Nuclear - Articles

Decay of the Non-Proliferation Regime: Can it be Reversed?

Next only to the visible threats emanating from international terrorism, is the invisible danger arising from the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Indeed, a link is established between these two hazards via nuclear terrorism. And, yet, while the menace of nuclear weapons spreading to a larger number of state and non-state actors is growing, the non-proliferation regime continues to fade away, with the international community continuing to display a cavalier insouciance towards this likelihood.

Nothing else can explain the turmoil that marked the closing of the two-week long preparatory meeting in Vienna last week that was intended to organize the next five-yearly review meeting of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), scheduled for 2010. The first week was wasted in disagreements among the assembled 130-member States on drawing up an agenda, and the next week was spent on discussions that could reach no conclusions. At the heart of the divide in Geneva was the plea by the developing countries of the non-aligned group that an altogether disproportionate attention was being accorded to compliance with the NPT, notably by Iran while nowhere near enough attention was being paid to the directions in that Treaty exhorting the nuclear weapon states to move towards nuclear disarmament. These differences being fundamental in nature, no agreement was reached on even a closing statement being made by the chairman of the session. Ultimately his "statement" was downgraded to a "working paper"; even a "summary" describing the content of the discussions was not possible. The inability of the preparatory meeting to accept the chairman's text bodes ill for the future of the Treaty.

In truth, both the developing (non-aligned) countries and the nuclear weapon states are right in their assertions. The original bargain envisioned by the NPT when it was negotiated in the late sixties cannot be ignored forever; it provided that the non-nuclear weapon states would forswear their right to acquire nuclear weapons; and, in return, the nuclear weapon states would relinquish their nuclear weapons. Since the latter have not taken any worthwhile steps towards nuclear disarmament on various specious grounds, several developing (non-aligned) states have felt justified in seeking their nuclear option by clandestine means. On the other hand, the United States argues that countries like North Korea and Iran have cheated on their solemn commitments to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which prohibits them from acquiring nuclear weapons in perpetuity. This is an unexceptional argument, since non-adherence to freely undertaken international obligations could spell the end of any kind of world order. However, North Korea and Iran have argued that the United States has added to their insecurities, while reneging on its obligations to move towards nuclear disarmament. Indeed, after the demise of the Cold War it is difficult to justify the American possession of huge nuclear arsenals or its on-going efforts to develop new generations of nuclear warheads that are considered more reliable or can penetrate underground targets.

While these arguments have been bandied about ad nauseam in earlier preparatory and review meetings of the NPT, the ground situation is fast deteriorating. The growing need for atomic power, apropos, forebodes a rapid expansion in the availability of nuclear reactors to a larger number of countries, raising fears about their physical safety, and their possible diversion for military purposes. The A Q Khan episode also draws attention to a flourishing black market where nuclear equipment and materials are available for a price. Renegade nuclear scientists and engineers, who have retired from weapons laboratories, can simultaneously be hired to fashion nuclear weapons.

The possibility of nuclear weapons falling into the hands of extremists or failed and failing states, therefore, and the possibility of their using these weapons in anger or by accident is no longer unthinkable. Ominously, a meeting of experts concluded in San Francisco last week that local communities should, advisedly, dig shelters underground to protect themselves from the aftermath of a possible terrorist nuclear attack. Even more ominously, an exercise simulating the explosion of a 10 kiloton nuclear bomb over Indianapolis revealed serious shortcomings in the US response system to handle this emergency.

So, what are the steps possible to reverse this slide over the precipice? Several remedial measures have been suggested in past NPT meetings. However, the political will to implement them is clearly lacking. A larger responsibility naturally falls on the nuclear haves to move credibly towards nuclear disarmament; otherwise, larger numbers of nuclear have-nots will persuade themselves to acquire nuclear weapons. Gating the spread of nuclear technology can only work up to a point. Mitigating the reasons why nations seek nuclear weapons is a lofty, but eminently desirable goal. Difficult? But the alternative is a world of many nuclear weapon states spelling disaster for the world on purely statistical considerations.