Nuclear - Articles

President Obama chaired the UN Security Council meeting that resulted in Resolution 1887 calling on states to abide by obligations under NPT. This presumably includes those under Article VI regarding ‘negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament,’ and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. This is in keeping with his agenda, outlined at Prague, of “America's commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons.”

In conveying India’s position on the Resolution its Permanent Representative endorsed Obama’s aspiration on ‘prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons and providing for their complete elimination within a specified time-frame.’ However, that the onus was on the US was evident from the statement that said, “It is clear that the international community would look to the countries with substantial nuclear arsenals represented on the Council for meaningful steps towards nuclear disarmament.” India’s position is thus quite clear. India agrees with Obama’s most quoted sentiment from his Prague address that “This goal will not be reached quickly - perhaps not in my lifetime.”

The global disarmament initiative can be expected to progress with India’s tacit support at least till the Non-proliferation Review Conference in May 2010. Any prospects of progress on a regional level are linked with those on the global level due to presence of China as a player in southern Asia. Given that India seeks notional parity with China and China, in turn, would wait for movement on the US-Russia nuclear front, the regional nuclear situation cannot be expected to change. However, the worsening regional security environment, the possibility of India figuring in both conflict dyads – with Pakistan and with China, suggests a South Asian track towards disarmament needs to be progressed irrespective of the global agenda.

A consideration of the actors and stakes involved would indicate whether this can happen. Some scientists of the ‘strategic enclave’ have already staked out their position for more tests. The strategic community will be busy watching the global scene and writing ‘I told you so’ editorials. Maximalists can be expected to lead the drive for maximizing fissile material stocks before the window closes. Academics would add a chapter to the disarmament syllabus. The military is content with the ‘triad’ that has something for all three. The politician is not likely to go out on a limb. The government is yet to recover from the limitations revealed at Sharm el-Sheikh. The NSA is reduced to cautioning the media against foreign policy determining levels of 'hype'.

A disarmament agenda is not likely to come about on its own. Redirecting the energies of these actors and institutions will be required. Scientists will need to be held accountable for delivering in the power sector, now that the nuclear deal has opened up new vistas. The military would be happier with conventional armament made possible by a speedier acquisitions process. The strategic community should be challenged to design contours of a peace dividend that it had visualized in the run up to nuclearization. With these three sectors quiesant, the less pressure on the political class can permit a reaching out to neighbours. The government can then proceed more firmly. Media too could then find fresh wind in its sails. A self-reinforcing loop can then bring a regional disarmament track alive.  

Such an agenda can be set if nuclear dangers in South Asia are openly discussed. Presently, reliance on deterrence is such that military strikes are discussed as a response option to another 26/11. With no ongoing talks to act as a buffer, such a response may be inevitable. The expectation that Pakistan is a rational state, one which has repeatedly proven false, may not withstand the test of conflict. With respect to China, the mutual ‘No First Use’ (NFU) policy is taken for granted. The chiefs of our armed forces have in the recent past hinted at the redefinition of China in Indian perceptions. China for its part, either to take pressure off Pakistan; in reaction or in cognizance of the subtext of the Indo-US strategic partnership, is making the moves that serve to justify Indian apprehensions. Given the importance of ‘face saving’ in any future conflict, rescinding of the NFU in a crunch situation by either side would be small price.

Proximity of nuclear dangers should be used to energize a peace and disarmament movement in South Asia. This can originate only in India. Pakistan, given the feisty media and middle class, is likely to catch on quickly. China would then have no recourse but revert to the bonhomie of ‘peace and tranquility.’ For this to happen, the peace discourse needs to become mainstream. Operating on the margins only facilitates its marginalization as ‘radical’ or ‘out of the box’. The key argument for a new peace discourse is that the break in the nuclear taboo in South Asia required for enabling disarmament, is now a distinct probability.