Naxalite Violence - Articles

Nayagarh Attack: Maoist Penetration in Orissa

In their trademark style, the Maoists launched multiple attacks in February on several places including a police station, a police training school and an armory in the Nayagarh district of Orissa. The attacks were executed by a group of 500-600 extremists that included cadres from the bordering states of Andhra Pradesh and Chhattisgarh, and carried out late evening when the policemen had let down their guard. How serious is the Maoist threat in Orissa? Which are the most sensitive areas and what is the significance of this attack in light of the growing Maoist problem in Orissa?

The most startling dimension about Nayagrah is that it had so far not been included in Orissa"s 16 of 30 Maoist-affected districts. The Maoist movement in Orissa has been most intense in its tribal districts (Gajapati, Rayagada and Malkanagiri in the south and Deogarh, Sundargarh and Sambalpur in the north), avoiding coastal districts such as Nayagarh. Seen largely as a spillover from the bordering states of Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand, all being severely affected by the insurgency, Naxalism, has nevertheless, managed to take root in these areas owing to the mountainous terrain that provides easy shelter to the Maoists, and the rich ganja cultivation in the southern districts that provides a lucrative source of income for them.

Recent developments however demonstrate their expansion into the coastal districts of Orissa as well. Among other issues, Maoist activity is largely centered on the agitation against mega industrial projects such as the POSCO steel plant in the Jagatsinghpur district and the TATA steel plant in the Jajpur district.  The Maoists have since then organized a number of road blockades in the region. Moreover, recent Maoist activity has also been noted in Cuttack and Bhubaneswar. These instances have compelled the state government to recommend the addition of coastal districts such as Jajpur and Keonjhar to the list of Maoist-affected districts in the state.

The eastern district of Nayagarh, barely 90kms from the state capital Bhubneswar, never figured in the state police intelligence radar. A mix of factors could be responsible for the selection of Nayagarh by the Maoists. For one, the district shares its border with the Gajapati and Kandhamal districts that have a heavy presence of Maoists. Moreover, the district has a very poor police presence. With a total geographical area of 3890sq. km., it has only nine police stations, that is, one police station for an area of 432sq. km. Another reason suspected by the police for the selection of Nayagarh is that it happens to be the hometown of one of the prominent Maoist leaders Sabysachi Panda, a commander of the Andhra-Orissa Border Special Zonal Committee. Reports claim that Panda has been making inroads into the thick cashew jungles that run from Ganjam district across the Daspalla forest in Nayagarh over the past three years. This exposes the weak intelligence network of the state. The attack on Nayagarh coupled with the above mentioned facts suggest an eastward consolidation of the Maoists in the state and indicate an attempt by the Maoists to link their southern and northern areas of operation together. This would in turn convert the entire eastern and coastal belt of Orissa into a Maoist hideout.

The attack has once again exposed the weak state security infrastructure in place in the Maoist-affected states. Besides, the state government"s counter-Naxal efforts have tended to limit themselves only to the Naxal-affected districts of the state. For instance, the state intelligence network had reportedly received information about possible Maoist attacks in Bargarh and Nabrangpur districts and, as a result, security was beefed up only in these districts, as opposed to throughout the state. Furthermore, other counter-Naxal measures including increasing the strength of the 84 police stations among the affected districts, deployment of four battalions of the paramilitary CRPF in the southern districts and upgraded training for its Special Forces with specialization on jungle and guerilla warfare have also been implemented only in the Maoist affected districts. Consequently, the state still suffers form an acute shortage of police personnel and weak security infrastructure. According to official estimates, the state needs additional 12000 police personnel and over 1000 more police stations in addition to the existing 482. Immediately after the Nayagarh attack, the government deployed an additional 600 CRPF men in the region, but given the slow pace of police reforms in the state and the dismal infrastructure, the gains of counter-Naxal operations threaten to be nothing more than short-term respite.

Above all, the most serious impact of the Nayagarh attack is the "surprise" element added to the Maoist strategy. By successfully attacking a hitherto unaffected district, the Maoists have substantially raised the level of the Naxal threat not only in Orissa but across the country. It has elevated the threat of such attacks against relatively unprotected areas in other Naxal-affected states. It is therefore extremely crucial for each state government to quicken the pace of the proposed security measures and build a strong intelligence network for the success of counter-Maoist operations.