Pakistan
’s nuclear tests made no adverse impact on
China
–
Pakistan
relations for two reasons. First, after the Indian tests on May 11 and 13,
Pakistan
was expected to provide a `matching response', and
China
was reconciled for any such eventuality. It was alleged that
Pakistan
's nuclear tests were done in collaboration with
China
. Since the 1980's,
China
was providing critical assistance to
Pakistan
's nuclear programme. Chinese entities have sold missiles and conventional weapons to
Pakistan
.
Beijing
has supplied
Islamabad
with M-11 medium-range missiles, capable of carrying a nuclear warhead, as well as the technology to build nuclear-weapons. On 9 April, 1998, the Defence Minister George Fernandes alleged that
China
had provided material assistance, including technology, to
Pakistan
for developing the intermediate range ballistic missile, Ghauri.
Pakistan
's Chagai tests, according to
China
, were a `response' to
India
's Pokhran tests, and not a prelude to the nuclearisation of
South Asia
. When Shamshad Ahmed, Pakistan's foreign secretary, rushed to Beijing for consultations with the Chinese leadership in the wake of the Pokhran tests, China agreed with Pakistan’s views that `India's nuclear explosions were a threat to Pakistan's security', and assured him that `China will not do anything which would not be in Pakistan's national security interests'.
Second, unlike Sino-Indian relations,
China
and
Pakistan
enjoy an `all-weather friendship' built on solid foundations. Since the early 1960s,
China
and
Pakistan
have `cooperated' and `coexisted' with each other due to their mutual conflict with
India
. Both have a common interest in opposing
India
- for
Pakistan
, the stake is national survival; for
China
, it is the need to check a major power that has the ability to challenge
China
and destabilize Chinese rule in
Tibet
. Moreover,
China
is sensitive over
Islamabad
's security concerns and did not allow the Chagai tests to affect the traditional Sino-Pak friendship.
Development after the Chagai tests
In the aftermath of Chagai, there has been no difference in the security relations of
China
with
Pakistan
, defence has continued to be the core sector of cooperation. While the world was criticizing
Pakistan
for its tests,
China
on June 1, 1998, quietly passed new regulations on export of sensitive nuclear technology to other nations. The primary motive was to facilitate the Sino-Pak nexus regarding nuclear and missile technology transfer. According to reports in the Washington Times, June 4, 1998,
Beijing
was busy selling weapons to
Pakistan
with little regard for their impact on the South Asian region. In August 1998,
Beijing
received General Jehangir Karamat, Chief of the staff of the
Pakistan
army.
This was followed by a five-day high profile visit by the Chinese Defence Minister Chi Haotian to
Pakistan
in February, 1999. The visit, which coincided with the Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Bajpayee's `bus diplomacy' to Lahore, was not a sheer 'coincidence', but a skilled display of Pakistan's time-tested friendship with China. The message was clear - any thaw in Indo-Pak strains would not be at the cost of
Pakistan
's friendship with
China
.
Apart from defence,
Beijing
and
Islamabad
do not share 'cooperative enthusiasm' in other fields. Actual trade between the two countries declined by 8% to $992 million in 1998-99 compared to the previous year, and
China
has not been very helpful in saving
Pakistan
from the heat of
U.S.
sanctions. The growing separatism in the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region (XUAR) of
China
has forced
Beijing
to seek
Islamabad
's help to contain fundamentalism in this region bordering
Pakistan
, although it is yet to be seen how the latter cooperates with
China
on this issue, given its internal political constraints.
For
India
, the continuation of the China-Pakistan collusion in the post-Chagai period will have an adverse bearing upon its security. Together, they form a 'nuclear arc' along
India
's borders in the West and North. The solution lies in taking concrete steps to improve ties with
China
and
Pakistan
. Conciliatory gestures by India to deny the 'China-threat theory'; increase in Sino-Indian trade by 5% in 1998-99 to $1.972 billions as compared to the previous year; and the `Lahore Declaration' in Pakistan are some of the steps which may lead to what Charles Osgood calls `Graduated Reciprocation in Tension - Reduction' (GRIT) along India's borders.
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