In September this year, Taiwan repelled a mainland attack of Trojan Horse viruses on its government computer systems. Chinese hackers had introduced more than a score different Trojan Horse programs, into the networks of ten private high-tech companies on the island that then spread into at least 30 different government agencies and 50 other private companies. Among the world's largest computer hardware and software producing bases, Taiwan’s information resources are highly vulnerable to such Chinese offensives.
While there was a time when China would have been unquestionably at the receiving end of a web-based conflict between the two sides – Taiwan's computing abilities are still among the best in the world – the mainland has rapidly shored up its abilities since 1999. It was in that year that Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui’s seminal, “Unrestricted Warfare†was published. The work was inspired by the Taiwan Straits crisis of 1996 when the mainland was very clearly put in its place by American carriers patrolling the seas as Taiwan conducted its first free presidential elections. The authors, senior colonels in the PLAAF and the PLA, while examining diverse viewpoints from Martin Heidegger to Norbert Wiener, laid down their idea of what constituted “warfare in the age of globalizationâ€Â. Heralding a revolution in Chinese strategic thinking, the work acknowledged for the first time, a new battlefield in the realm of cyberspace.
It was also in 1999, that the then Taiwanese President Lee Teng Hui put forward his "two-state theory". In addition to the flurry of diplomatic invective that passed between the two entities, hundreds of web sites on either side of the Taiwan Straits were also hacked and defaced. While Taiwanese authorities had then warned that hacking even a Chinese web site was illegal and threatened its hackers with prosecution, a year later, cyber warfare was part of Taiwan’s annual war games for the first time. In fact, officials stated that the military had been testing the viruses for several years. The PLA too chose the same year to complete its first full-scale simulation of a virtual war.
With budgets running into billions of dollars, the PLA has assiduously prepared to fight a future war in cyberspace with Taiwan and the West. Attacks on American, Japanese and South Korean systems among others, have been traced to China. The PLA has regularly simulated computer virus attacks in its military exercises and Chinese companies with strong links to the PLA have also acquired the latest computer technology from the US. In addition, much work is being carried on in the field of miniaturized weapons using nanotechnology and superconductors. This October Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense declared that China was planning to use "paralysis warfare" against Taiwan in the future. One of the components of this form of pre-emptive warfare is information warfare, critical in slowing down both Taiwanese reactions as well as possible American intervention. Nevertheless, the PLA is still a long way off from carrying out its intended goal of disrupting Taiwanese military and civilian infrastructures or American deployment using cyber tools.
In an adversarial situation, the smaller power is usually the one that adopts high-technology or unconventional weaponry to counter threats from its bigger neighbour. But in this case, it is China that is the smaller power and Taiwan under the US umbrella holds the advantages. However, the fact remains that Taiwan is currently also caught in a politico-military bind over the question of military modernization. Despite encouragement from the US, Taiwan’s conservative military has often stalled calls for the modernization of its conventional forces for fear of jeopardizing its dreams of realizing a united China. Taiwan’s C3I, surveillance and reconnaissance systems have been especially affected. A Pentagon report has predicted that the balance of power will shift in China's favor as soon as 2005, if Taiwan continues on its present course. While on the one hand, Taiwan’s cyber warfare abilities can also suffer in such a situation, it is also possible that the private sector or reformist elements within the government and the military can continue to keep Taiwan cyber sharp.
Cyber warfare will in the future, be as critical as air supremacy is today, in disrupting and destroying the enemy’s lines of communication and critical infrastructure. This form of warfare will more and more be an essential component of achieving “shock and awe†effects against the enemy. The Chinese seem to be learning their lessons pretty fast from American tactics in the two Gulf wars and the Kosovo conflict in between. The Taiwanese need to remain on their toes.