing its nuclear energy programme with its long-term advantages. Or preserving its access to fossil fuels, desperately needed for its short and medium term requirements. Both sides of this question need attention. Currently, atomic energy provides only 3 per cent of India's total energy production of around 1,10,000 MWs, compared to fossil fuels that account for almost 80 per cent (coal 58% with oil and gas making up the rest). Even wind energy contributes some 4.5 per cent to India's energy requirements. In truth, the arguments in favour of nuclear energy are really a subtle plea for nourishing India's military programme, which has developed out of its atomic energy programme. Ideally, India should pursue both its atomic power programme and ensure adequate supplies of oil and gas by domestic production and importation. But, if a choice is to be made national interests would dictate that fossil fuel supplies should not be prejudiced. Iran, therefore, should not be abandoned in its hour of peril.

There is another way of looking at this question impinging on national interests. An examination of the Indo-US nuclear deal reveals its unequal nature. President Bush has promised to "seek agreement from Congress to adjust US laws and policies, and?work with friends and allies to adjust international regimes to enable full civil nuclear energy cooperation and trade with India, including?expeditious consideration of fuel supplies for safeguarded nuclear reactors at Tarapur."

India has reciprocally agreed to "separating [its] civilian and military nuclear facilities and programmes in a phased manner and filing a declaration regarding its civilian facilities with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); taking a decision to place voluntarily its civilian nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards; signing and adhering to an Additional Protocol with respect to civilian nuclear facilities; continuing India's unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing; working with the United States for the conclusion of a multilateral Fissile Material Cut Off Treaty; refraining from transfer of enrichment and reprocessing technologies to states that do not have them and supporting international efforts to limit their spread; and ensuring that the necessary steps have been taken to secure nuclear materials and technology through comprehensive export control legislation..."

How India will separate its civilian and military nuclear installations is currently in debate. Responsible US officials have clarified that this separation must be to their satisfaction before the US Congress could be approached to make India an exception under American laws on technology transfers. Naturally, the United States would need to go first before it could "work with friends and allies to adjust international regimes" and commence nuclear commerce with India. These modalities seem designed to gain entry and control India's military nuclear programme, using the leverage of nuclear cooperation in the civilian area.

Would India wish to pay these high costs to secure nuclear energy from abroad? If not, the choice in Vienna is clear. India cannot abandon Iran.