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#1276, 15 January 2004
 
Pakistan’s Defence Expenditure and Kashmir
D Suba Chandran
Assistant Director, IPCS
 

An important observation of the report is the linkages between defence expenditure and Kashmir conflict. The report comments: “The Kashmir conflict is also used by the military to justify high defence expenditures, including Pakistan’s acquisition of nuclear weapons..” If this is true then would the Pakistani military like to resolve the conflict? In this case then resolving the conflict is directly against the interests of Pakistan’s military. Pakistani military may like to use Kashmir conflict as a reason to further its interests inside Pakistan, but that may not be the real reason. As mentioned earlier, Kashmir conflict assumed importance only in the late 1980s, whereas by then it was believed Pakistan had nuclear weapons.

India and not Kashmir is the real reason for Pakistani military’s need to maintain the necessary defence expenditure. Kashmir is only a symptom and not the disease. Irrespective of resolving the Kashmir conflict military’s struggle for dominance inside Pakistan would continue. So would be its hostility towards India. Pakistan may like to live in peace with India but never it’s military. Why should it?

Pakistani military think otherwise. They think India would not remain a peaceful neighbour irrespective of resolving the conflict. The report quotes a serving general: “If we (Pakistanis) think, after resolving the Kashmir dispute, India will live with us as a peaceful neighbour, we are gravely mistaken.”

How far would the Pakistani military go in compromising?

From an Indian perspective, it is essential to analyse how far would Pakistan be willing to compromise on Kashmir. Musharraf recently announced that he would be willing to discard the UN resolutions. No doubt, Musharraf may be sincere in his dialogue offer and a composite negotiation. But how much would he be willing to concede?

The report published much before Musharraf’s discarding UN resolutions statement, quotes Niaz Naik mentioning the same. Niaz Naik, who was involved in a track II level discussions with India before the Kargil conflict was quoted telling that the military leadership might abandon “Pakistan’s long standing insistence on a UN sponsored plebiscite for Kashmiri accession to either India or Pakistan and agree on a compromise solution if India were to offer reciprocal concessions.”

Pakistan’s willingness to abandon the plebiscite option only reiterates its underlying efforts in Kashmir under the veil of “Kashmiris and self determination”. Right from the beginning, Pakistan wanted to annex Kashmir to its side and the UN resolutions and plebiscite were only used as rhetoric and for political purposes. How far Pakistan’s military would be willing to go on Kashmir? What would be acceptable to as a final compromise? Or, what would not be acceptable to Pakistan’s military?

The report is perceptive: The military is not likely to accede to Indian or international pressure to accept transformation of the LOC, as presently constituted, into the international border. However, it could be willing to consider combinations ranging from the retention of the LOC as a temporary border until resolution of the dispute to territorial adjustments that work to mutual benefit.

The report makes it clear that the Pakistani military is aware of the international pressure to maintain the status quo on the border permanently. Especially, since the 1998 nuclear tests and the follow up Kargil conflict the international community, especially the US has made it clear that alteration of border through force is not acceptable, if the attempt is made either by Pakistan or by India. The international community is not only against any Pakistani efforts of using force across the border, but also against India, as could be seen from the pressure during 2002 confrontation. Clearly maintaining the status quo is in the interest of India and would be happy to do so forever.

This is why Pakistani military is under pressure to reach a compromise with India, before the American interests in Pakistan subside. In other words, Pakistani military would like to reach an agreement when they have certain leverage over the US. Pakistan is also aware, the American interest is them is limited to the capture of Osama and an acceptable level violent governments in Afghanistan.

 
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