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Defining India-US Defence Relations

Pranab Mukherjee and Donald Rumsfeld signed the Defence Framework Agreement in Washington on June 28. It defined the parameters of strategic cooperation between the world's oldest and the largest democracies for the next ten years.

It is a major development that goes well beyond the Agreed Minutes of Defence Relations signed in Delhi in January 1995 by William Perry and Mallikarjun. That agreement evolved after a deliberate assessment of the emerging global order by both sides. It was obvious even to the Cold War warriors of that era that there were insufficient reasons for continued mutual distrust and distance. The Minutes outlined the framework in which defence cooperation would develop, guided by a Defence Policy Group and a Joint Technology Group. Structured and sustained dialogues subsequently led to an intense military to military cooperation that we witnessed in the last three years.

The new Agreement lists the shared security interests of both countries and identifies thirteen specific areas of cooperation. These span a wide range that include; military tactical cooperation, maritime coordination, enhanced strategic and intelligence exchanges, countering proliferation of WMDs, peacekeeping and disaster management, and collaboration in defence research, technology and trade.

This agreement has been several years in the making since 1998. Strobe Talbott and Jaswant Singh dialogues set the tone. Former Prime Minister Vajpayee assiduously cultivated it during his visits to the US. President Clinton's visit in March 2000 to India finally ended the debate in the US in India's favour. The Bush administration had a positive approach to India from the beginning, but the war on terror diverted it. Colin Powell's isolation in the administration and his own gaffe in defining Pakistan as a non-NATO military ally even as he kept India in the dark, were obstacles in the process. But these were minor aberrations in an overall positive movement. Just as the unfounded fears that a Congress government in India will once again turn to the sterile ideas of non-alignment.

The Agreement is a comprehensive blueprint and fulfils Vajpayee's idea of an India and US that are "natural allies". In helping India become a 'major world power' in the 21st century, this agreement will augment India's military strengths, which along with economic and political strengths constitute the principal elements of power in the world. Today, there is bipartisan support in both India and the US to this burgeoning relationship. Principally because it is based on shared values, common national interests and matching foreign policy objectives, even though they differ both in specifics and intensity on some issues.

Four factors will determine whether this will truly emerge as a long term strategic partnership. First, is the conduct of the global war on terror. India has been an early victim and through trial and error has developed responses and capabilities which it will need to now share more effectively with the US. This will also impose burdens on Delhi even as it serves its national interests. Washington too needs to evolve a more viable counter-terror strategy based on international cooperation and long term commitment. The war in Iraq is only one part of a conflict that will be long drawn and whose duration will be measured in decades. It will also assume forms we are not entirely familiar with now and can correctly predict. This endeavour will test the skills and resources of both nations for the long haul.

Non-proliferation of WMDs is an immediate concern as the next level of terrorism may well encompass this threat. India's active participation is vital for the success of a non-proliferation regime and its implementation, particularly in Asia. Modalities of this cooperation both among themselves and with the international community will have to be framed as a matter of high priority.

Global energy security is an issue that concerns not only India and the US but the world. Ensuring it will be high priority for both countries. This has several dimensions; from developing alternate fuels, diversifying sources, assuring safety of supply routes, ensuring security of regimes with high energy reserves and others. India's geo-strategic location endows it with a high potential to play a role in many of these areas. It also imposes high responsibility. Cooperation with the US in developing strategy, expanding options and enhancing capabilities will be an immediate priority.

Finally, there is the question of maintaining stable relations with China. Beijing's growing economic and political influence particularly in Asia will not allow it to be contained and it is patently against both Indian and US interests to even attempt to do so. It is important that this trilateral relations between India, China and the US remains stable and in equilibrium. Any distortion will be neither stable nor to the advantage of any country. Maintaining this equilibrium will need constant attention. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's visit to the US less than three weeks after this agreement provides an excellent opportunity to build on it. This will necessarily address issues of economic and political partnerships.