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#3178, 5 July 2010
 
Violence in Kashmir: Is the Conflict Transforming from Militancy to Civilian Unrest?
D Suba Chandran
Deputy Director, IPCS
email: subachandran@gmail.com
 

Conflict is never unilinear. It transforms – for the better or worse, depending on the major actors, their current strategies and the government’s counter strategies, besides the ability of the security forces to bring the situation under control.

The recent violence in Kashmir valley should be seen from the above perspective in terms of conflict transformation from militancy to civilian unrest. At the outset, it is essential to understand, that ‘violence and unrest in Kashmir’ may not actually reflect the actual ground situation. The violence is primarily centered on Srinagar and Sopore; however, the chances of it spreading towards other towns of Kashmir valley, and then to rural areas cannot be overruled.

In terms of cross-LoC infiltration and terrorism, there is a marked decline in the activities, despite the recent efforts to increase infiltration and a few militant attacks and encounters. In terms of numbers, there is an increase in militant related violence, but compared to 2008 and 2009, this number is insignificant.

With the Indo-Pak dialogue all set to resume, one is not sure, whether there will be a revival in militancy. With the Hizbul in tatters and Jaish fighting along with the TTP in FATA and Southern Punjab, it is unlikely that there will be a major initiative from these two groups. Lashkar needs to be watched; can Islamabad afford to let Lashkar carry out large-scale terrorist attacks now, given the fact there is international pressure including from New Delhi?

The question – will the militancy revive in Kashmir, needs to be answered separately; the focus of this article is to analyze the changing nature of violence – from militancy to civilian unrest. Two issues are clear in the ongoing violence. First, it is led primarily by the youth, expressed in the form of stone pelting against the security forces, primarily the CRPF.

Why are the youth stone pelting, for what reasons, and who is behind them? The answers are not difficult to find. Many closer to the Hurriyat suspect, that the PDP is playing a dirty game and is willing to sacrifice few youths, to create instability, so as to make Omar Abdullah’s government look ineffective. This is to show the Union government what they can do, if they are kept outside the government. While a section of the Hurriyat is happy with the ongoing unrest, it is also equally apprehensive. It is happy, because the ‘Kashmir’ issue is back under the limelight at national and international levels, pooh-poohing Delhi’s claim that everything is under control. At the same time, the Hurriyat is also apprehensive, for it fears, it may not be able to engineer or alter the course of events.

What goes on in the minds of the youth, who are actually pelting the stones in the streets? Do they not understand the designs of the PDP and the Hurriyat? Or do they believe, that this will lead to a movement resulting in Azadi? Informal interactions with the youth clearly reflect that the anti-Indian feelings have not subsided, and form the core of their hatred. It is unfortunate, that New Delhi believes, by pumping more funds, it can address this hatred. It is also unfortunate, that New Delhi believes after the successful elections in 2008, the situation in J&K is normal. Lastly, it also believes, based on the numbers in the last few years, militancy has declined, so the situation is good.

This is precisely what angers the youth even more – Kashmir unrest is not just about militancy and violence, as New Delhi wants to believe. This anger is now turning the youth against the security forces, whom they consider the most visible face of New Delhi in the Kashmir valley. To make matters worse, some of the recent issues relating to human rights violations – both real and imaginary, have further fuelled the fire.

This is where, the second issue, also becomes important – the failure of government and the security forces, to impose their writ. How can the people be made to respect a curfew? What can the security forces do, if youths come out in hundreds to disrupt the curfew, and attack the security forces? While it would be easy for researchers and human rights activists to advice the CRPF to pursue restraint, what can they do, if they are being physically targeted and beaten up?

The unfortunate truth is that the breaching of curfew is purposefully orchestrated by few leaders, to invite injury (even fatal); invariably few youths get shot. Those puppeteers then devise a larger strategy to use the ‘murder of innocent youths’ to invoke the larger civil society. The funeral procession of these youths is larger than the initial group that pelted the stones. In Kashmir, the funeral processions have become even more violent and political, creating a vicious cycle.

Whatever may be the nature of current unrest and the failure of government to handle this, it is certainly not totally spontaneous. There is a clear orchestration and those who are behind the unrest want this to spread to other towns and rural areas as well. This will be another sad leaf in the history of violence in Kashmir.

 
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