Panelists: Lt Gen V
Oberoi
(Retd), Vice Adm V Koithara (Retd)
Chair: Maj Gen D Banerjee
(Retd)]
Indian Army Doctrine:
Lt Gen V Oberoi
-
A doctrine should offer basic
guidelines for all arms and services. It should provide directional
principles, or an "approach" to warfare, that are judiciously interpreted by
military personnel.
?? It should be both enduring and dynamic, based on
current or achievable capabilities. It is not a blueprint for future
structures or plans.
?? It is not a concept of operations - it should
provide a philosophical framework of war-fighting, not the mechanics of
operations.
?? The new doctrine updates India's first publicly-released
formal doctrine of 1998.
-
Chapters 1 and 2 cover the
fundamentals of the Indian Army doctrine and warfare. In its discussion of the
principles of war, the new doctrine includes an addition: intelligence.
-
Chapters 3 to 5 constitute the core
of the new doctrine, covering all operational aspects, offensive and
defensive.
?? The new doctrine emphasises several operational factors,
especially force readiness, surprise and deception, the revolution in military
affairs, directive command, and mobility.
?? The doctrine treats special
forces as an adjunct to regular military operations; a framework for
independent, covert operations in sub-conventional war is conspicuously
absent.
?? The doctrine also covers operations other than war and
non-combat operations, such as aid to civil authority, disaster relief, and UN
peacekeeping operations. However, the doctrine fails to mention the prospect
of coalition operations.
-
Chapter 6 deals with logistics,
calling for a joint approach that maximises economy. It discusses the
"revolution in military logistics," an approach that is more
capabilities-based, flexible, and makes use of advanced information
technology.
-
Chapter 7 is concerned with
preparations for war, including force structuring, training, and intangible
factors like professional and military ethos.
?? The force composition
discussed in the doctrine is generalised and unchanged from the earlier
doctrine. It includes types of forces like strike corps, pivot corps, and
special forces, but conspicuously fails to mention nuclear forces.
??
The doctrine's discussion of training emphasises inter-operability, nonlinear
operations, and manoeuvre warfare.
-
General Oberoi concluded with some
general comments. He noted that the doctrine has a marked emphasis on
manoeuvre warfare.
?? He disagreed with the doctrine's suggestion that
the revolution in military affairs will have less of an impact on
low-intensity conflict operations. He pointed out that future concepts of
operations are not featured in the doctrine - it only mentions in passing
notions of future threats and battlefield environment.
?? The doctrine
focuses on conventional operations - while low-intensity conflict operations
and operations other than war are mentioned, they are not emphasised.
-
Finally, General Oberoi opined that
no part of the doctrine should remain classified. The purpose of a doctrine
should be to generate public discussion, therefore a wide dissemination is
important.
Maritime Doctrine:
Vice Admiral Koithara
The Admiral in his presentation did not go to the basics
regarding doctrines, their definition or differences with concepts as these
issues were dealt by General Oberoi.
The Naval doctrine was broader in scope, larger in spectrum and
was less detailed than the army doctrine. The last official doctrine was
released by the Indian Navy in April 2004. While there are no records of any
preceding doctrines from the Navy, there have been strategy papers and
directions from time to time.
The Maritime doctrine has a two fold function. It is addressed
to the Navy as well as at the other two services. The doctrine emphasizes the
Navy's role in the overall defence framework. It sets out the issues applicable
to the Navy in general and also lays out the basic concepts and attributes of
the maritime requirement. The point to emphasize here is that the maritime
doctrine is not merely the Naval doctrine, as the role of the Navy goes beyond
its functional military role into the realm of economics and diplomacy. The
doctrine is meant to guide the Indian Navy and chart a path for its future
developments with respect to force development and such issues. In Admiral
Koithara's view, the perennial problem of the Indian Navy is that the seat of
political power is New Delhi which is far removed from the seas and its general
culture does not understand maritime issues.
Mapping the increasing importance of the Indian Ocean, Admiral
Koithara pointed out the fact that the bulk of the world's shipping passes
through the Indian Ocean region between the Gulf of Oman and the Straits of
Malacca. India has a maritime advantage over all the littoral states in the
Indian Ocean region in terms of its strategic location. Increasingly, with
liberalization, India's maritime trade has dramatically shot up as a result of
the export-import orientation in policies as well as due to its energy imports.
It is through the Indian Ocean that 90% of India's gas imports flow. These
points explain the importance of the seas for India and therefore, that of
maritime security.
Extra-regional
Powers
The presence of extra-regional powers in the Indian Ocean has
always been a sore point for the Indian Navy. India's improving relationship
with the United States takes care of the presence of the US Navy in the North
Indian Ocean region. However, even this benign presence of the United States
restricts the actions of the Indian Navy in a region that India claims as its
own. Over $100 billion of China's trade passes through the Indian Ocean and this
is growing rapidly. It is expected that the Chinese will sooner than later
increase their presence in the Indian Ocean and that is most likely to be with
nuclear submarines. Pakistan is no threat to the Indian Navy but along with
China the two countries together can be formidable, especially once the Gwadar
port is operational. The last decade has seen the People's Liberation Army Navy
(PLAN) grow double in size.
Sea Control and Sea
Denial
The Maritime doctrine remains important for laying the
principle for sea-denial and sea-control. These are the two fundamentals
of Maritime security . Sea-control is an offensive posture where the seas are
under one's control and this requires air-support. Sea-denial is a defensive
strategy wherein extra regional powers should be denied access to the seas. This
is achieved more through submarines. The Admiral was of the opinion that the
India's objective should be to achieve sea-control, however, ground realities
today are different.
Littoral Warfare
In terms of actual military use the Admiral mentioned the
importance of littoral warfare primarily against Pakistan. Littoral warfare
could be used to throttle the enemy's Navy, it could support land operations and
also maintain a blockade. Against extra-regional powers, like China, littoral
warfare was not possible and the maximum the Navy could do was threaten trade
ships. The doctrine lays less stress on Sea Launched Ballistic Missiles
(SLBM's), but that capability is more than a decade away.
Admiral Koithara then went into various other issues of the
doctrine which were joint warfare, technology advances, operational changes, air
capability and amphibious operations. The Admiral, in his conclusion, pointed to
the growing international cooperation at sea among various countries of the
world outside the alliance system. The doctrine did not, in Koithara's words,
reflect any clear vision about the future.
Discussion
Questions &
Comments
1. Given that India has been invited to
join the PSI, how will Indian Navy function under it? How will the Navy be able
to contribute to limited warfare below a nuclear threshold like the
army?
2. Isn't acquiring of sea-based
technology fundamental to deterring the "extra-regional threats" that are
mentioned in the doctrine?
3. At the national level, the doctrines
become a mere set of guidelines because they are prepared in a void and do not
take into consideration factors like resource constraint or capability. At the
same time, there is no standard layout for the doctrines; for example, the Navy
covers a wider canvas, but it lacks specificity and is thus vague.
4. The world seems to be thinking in
terms of counter-terrorism and low intensity conflict (LIC), however, India
seems to be neglecting this as reflected in the Army doctrine.
5. This doctrine is realistic because
it is talking in terms of "today" and is thus not futuristic. The concept of
'Special Forces Operations' should be strategic rather than just "commando type
operations".
6. Proper understanding of the purpose
of the doctrine is very important on the basis of "what we have and what we
need". The days of strategic wars are over and today we need to talk in terms of
LICs. Inflicting harm on the enemy without going to war is the acme of strategic
leadership.
7. There is no jointmanship within the
three services thus resulting in a void and lack of networking which is
ultimately due to distrust of each other. This affects the doctrines which are
only theoretical pieces of work where tough issues are not tackled .
8. A doctrine is supposed to provide
some philosophy of national defense whether it is offensive or defensive, etc.
This lack of philosophy has left India helpless on many occasions like in 2002.
9. India has given a nod to the PSI,
but is yet to join it. PSI remains illegal in international law. How much
benefit will it bring to India?
10. The government has to be in command
and take the lead, otherwise, formulating doctrines is a waste of time, because
the armed forces are building capabilities that are not likely to be used. It is
due to a lack of government initiative that one has to operate in a strategic
void. It is for the strategic community, to demand of the government, a clear
national doctrine.
11. Till recently India had no
organisation for strategic thinking at the national level. We now have a
national security council staff which should be in a position to issue national
security policy doctrines after approval from the government.
12. This doctrine is completely
aspirational in terms of each service trying to outdo the other. Why talk of
RMA's when you do not have a revolution in personnel kit? At lower levels, the
soldiers are not even aware of doctrines, so what is the use? The internal
mechanisms play a more important role than the media in pushing for a national
security doctrine. Perhaps it may take a few years yet.
13. The new doctrine emphasises
maneouvre and network-centric warfare, which seeks to blind and paralyse the
enemy. But in a crisis or war between nuclear rivals, clarity of information and
communication is necessary to control escalation. How can the doctrine resolve
this conflict?
14. Advanced countries like the United
States and others have defense papers every year, why not India?
19. The Indian army's twin role of
maintaining external and internal security is a colonial legacy which must be
reconsidered. It is not amenable for a democratic country to have the army
functioning as the police through powers such as the Armed Forces (Special
Powers) Act.
Responses from the
Presenters
1. With the PSI there are two sets of
issues. Will we do what the US wants us to do, or should we focus on our own
interests? This ambiguity only leads to questions of interpretation of
international law.
2. To deter extra-regional threats,
there is no need for a surface based nuclear force. Rather, submarines that are
difficult to identify and missiles that are sub-launched are required.
3. The lack of a national security
doctrine does not mean that one is not thinking. The fact that there is an army
doctrine which thinks in terms of future conflict means we are planning for
these contingencies.
4. In India we are not talking merely
in terms of capabilities or resource constraints but in terms of "threats
approach". One must remember that doctrines are not about resources,
organisation, structure, etc.
5. As far as jointmanship is concerned,
in the army doctrine, only those aspects come in, in which the army can play a
role.
6. The army should have full
conventional war capability as well as to conduct LICs. However, the question of
emphasis on which is not dealt-with in the doctrine. The Army should be prepared
for full spectrum capability like the Americans.
7. The issue is not that of demise of
conventional wars when you're talking of limited wars. India has been fighting
limited wars since independence.