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#530, 25 July 2001
 
Fearing a Chinese nuclear attack in Arunachal Pradesh
Bhartendu Kumar Singh
Research Officer, IPCS
 

Ever since India went nuclear in 1998, the question has become critical for strategic analysts whether China would use nuclear weapons against India in any future scenario. Opinion on this issue is divided into two categories. The first group sees very little chance of a nuclear attack on India by China unless India fires the first nuclear salvo. The argument put forward by them is that China has a defensive nuclear doctrine and follows a policy of ‘no-first’ use of nuclear weapons against nuclear weapons states (NWS). This group sees China as a ‘satisfied power’ that is happy with its ‘status-quo’ position on the Sino-Indian border. India , therefore, figures very low in the Chinese threat cosmology and there is a very low probability of both countries going to  war over the border question. Even otherwise, the stakes are too low for China to use nuclear weapons in any such war, if it happens. 

 

 

However, there is another group that is apprehensive of the Chinese nuclear posture. They reason that there has always been a gap between China ’s policy and practice. The same holds true for nuclear weapons. From a country that used to denigrate nuclear weapons as ‘paper-tigers,’ China quickly gave up this practice the moment it acquired nuclear weapons. Further, if the border issue is not resolved, the Chinese attitude towards India could become more aggressive and China might resort to a nuclear attack in Arunachal Pradesh to ‘teach India a lesson.’ In doing so, China might justify its attack on various grounds. It may argue that it does not recognize India ’s rights to Arunachal Pradesh that rightfully belongs to China . In using nuclear weapons against its ‘own territory’ China may claim the issue to be a ‘domestic’ one, and may even dispute the fact that it has attacked India . It might even brush aside the allegations that it has violated the 1996 Agreement with India on Confidence Building Measures in the Military Field Along the Line of Control (LAC) on the pretext that Art. I of the Agreement only prohibit use of military capability and not nuclear capability.

 

 

In posing the bogey of a possible Chinese nuclear attack on Arunachal Pradesh, the second group is making a  narrow interpretation of the 1996 Agreement, apart from being grossly pessimistic and ignorant of international law.  Art. I needs to be read in a broader perspective; it also needs to be read alongwith other articles of the Agreement. The term military capability is a broad term that also includes nuclear capability. Art. I should be read in that spirit. As for the claim that China could dub Arunachal Pradesh  a domestic territory while launching a nuclear attack, Arts. II-VIII provides safeguards against such an eventuality. Article II of the treaty clearly stipulates that ‘pending an ultimate solution to the boundary question, the two sides reaffirm their commitments to strictly respect and observe the LAC in the India-China border areas. No activities of either side shall cross the LAC. Art. III commits both nations to reduce their military forces along the LAC to a minimum level. Art.V provides that no combat aircraft shall fly within ten km. of the LAC and that no military aircraft of either side shall fly across the LAC except by prior permission. If these provisions are read along with the 1993 Agreement to maintain Peace and Tranquility along the LAC, it becomes clear that China cannot explain its violation of LAC, as it is duty bound to observe and implement both the agreements signed by it.

 

 

Moreover, it is a known fact that the Chinese claim to Arunachal Pradesh is symbolic which China had been willing to barter for Aksai Chin under its proposals for ‘Mutual Understanding and Mutual Accommodation’. It is dubious if China is serious enough about Arunachal Pradesh to contemplate a nuclear attack. Even if it is assumed that China considers Arunachal Pradesh as its own territory, the truth is that both countries have taken steps to ameliorate the chances of China launching a nuclear attack. Respecting the LAC is a step in that direction.. 

 

 

After the 1962 War, both countries have managed to live together in a relatively peaceful atmosphere, despite the lingering border problem. Both countries have respected the LAC. In the last decade, both countries have developed a mechanism to define the LAC so that no untoward incident takes place. There is a high probability that the LAC may be agreed to as the final border between the two countries. Pending that, there is little possibility of China violating the LAC, leave aside the chances of a nuclear attack on Arunachal Pradesh. 

 

 

 

 
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