Naxalite Violence - Articles

The response of Bihar and Andhra Pradesh to the Naxal’s threat needs to be analyzed. Studies for the 1995-2005 period have shown that even when the Naxalites boycotted elections in Bihar, they allowed their supporters to vote for the ruling coalitions, making a substantial difference to their fortunes. There is an understanding between the Naxals and the ruling coalition, (Rakesh Chaubey, ‘Democracy and Naxalism in Bihar’) resulting in no action by the government against the Naxalites.

On the other hand, while different governments announced ceasefire and entered into negotiations with the Naxals in Andhra Pradesh, it did not affect the evolution of the Greyhounds. The force continued to remain fit; the fighters were young and fit, led by experienced officers, and their training was special-jungle oriented. Motivation was a key issue; the government announced a substantial 50 per cent extra remuneration. But most important, was the intelligence back up. A force can go and tackle its adversary only when there is specific information as to the adversary’s strength and location. The Andhra Police have superb intelligence back up to deal with the Naxalites; this was not built in a day.

The Naxal bases in villages and towns and Universities became targets for the police. Importantly, the Naxals could not disappear into the jungles for safety anymore, as the Greyhounds could not only survive in the jungles for days on end like the Naxals, but could surprise the Naxals themselves in their hideouts! One example of this is the occasion when, in 2004, the Naxal leadership was surrounded by the police and Greyhounds in the Nallamala jungles, when talks between the State Government and the Naxals had failed. It was only with the intervention of the political leadership that the Greyhounds withdrew from the location, allowing the Naxals to go away. Similarly, sometime in 2000, three important Andhra Naxal leaders were picked up by the Andhra Police from a Bangalore hideout; such is the quality of their intelligence. Police Stations in vulnerable areas, which were targeted for killing Policemen and looting arms received special attention. They were fortified with proper walls and machine guns. Fearing the Andhra Police, the Naxal leaders are today leading movements in West Bengal, Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand and Bihar!

There is now talk of the army being inducted to fight the Naxals, after repeated deadly attacks on civilian, police and paramilitary targets, raising the pitch as never before. The Indian Army is a professional force, trained to engage and destroy the enemy, and is rarely deployed on law and order duties. When Army units are called to aid the civil authority, as envisaged in the CrPC, their role is mostly confined to flag marches through the affected areas, sending stern warning that the Army has arrived, and that arson and violence will not be tolerated. The moment order is restored, the Army is withdrawn. A distance is deliberately maintained between the people and the Armed forces.

If the Army is deployed, it will treat the Naxals and their supporters like any other enemy and would use all the force at its command to destroy that enemy. Though the IPKF was received with such warmth by the Sri Lankan Tamils when they first arrived in Sri Lanka, it did not take much time for the LTTE leadership to attack the IPKF units from places like hospitals, temples and markets resulting in heavy civilian casualties. The LTTE propaganda successfully made allegations of human rights violations against the Army, not only in India but in capitals of the world.  The Naxals would also adopt similar strategy to discredit the Army, and then criticism would flow, curbing the Army’s operations, and adversely affecting its morale.

Army deployments will not prevent Naxal attacks on trains and other civilian targets. Who will provide intelligence to the Army? They will pick up youth from the affected areas for interrogation, further alienating the people. Deaths in custody would lead to violent protests, and provide further recruits to the Naxals! The Army will ask for the Armed Forces Special Powers Act, as in the Northeast and Kashmir, which is a cause for alienation.

The only tenable solution is to strengthen the local police, set up Greyhounds-like units, with the same motivation, protection, training and intelligence support. It may take up to a year to do this, but this is the only way forward for a democracy like India. The Greyhounds of Andhra will certainly not achieve the same success in other states; each State will require their own Greyhounds-like units, which understand the local issues, language, terrain, people etc, and can exploit issues within the Naxals’ formations to achieve surrenders.

Surrenders are important to get the latest and best intelligence about the Naxals’ activities, including their hideouts. Intelligence is vital; a separate intelligence unit for dealing with the Naxals should also be set up, with co-ordination between the intelligence units of the States and the anti-Naxal units. These units should have extra pay, like the Greyhounds, special insurance package and housing so that the members do not have to worry about their family’s security. These units will successfully tackle the Naxals.