Home Contact Us
Search :
IPCS: Research Institutes in India
   

Military - Articles

Print Bookmark Email Post Comment
#1595, 22 December 2004

Menu for the New Chief

Firdaus Ahmed
Defence Analyst, Delhi

Lt Gen J J Singh, who has been designated to succeed Gen Vij as the new army chief from 1 February 2005, will have a tenure of about three years. Three years is a long enough time for a chief to make a lasting impact on the force. In their introductory and inaugural press conferences most chiefs spell out their priorities. These are generally about keeping the army well honed and in high morale. Since these yardsticks are difficult to measure, the success or otherwise of a chief in office is an exercise in subjective judgment on the outcome of some or other major initiative of his tenure.

Gen Vij for instance will be known to history as one who got the LoC fence through. Gen 'Paddy' has already expressed his preference for the proactive option in his post retirement book (India Checkmates America), an option he was denied while he kept the army ready on its starting blocks during Operation Parakram. Gen V P Malik barely retrieved his reputation by beating back the Kargil intrusion. Shankar Roychowdhury would not be known for much, since the Arjun tank does not amount to much, even though the army in his tenure was only 'Officially at Peace'.

Gen Joshi paid the price for a hard driving life in saddle for getting major initiatives as the Rashtriya Rifles through, though the jury is still out if that was a wise decision. Gen Rodrigues tenure saw Indian Army grappling with over-stretch, to ease which he was constrained to highlight that 'good governance' was also the army's business. Gen V N Sharma did well to pull the IPKF out, even if he would prefer to be remembered for his role as Eastern Army Commander in challenging the Chinese in 1987 at Sumdorong Chu. Of his predecessor, Gen K Sundarji, there is no denying that his main contribution to national security was in propounding a nuclear doctrine and preparing the army for the nuclear era. Against such line up of illustrious predecessors at 5, Rajaji Marg, there is little doubt that J J Singh would want to be known to history for more than being the first Sikh to head India's army.

Sam Bahadur in his inimitable style let it be known at the recent conclave of former chiefs that a chief has his own mind and could do without gratuitous advice. However, there is no escaping that J J Singh will have to contend with Kashmir. In the cases with earlier chiefs the situation was never as bright. Therefore, with due apologies to Sam Bahadur, Gen J J Singh would be well advised to set as target a draw-down in India's military engagement in Kashmir during his tenure, albeit one predicated on an improvement in the Indo-Pak relationship and the internal political environment in J&K.

That J J Singh has it in him to bring this about is evident from the unintended revelatory encounter with the press on being appointed chief designate. The General was caught on camera in an unguarded emotional moment on his stint in Kashmir when he had let off a newly wed militant on the promise of reform. This is the human face that could turn round the situation in Kashmir since the army is the ubiquitous presence of the Indian state in Kashmir.

An army press release on the adoption of a new counter terrorism doctrine has it that it would prioritize 'winning hearts and minds' in such situations. Institutionalization of such an approach, rather than leaving it to the level of liberality and enlightenment of officers, is the answer, rather than the army's efforts at media management to brush up its image. If Gen J J Singh manages to sell the doctrine to the hardliners within the force, it could, with an admixture of a Mizoram style political opening, bring about the end game in Kashmir. In doing so it could provide a telling counter to the K P S Gill doctrine of 'exhaustion', seen as India's only 'successful' military answer to insurgency so far.

Gen J J Singh, with a background in mechanized warfare having commanded a strike corps and the western army, would like to propel the army into being one of the RMA generation. This can only be brought about by Kashmir being off its agenda and the finances so released being directed into a down sized tech savvy force subsequently.

The first ever Indo-Pak talks at official level on conventional forces and CBMs recently concluded in Islamabad provide an interesting opening. With Pakistan having access to arms as a major non-NATO ally of the US and with it arriving at a modus vivendi on the conventional imbalance with India, its need to keep India tied down in Kashmir will recede.

With infiltration levels down, talks on with both Pakistan and with dissidents in Kashmir, no chief ever had it so good. Thus Gen Singh will have a lot to answer for in case, as he hangs up his spurs, the situation is back to square one in keeping with the unfortunate pattern in Kashmir.

Rate this Article

Not Rated stars Ave. rating: Not Rated from 0 votes.
View comment(0)
POST Your Comment
No comment for this article
 
 
Article by same Author
Rescuing Tribal India: The Nagaland Model
AFSPA in J&K: Why should it go?
Interrogating Security Expansionism in India
Compellence, Deterrence or Defence?: Saxena Task Force and India’s Defence Reforms
After Osama - VII: Should New Delhi Engage Pakistan or ‘Wait and Watch’?
An Indian Anti-Nuclear Peace Movement
Revisiting Intelligence Reform
The Indian Army: Organizational Changes in the Offing
Blast from the Past - The Varanasi Explosion
AfPak: Beginning of an End?
India’s COIN Policy: ‘Peace Preceding Talks’?
Jammu and Kashmir: Need for a Political Solution
Countering the Naxal Threat-IV: Military as an Option?
Revisiting ‘1971’
The Bright Side of ‘Asymmetric Escalation’
Questioning Defence Spending
India at 60: Acquiring Escape Velocity?
Making Obama's War Also India's
An Issue in Civil-Military Relations
Disarmament in South Asia
Emulating the US
The 'Vision Thing'
Kargil: Ten Years On
From ‘No First Use’ to ‘No Nuclear Use’
Agenda for the Next Government
Rethinking Civilian Control
A Strategy for ‘Af-Pak’
Not Quite an Empty Threat
The Counter Narrative on Terror
National Security Adviser: Reviewing the Institution
A Roadmap for Kashmir
Afghanistan: Appraising the Future
The Lesson from Sam Bahadur's Triumph
The Myth of 'Weapons of Peace'
Getting it Right: Rereading India's Nuclear Doctrine
Reconceptualizing Internal Security
Musharraf and the 'TINA' Factor
Understanding Minority-Perpetrated Terrorism
For a Return to Lahore
The Day After 'Cold Start'
Haldighati II: Implications for Internal Security
Tackling Intervention in South Asia
Querying India's Grand Strategy
Kargil: Back in the News
In the Line of Fire: Pakistan Army
Pakistan's Possible Nuclear Game Plan
For a Paradigm Shift
Addressing the 'Central' Issue
'No' To 'Cold Start'
The Price of Malgovernance
The Price of Misgovernance
The Police and the Example of the Armed Forces
Missiles and Crisis Stability
Widening the Discourse on Terror
The Post-Parakram Peace Agenda
Indian Peacekeeping in Iraq?
The ‘Peace Initiative’: A Tactical Gambit
The Sole ‘Lesson’ of the Iraq War
Muslim India as ‘Threat’
For a Return to Clausewitz
Preparing for ‘Limited Nuclear War’
The General Did Not Bite!
Lessons from India’s Kashmir Engagement
The Logic of Nuclear Redlines
A Smoke Screen Called Limited War
‘Terrorism’ and Intellectual Responsibility
The Need to Revisit Conventional Doctrine
Moving Beyond Realism
Lessons from the Present Crisis
The Impetus behind Limited War

 
ADD TO:
Blink
Del.icio.us
Digg
Furl
Google
Simpy
Spurl
Y! MyWeb
FacebookFacebook
 
Print Bookmark Email
 
 

The Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS) is the premier South Asian think tank which conducts independent research on and provides an in depth analysis of conventional and non-conventional issues related to national and South Asian security including nuclear issues, disarmament, non-proliferation, weapons of mass destruction, the war on terrorism, counter terrorism , strategies security sector reforms, and armed conflict and peace processes in the region.

For those in South Asia and elsewhere, the IPCS website provides a comprehensive analysis of the happenings within India with a special focus on Jammu and Kashmir and Naxalite Violence. Our research promotes greater understanding of India's foreign policy especially India-China relations, India's relations with SAARC countries and South East Asia.

Through close interaction with leading strategic thinkers, former members of the Indian Administrative Service, the Foreign Service and the three wings of the Armed Forces - the Indian Army, Indian Navy, and Indian Air Force, - the academic community as well as the media, the IPCS has contributed considerably to the strategic discourse in India.

 
Subscribe to Newswire | Site Map
B 7/3 Lower Ground Floor, Safdarjung Enclave, New Delhi 110029, INDIA.
Tel: 91-11-4100 1900, 4165 2556, 4165 2557, 4165 2558, 4165 2559 Fax: (91-11) 41652560
Email:
© Copyright 2012, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies.