Naxalite Violence - Articles

In terms of terror tactics, naxalism went one step further when the armed cadres of the CPI (Maoist) hijacked the 628 down Barwadi-Mughalsarai train on 13 March. The incident took place near Hahegarah station in the Latehar district of Jharkhand. The naxals may claim it as another feather in their cap but it signals testing times ahead for the state. They managed to do something new by striking at the largest public transport system in India by hijacking a passenger train. Of course, they have been targeting railway properties for quite sometime, but hijacking a train is something innovative, highlighting the unpredictable nature of red terror in India. A new pattern of Naxal violence on the pattern of unconventional warfare could be initiated.

It was on the evening of Monday that the guerillas stopped the train in a thick jungle between Hahegarah and Kumundi stations. Latehar Superintendent of Police (SP) Subodh Prasad said the Naxals probably boarded the train at Auntikheda, where the train halts unofficially. Immediately after taking control of the train, the Naxals roughed up the driver and snatched the walkie talkie of the guard and driver. There were at least three hundred passengers in the train who were robbed and remained at the mercy of the Naxals for the next twelve hours. However, they deserted the train early in the morning without causing physical harm to anyone, and before the arrival of the police. The CPI (Maoist) had called a Bandh on 13 March in Palamau Division comprising Latehar, Palamau and Garwah districts, to protest against the death of Palamau Zonal commander, Jagannath Mahato alias Jagannath Koeri. Koeri was killed on 3 March during Operation Thunderbolt conducted by the state police with the Central Reserve Police Force in Palamu. It was during this Bandh call that the Naxals managed to strike, of which the police had no clue.

Although there were no causalities, this episode raises some serious doubts about the preparedness of the state forces against the ultras. A strong intelligence network holds the key to counter insurgency measure. But leave alone prior information; even post facto information reached security forces after railway officials were alerted by the guard of another passing goods train. The Naxals however knew the exact whereabouts of the police force on the Bandh day and put their plan into action.

According to police reports the CPI (Maoist) cadres hijacked the train around 7.30 pm on 13 March and the security forces reached the site at 6.30 am the next morning. Why this delay? The explanation given was the fear of approaches being mined by the Naxals. Of course there was this danger, but in the prevailing situation the security forces needed to show greater resoluteness in their operations to restore public confidence in the police. The Union Home Ministry has released Rs 1098.52 lakhs to various Naxal affected states in 2004-05 to meet security related expenditure. The security forces must arm themselves psychologically to counter the changed strategy of Naxal movement. Clearly the Naxal movement is not a law and order problem, it is a socio-economic-political problem, but in the face of growing violent incidents the government needs to contain the violence. Its long term measures would yield results only when they reach the people and the security forces have a major role to play here.

There is an urgent need to understand the Psychology of Militancy and frame counter insurgency policies accordingly. It is clear from the train hijacking incident that the Naxals are working on a two pronged front. First, by raising popular issues like land, poverty, exploitation and corruption the Naxals want to establish linkages with the people. Secondly, by implementing their terrorist plan, like train hijacking, they want to show that there is no other way out. The success of any government strategy will depend on how successfully the government balances these two facets of red terror.