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#569, 4 September 2001
 
Kashmir: Issues and Actors
D Suba Chandran
Research Officer, IPCS
 

Kashmir became an issue between India and Pakistan in 1947, when Pakistan sent tribesmen and its own troops to capture Kashmir, which was then ruled by Maharaja Hari Singh. Muzafarabad was captured on 22 October 1947. When the troops from neighboring Patiala proved inadequate to face the threat, Maharaja Hari Singh appealed for help to Lord Mountbatten, the then Governor General of India, and later signed the Instrument of Accession with India. 

Accepting this Instrument of Accession, Mountbatten added a caveat to the effect that the people of Kashmir should ratify it. Thereafter Indian para-troopers were dispatched to Srinagar. On 1 January 1948 India lodged a complaint with the UN. The UN Security Council adopted a resolution on 13 August 1948, which had three parts: the first called for a cease-fire between India and Pakistan; the second called for the withdrawal of Pakistani troops from the disputed area which was to be followed by withdrawal of troops by India, except for a minimum force required to maintain law and order; the third stated that the future of Kashmir would be decided “in accordance with the will of the people”. Except for the first part of the resolution, there has been no progress regarding its other two provisions. 

Following the Indo-Pak war in 1971, India and Pakistan agreed at Shimla, that “neither side shall unilaterally alter the situation”. The situation inside Kashmir started deteriorating since 1989. India has been accusing Pakistan for abetting terrorism inside Kashmir ever since. 

There are at least four major actors involved in the conflict – the governments of India and Pakistan, the Kashmiris and the militant groups operating in Kashmir. The Indian Government’s position on Kashmir is focussed on the following aspects:

·                     Jammu and Kashmir is an integral part of India since its accession; hence the crisis in the state is India’s domestic affair;

·                     Pakistan should vacate the territory that it has illegally occupied;

·                     Any future discussion on the position of Kashmir shall only be undertaken within the framework of the “Indian Constitution”;

·                     Any discussion on Kashmir with Pakistan will only be held under the terms of the Shimla agreement, which envisages a bilateral negotiatory framework.

Pakistan’s position on Kashmir is based on the following perceptions: 

·                     The accession of Jammu and Kashmir to the Indian state was not final;

·                     The people of Kashmir should decide the future of Jammu and Kashmir and its accession to the Indian state through a plebiscite;

·                     Since the bilateral framework has not worked between India and Pakistan, third party mediation should not be ruled out

The third major actor in the conflict, the Kashmiris, does not constitute a monolithic entity. The Indian Kashmir comprises of three distinct regions – Jammu, the Kashmir Valley and Ladakh – and has four major ethnic communities – the Sunni Muslims, constituting the majority, the Kashmiri Brahmins, called “pandits”, living in the Jammu region, the Buddhists, living in the Ladakh region, and the Shia Muslims, settled around Kargil. Besides, Kashmiris live in Pakistan occupied Kashmir (referred to as “Azad Kashmir” by Pakistan), with their capital in Muzzafarabad. Elections for the State Assembly were held in the Indian Kashmir in 1997, and the National Conference is ruling the State of Jammu and Kashmir ever since. The All Party Hurriyat Conference (APHC), a conglomerate of more than 20 parties, has never participated in the state elections but claims to be the sole representative of Kashmir. Within the APHC, there is no unanimity regarding the objectives of the party; one section aims to make Kashmir an independent country, whereas the other section aims to become a part of Pakistan. The State Government recently passed two resolutions in the State Assembly that focused on acquiring more powers to the State from the Centre and devolving powers to the various regions. The Union government has rejected the State autonomy proposals. 

The various militant groups operating inside Kashmir constitute the fourth actor in Kashmir. They do not belong to any single group and they could be classified into three different categories. There are many differences within these three categories in terms of objectives, means, local support and ethnic constitution. The first category comprises of indigenous militants, who are fighting for an independent Kashmir; the Hizbul Mujahideen, belongs to this category. The second category comprises of mainly Pakistanis, whose objectives are larger than the Hizbul. For this group, it is a “jehad”, whose final objective is not the independence of Kashmir but the establishment of an Islamic Caliphate; the Lashkar-e-Toiba belongs to this category. This group has its own finances, mobilized both inside and outside Pakistan and as such is not totally dependent on the Pakistan government for its “jehad”. The third group belongs to the mercenary category and comprises mainly of Afghans; the Harkat ul Muhajideen belong to this category. Though there does exist an unified command for these different militant groups, the differences among them are many. 

 
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