Fighting the Naxalites: CRPF is the Best Option
D Suba Chandran
Deputy Director, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies
email: subachandran@gmail.com
The Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), the primary paramilitary organization engaged in the anti-Naxalite operation has been under severe criticism. It has been accused of lack of leadership and planning, inefficiency, inability to cope with the situation and unpreparedness. How true and valid are these accusations? Given the situation, is there a better option available to fight the Naxalites?
First, the accusation that the CRPF lacks leadership at the highest level and at the middle level is totally untrue and factually incorrect. Today, next to the Indian Army, in terms of numbers, CRPF is employed all over India from J&K and the Northeast, to fight insurgency. There has been an exponential growth in the CRPF, in terms of the numbers and their deployment in the last ten years. Why? Does this mean, successive Indian governments have been funding and expanding an inefficient force? Inefficiency argument is utter nonsense.
So is the argument that the leadership of the CRPF, especially at the middle level is under- prepared or not suited to the occasion. Those who criticize them, would have never interacted with the CRPF leadership at the top and middle levels, or seen them perform in insurgency situation. Today, the CRPF has one of the most efficient leadership, especially at the middle level, is battle hardened, experienced and has sufficient exposure to fight an insurgency.
The problem however with the CRPF in the Naxal areas is related to space and patience. Each region in India, which is facing insurgency, is unique. What method works in J&K or Northeast might not work in the Naxal region. In fact, the success that the Greyhounds have achieved in Andhra Pradesh in fighting the Naxalites cannot be copy pasted onto Chattisgarh and Orissa. Any force, whether the military or the Greyhounds, if deployed in any of the Naxal affected region, will take time to adjust to the new environment, and evolve best practices. The Standard Operation Procedures (SOPs) can never be the same for all regions from J&K to Northeast.
In this process, the CRPF (or any other military/paramilitary unit) is likely to face initial failures. What the critics also do not appreciate is – the intelligence and operational smartness of the Naxalites. The Naxalites, who are fighting in these States may not have high-powered weapons like those militant groups in Northeast and J&K; but they are smart and shrewd to inflict maximum casualties.
More importantly, the CRPF is operating in a vacuum, where there is no governance. In fact, historically, these regions never witnessed any effective governance from the State. Delivery mechanisms from public health to legal institutions have been extremely weak, which is being exploited by the Naxalites. The people, especially the poor and the downtrodden are not with the State; worse, a sizeable population sympathize with the Naxalites and are a part of them.
What are the options available to the State, outside the CRPF? The local police are ill prepared to meet the situation. Police modernization is a process, which will take at least two more generations, if the political leadership is absolutely sincere. The option of deploying the local police is totally out of the question for the next twenty years. The governments in the Naxal affected States are neither willing nor capable to pursue the path of police modernization.Besides, the Police will have to cooperate between three more States, for the Naxal spread is not limited to one single State. The unfortunate reality at the ground level is that the police force is yet to evolve best practices to cooperate between two ‘thanas’ (police stations) within the same district; forget cooperation between the States!
Deploying the military and Air force is a much debated issue. It has been argued elsewhere that it is a bad option. (See “Countering the Naxal Threat-III: Use the CRPF and Avoid the Army)
CRPF today is the best option that is available. Other paramilitaries do not have adequate numbers to be deployed in the Naxal region. Nor do they provide the operational flexibility to the government. More importantly, CRPF is much in demand among the Union government, because it demands the least. For example, it will be extremely difficult for any government to deploy a force in a situation with a strict command: “Come what may, you will not respond.” Even if there are stones pelted and your writ questioned over and over again, and even if you have to take significant casualties, you will not respond. CRPF, in fact has been deliberately designed to be a soft paramilitary force that is willing to take damage and withstand. If someone accuses the CRPF of being soft, it does not make sense; because it is expected to be so.
The CRPF will take time to understand the Naxal environment and in the process may fail on occasions. This has been the history of all counter insurgencies; with all its technical superiority and military might, the US military has been accused of failure in Afghanistan. When compared, the CRPF is doing a much better job in a hostile environment. It may not have delivered so far. What is needed is better training and equipment. Also, more operational space and time is needed, for them to deliver. Presently, there is no better option.
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