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#430, 14 November 2000

LTTE and Tamil Nadu: A Nexus

Sabil Francis
Freelancer

War begins in the minds of men. But to wage war, they need weapons. This is the key difference between a successful insurgency like that of the Tigers in Sri Lanka and the failed one like that of the Tibetans in the mid-1950s. Very few rebellions have succeeded without the support of an outside power, to provide a steady logistical pipeline. For example, the US supplied $ 250 million worth of arms annually from 1980 to 1989 to the Afghan resistance when the battered Soviet forces withdrew.

 

 

This is the danger that Tamil nationalist groups like the Tamil Nadu Liberation Army (TNLA) and the Tamil Nadu Retrieval Troops (TNRT) pose as they forge links with the LTTE. The LTTE, which has fought the Sri Lankan army to a stalemate, is like a small nation. Since it takes upto 10 soldiers for every guerrilla to counter an insurgency, the hard-pressed Indian army could get bogged down in a southern insurgency if the LTTE supplies arms to the TNLA or the TNRT.

 

 

The TNLA is the armed wing of the Tamil Nadu Communist Party-Marxist-Leninist (TNCP-ML)—is an offshoot of the CPI (ML), which fell out with its parent group when it advocated the formation of a separate Tamil Nadu in the mid-1980s. 

 

 

The LTTE was formed in 1976, but only became a formidable force after 1983. It now is one of the world’s most powerful militant organisations. Indian support, after the 1983 anti-Tamil riots made the LTTE a formidable force. The Indian Government had set up training camps for the Sri Lankan Tamil militants in southern India and helped arm the LTTE. Prabhakaran was treated as an ally of India , provided a villa in Madras and an armed escort. After the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi, the LTTE network was smashed.

 

 

But, even after 1991, it was able to fight the Sri Lankan army successfully. The amazing resurgence of the LTTE after the assassination is explicable due to its extensive arms supply and money collection system (an estimated $4 million every month), and its ability to transport arms wherever it wants.

 

 

How can the LTTE help groups like the TNLA or the TNRT? These groups give the LTTE a chance to infiltrate India , much like a virus is able to penetrate the body’s defences. Though there are reports of the LTTE’s links with the PWG and the Kashmiri militants, what makes a TNRT/TNLA-LTTE linkup more dangerous is firstly the ideological bonding of Tamil nationalism. This converts such fringe groups into highly motivated fighters, one of the key factors for victory in guerrilla warfare, even against overwhelming odds, as the Vietnamese war showed. And the LTTE is one of the most motivated guerrilla armies in the world.

 

 

The second reason is that the LTTE can supply advanced weapons to the TNLA, TNRT, or outlawed bands like that of Veerappan. The LTTE’s ability to strike is phenomenal. Within a few hours the LTTE has the ability to concentrate a force of 5,000 cadres to attack a military facility anywhere in northeastern Sri Lanka or launch long-range deep-penetration operations, ranging from suicide/commando style attacks to bombings in Colombo . And the range of its weapons is formidable. With small arms cheap on the international market, it would be easy for the LTTE to fund a small war in South India —if it can find the right people.

 

 

The third reason is supply and logistics. At present, the LTTE sources its arms from international arms traders, re-routes them through Southeast Asia , and then moves them to the Jaffna peninsula. With the LTTE network in Tamil Nadu, and the links existing between coastal Tamil Nadu and the Jaffna peninsula, it will be easy for these weapons to reach South India . Mullaithivu is the hub of the Sea Tigers. Their fleet consists of cargo and passenger craft, two captured Israeli Dovra ships and an assortment of speedboats and trawlers. The LTTE also owns 12 ships through front companies registered in the London-based Lloyd's list. And it has a naval facility off Phuket in Thailand .

 

 

The logistics are therefore in favor of the LTTE, as it can supply arms through an established network. The only thing lacking was people ready to fight, and that is what the TNLA or the TNRT provides. 

 

 

 

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Article by same Author
The LTTE Network
Widening the Nuclear Trigger
The Uniqueness of LTTE's Suicide Bombers
Prabhakaran: Key to the LTTE
No Compromise in Sri Lanka
LTTE's Human Wave Tactics Redefine Guerrilla Warfare
The LTTE: Waiting to Strike?

 
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