Jammu & Kashmir - Articles

In his recent article in the Indian Express, (21 August 2010) K Subrahmanyam, has written that a realistic approach is to “encourage Kashmir leaders to collectively evolve a solution” and then bring it to New Delhi. Few days later, Chidambaram, Indian Home Minister, in his meeting with the Directors General and Inspectors General of Police in New Delhi said “We are concerned that we have not been able to stop the vicious cycle in which that state is caught…it is my hope that, in the next few days, we would be able to find that elusive starting point.”

But where is the problem? Is it the lack of consensus? Or the failure to recognize, the existing consensus by New Delhi? Is the situation, so vicious, that finding a ‘starting point’ is so tough?

A ’Kashmiri’ consensus, undoubtedly, will be the most sensible approach and is much needed. It will not be easy to find; there are three different regions (Jammu, Kashmir valley, and Ladakh) with numerous distinct regions within themselves. Neither are the three regions monolithic, nor the communities that live there. As Subrahmanyam has also commented, the political parties – regional and national have different perspectives, besides numerous smaller political and social organizations in these three regions. The PDP and National Conference are substantial regional parties, with significant differences amongst them; so are the differences between the BJP and Congress. Political parties based in Jammu region and Ladakh have always accused New Delhi of listening only to the voices from Kashmir Valley, and absolutely ignoring them. And then there are separatists and the militants in Kashmir valley.

But then, is the difference amongst numerous actors the only reason from evolving a regional consensus on what needs to be done in J&K? The real problem is not the lack of consensus or the failure to find a starting point, amongst the different actors in J&K. Of course, given the differences and deep fault lines, between the regions, political actors and religious communities in J&K, such a consensus will never be complete and unanimous. But, still there has been consensus in the past, in fact, even during the recent past.

What then is the problem vis-à-vis a ‘Kashmiri’ consensus? The real problem is in terms of New Delhi recognizing this consensus and taking appropriate measures. Consider the following two consensuses in the last ten years – the first one, in the legislative assembly of J&K, and the second one, at a larger level, ironically initiated by none other than our PM himself – in terms of the Round Table Conferences and the Working Groups. How did New Delhi react to these two consensuses?

Led by the National Conference, the J&K legislative assembly passed a resolution demanding autonomy in June 2000. If New Delhi tells the entire world, that it does not consider the separatists (or the militants) as representing the will of the people of J&K, because the real representatives are elected directly by the people, then what the legislative assembly passes as a resolution should be considered as a consensus.

New Delhi and the rest of India may have issues in totally accepting what is being put forward by a State. Those outside J&K may not agree with the entire resolution; but still, this represents a consensus, hence should have been publicly debated in the Parliament. There may be sections of this resolution, which may be totally unacceptable, sections totally acceptable and others debatable. The then government should have allowed a national consensus on the Kashmiri consensus. Instead, the cabinet decided to reject, as it found the entire resolution ‘unacceptable’.

During his first tenure, Manmohan Singh initiated a series of Round Table Conferences during 2006-07, and appointed five working groups on issues including governance, cross-LoC interactions, economic development, and the center-state relations. Prominent persons, including Mr Ansari, India’s Vice-President today, have been invited to head these working groups; invitations were sent to various political parties and organizations. Except the separatists and the militants, the rest of J&K took part in this exercise; all five groups have published their recommendations.

Was the above exercise not an attempt towards finding what the people of J&K want? Were those reports of five Working groups not considered as consensus? What did New Delhi do, to its own initiative to find a consensus? What has been the action taken on these consensuses? Nothing. Absolutely nothing.

Of course, one should be thankful to New Delhi, for not making these reports confidential and locking them in a bureaucratic maze. Perhaps, this is a part of its decision to do nothing with the Working Group reports!

The real problem in finding a consensus and a starting point in J&K is not related to the absence of it, or the differences within different regions and communities. Rather, the problem is with New Delhi in recognizing what already exists, not in some abstract terms, but in black and white. In fact, that could be the elusive starting point, which the Indian Home Minister is searching for. Let him begin with what already exists; as a confidence building measure, he could unilaterally announce the withdrawal of AFSPA, in the urban areas, at least in Srinagar. Ashok Bhan, a former DGP of J&K police, in a separate article, “J&K: In Search of a ‘Starting Point’ to Break the Impasse," has called for the same. Neither the police nor the CRPF need the AFSPA to maintain law and order.