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Securing India's Coastline

In January 2008, the Union Home Ministry undertook a comprehensive review of the "Coastal Security Scheme (CSS)." The Scheme was launched in March 2006 for a period of five years with the aim of safeguarding the country's 7,516 km-long coastline along nine States and four Union Territories which is prone to illegal cross-border activities, including smuggling of explosives and infiltration by terrorists. In the comprehensive review, the Union Home Ministry indicated that the task of operationalizing 73 coastal police stations is still at a half-way mark with only 47 police stations having been made operational.

The CSS was formulated to enhance India's coastal security by strengthening infrastructure for patrolling and surveillance. To this end it envisaged setting up 73 coastal police stations, 58 outposts, 97 check-posts, and 30 barracks in the coastal areas. The Scheme also focused on closer coordination among the Indian Navy, Indian Coast Guard and Coastal Police in patrolling the coastline. With an outlay of Rs.400 crore for non-recurring expenditure, an additional Rs.151 crore for recurring expenditure like fuel, maintenance and repair of vessels, including training of personnel, was approved. Out of this, an outlay of Rs.329.52 crore for setting up the coastal police stations and equipping them with vessels, vehicles and other facilities had been approved.

Along with sustained security measures to secure the land areas against infiltration by militants,, India has now woken up to the challenges of addressing the vulnerability of its coastline to infiltration. The coastal areas in the western region have been more sensitive and intelligence agencies have voiced concern over the influx of Taliban-style militants into Indian states like Gujarat and Maharashtra. These coastal routes coupled with the land border along Nepal and Bangladesh are the most preferred routes of terrorists to infiltrate and smuggle in arms and explosives into Indian territory.

Coastal vigilance becomes all the more significant in the Indian Ocean since Maldives is also fast becoming a hub for terror activities. With Maldives offering easy entry to visitors, militant groups are able to send their activists to South Indian cities via sea routes. Intelligence reports suggest that the LTTE is using Maldives to ferry arms, run drug-smuggling activities, and send illegal migrants to work as spies.

Sea patrolling is a daunting challenge to security personnel, and an identification of the existing loopholes in India's coastal security can prove to be a valuable starting point towards addressing the same. While the Navy usually operates on the high seas and the coast guard patrols Indian waters between 10 and 30 nautical miles from the coast, the area from the coastline to 10 nautical miles is left largely unpatrolled. This unpatrolled zone has a high density presence of boats and vessels, which can ferry weapons to the shore and easily offload consignments on land. Another problem is the issue of apprehending the culprits in the event of a chase, since the vessels that the Indian Navy and Coast Guard use, make it difficult for them to chase small and fast boats in shallow waters.

With a major chunk of the focus directed towards Jammu and Kashmir and the Northeastern states, for decades, Indian coasts remained vulnerable to infiltration by militants. It may be recalled that the Palk Strait - the narrow strip of water that separates India from Sri Lanka, had been used by Tamil rebels for safe sanctuary in the 1980s, and more recently, this route was used to ferry arms and explosives from across the Arabian Sea, used in the serial blasts in Mumbai in 1993. In May last year, Defence Minister AK Antony informed Parliament that there were terrorists of various tanzeems (groups) being trained abroad and warned of the likelihood of these being infiltrated through sea routes.

Another vital reason for enhancing coastal security is the safety of nuclear, oil and gas installations along the coast. Some of the sensitive installations along the coast that are believed to have repeatedly figured in intelligence reports as likely terrorist targets include the Bhabha Atomic Research Center (BARC) in Mumbai, the Kalpakkam nuclear power plant near Chennai, the Bombay High offshore oil facility, the Chandipur-at-Sea missile-testing range in Orissa, and the Equatorial Rocket Launching Station at Thumba and Goa shipyard. These concerns were voiced by Home Minister Shivraj Patil at a conference attended by top police officials in New Delhi last year when he pointed out that some Lashkar-e-Toiba operatives were being trained specifically for the sabotage of India's oil installations.

Besides, since the sea accounts for 90 per cent of India's trade by volume, the safety of Indian waters is all the more crucial. For example, between April and December 2007, India's total imports and exports stood at Rs.1,000,000 crores. The Chief of the Naval Staff, Admiral Sureesh Mehta describing the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) as the de facto home of global terrorism where many regional states covertly or even overtly aid and abet subversive elements, called for an intensification of the security of coastal areas through the proper implementation of the CSS.