Nuclear - Articles

A Chinese Puzzle in Vienna

With the India-specific waiver finally making its way through the Nuclear Suppliers' Group (NSG), the immediate focus of China watchers has been on interpreting the perceived Chinese opposition to the Indo-US nuclear deal at the NSG. While the National Security Advisor (NSA) declared that India was "disappointed," others less diplomatic, have cried 'betrayal,' referring to earlier declarations by China's top leaders that it "would not stand in the way." In reality, very few in India seem to have actually trusted China or expected anything good of it in the IAEA and NSG deliberations, and there are, no doubt, many who felt vindicated by the turn of events.

The key event here, however, is not the Chinese 'betrayal' but of remembering what was achieved. The point remains that the Chinese did not scuttle the deal - something that was within their power to do. Chinese leaders, in fact, realized at an early date that there was very little they could do to block the deal given the importance of China's relationships with the US and India. To say that China appeared to have encouraged others in the NSG to put paid to the deal is perhaps carrying the argument a bit too far. Surely, India also needed to consider and address the views of the smaller countries on their own merits, with or without Chinese support for them. Indian diplomats would have known that any shortcoming in this regard, could conceivably be exploited by China. In the event, both India's diplomats and its leaders realized this and stuck to their task without wasting their time wringing their hands about any attempted Chinese sabotage. It was nobody's case that the Indo-US nuclear deal would pass the IAEA and NSG only on the strength of American diplomacy and pressure tactics. India too had a job to do and it did it, despite the obituaries on the deal being written by 'strategic experts' in New Delhi.

Meanwhile, in contrast to the Indian NSA's unhappiness, the External Affairs Minister (EAM) has appeared more sanguine about the Chinese role at the NSG by saying that "[t]his is their internal matter." The key word here is "internal." Perhaps, the EAM is not unaware of the pulls and pressures within the Chinese establishment on the Indo-US nuclear deal. Like any country, China has its hawks and doves on matters of national security and foreign policy. One must understand, for instance, that the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) does not function as its counterparts in India or the US do. Not only is the MOFA answerable to the Communist Party, the Ministry can sometimes be in the dark, as to what the military establishment is up to (as in the case of the Chinese ASAT test in January 2007) and its views are in reality often also of secondary importance to what the PLA has to say. It is likely there were differences of opinion at the highest levels of decision-making in China on how to react to the Indo-US nuclear deal and on China's options at the NSG.

In this case, China's powers that be probably decided that angering India a little was less of a problem than giving the view domestically that China had given the US and India (in that order) a walkover. Every action including China's original declarations of support, Pakistan's unhappiness, US pressure and Indian expectations, formed part of the larger tableau playing out within China. It was, therefore, surely no coincidence that the Chinese Foreign Minister was in India at precisely this time, when he would be most required, to smoothen ruffled Indian feathers.

If China did attempt wholeheartedly to oppose the deal, it certainly was aware that there would have been a price to pay, to mollify New Delhi. Even if the deal had not gotten through the NSG, China would have had to make up for it with concessions to India in other areas. This in itself would have been an achievement of these negotiations, even if most lay observers would not see it that way. Indeed, one can be sure that Beijing will extract its pound of flesh from Washington as well, for agreeing to the latter's requests, perhaps on Iran and North Korea. All of this is part of normal diplomatic maneuvering. Indeed, the NSA's statements and the Indian demarche to Beijing could well be interpreted as attempts to keep China off-balance and to avoid giving the impression that India owed China anything for the waiver. On the other hand, carrying this point still further, India could even have been helping Chinese moderates to convince their hard-line counterparts that if India has taken offense at the Chinese actions, then surely the Chinese delegation must have done its best to stop the deal. This sort of logic is nothing new and has been employed within India to counter the opposition of the Left and the BJP to the nuclear deal.

However, the time now is to look forward, not back in the interests of better Sino-Indian relationship. To that end, the fact that China went beyond narrow conceptions of strategic gain to let the waiver for India pass at the NSG and that the Indian EAM has refused to have words put in his mouth about any alleged Chinese betrayal are encouraging signs.